Fragments of Cities

The New American Downtowns and Neighborhoods

Larry Bennett

Larry Bennett's *Fragments of Cities: The New American Downtowns and Neighborhoods* examines the social consequences of both the new approaches to downtown design and the physical upgrading of residential neighborhoods.

Bennett draws upon lively case studies—ranging from Detroit's Renaissance Center to New York City's SoHo to Chicago's Wrigley Field—to relate physical redevelopment and urban social life. He demonstrates that a small, well-located delicatessen can bring people together while clusters of multi-million-dollar office centers in renovated downtowns can drive them apart.

Bennett's evaluation of contemporary urban rebuilding, which is unique in giving equal attention to the political, economic, and social impact of urban design and rebuilding, is frequently pessimistic. He finds that the gentrification of many big-city neighborhoods and the design strategies characterizing new downtowns do little to promote street life, unplanned social encounters, or public life in general. Bennett also contends some advocates and practitioners of the much-praised neighborhood movement have chosen isolation and local security as their primary goals, thus echoing in their concerns the physical plans developed by urban designers. In contrast, Bennett argues, both groups should embrace a vision that encompasses the entire city, or they will risk losing some of the best things cities encourage—surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic participation.

Bennett does find cause for optimism in the designs of some particularly innovative architects and planners, and he praises the broadening initiatives taken by many residents acting independently to give life to their cities. American cities face a crossroads, he says, and must choose between becoming genuine communities or a series of isolated zones.

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For Robert B. Bennett
and
Alec C. Bennett, alias THE SNAKE

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Preface

This book began a number of years ago in Philadelphia. I was visiting a friend there and had the opportunity to spend a day walking around the city's central neighborhoods. I had gotten to know Philadelphia initially during the mid-1970s while I was doing graduate work at Rutgers University, but in the few years since I had moved from the East Coast to Chicago the city had changed dramatically. Trying to account for the changes I was observing that day in Philadelphia, and which were taking shape across the country in other big cities, set in motion my work on this book. In its first drafts the manuscript quite explicitly sought to extend Jane Jacobs's analysis of American cities in the 1950s to the emerging cities of the 1980s, but as I rethought and reworked the project it took new directions. Ultimately it became the normative assessment of contemporary urban design and of the effects of urban rebuilding on neighborhood-level politics that now holds center stage in the completed book. Since the 1950s, scholars studying American cities have produced a rich body of work. It is my wish that the present volume makes at least a small contribution to extending the reach of this literature.

Acknowledgments

In writing this book I have benefited from the insights and comments of a number of colleagues. Bob Beauregard, Susan Fainstein, John Harrigan, Clarence Stone, and Harry Wray read portions of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. At the end of the writing process, Zane Miller's very close reading of the entire manuscript permitted me to clarify my comments on a number of topics. Ann Durkin Keating also read the next-to-last draft, and I wish to thank her in particular for suggestions that greatly tightened the first chapter's presentation. The writing of this book also benefited from the work of an individual whom I know only through his own writing, George Orwell. There was a time when I did not think that I could find the words to present the analysis offered here, but several readings of Orwell's essay "Politics and the English Language" encouraged me to keep going and pin down exactly what I was trying to write.

Readers will note that the city of Chicago provides many of the anecdotes, examples, and case studies supporting my analysis of urban rebuilding. I owe a considerable debt to a large number of experts on my home city, but three friends have also contributed substantially to this book. Jean Lachowicz, a former DePaul student, has kept me informed about the Wrigley Field lights controversy, while insisting that the local politics of Wrigleyville are more complicated than I originally thought. In a similar fashion, Joe Crutchfield and Mike Smith made it possible for me to observe at close range the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City Coalition. To Jean, Joe, and Mike I offer my thanks, with the hope that along the way I have given them something in return.

Putting words and images on the page has produced another mound of debts. Research leaves approved by DePaul Univer-

sity's Research Council and the College of Liberal Arts gave me six comparatively untroubled months to complete the manuscript in 1988. Lisa Milam contributed to the word processing of the manuscript, at crucial points rescuing it from the effects of my manual incompetence. The maps were drawn by Tom Clune, and I salute Tom's skills. Finally, in shepherding the manuscript through to publication, Alex Holzman and Lynne Bonenberger have been cheerful, encouraging, and effective editors.

And in the end, none of it would have been possible without the unstinting support of a friend named Gwyn.

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The New American City

On the evening of August 8, 1988, Chicago's normally busy Wrigleyville neighborhood was livelier than usual. In the afternoon the Goodyear blimp had cruised above Wrigley Field, the home of the National League's Chicago Cubs baseball franchise. Over 500 reporters and broadcasters were in town to cover a late-season game between the fourth-place Cubs and the fifth-place Philadelphia Phillies. Crowded into the ballpark were 40,000 fans, a few thousand in excess of seating capacity. Several thousand additional onlookers milled around Wrigley Field, and in the surrounding neighborhood a fleet of tow trucks patrolled, removing illegally parked cars. The tow trucks were accompanied by a foot patrol of approximately 200 neighborhood residents, members of a local community organization, who in addition to identifying illegal parkers intended to report unruly behavior by fans outside the park.

At 6:05 PM an elderly Cubs fan pulled the lever that activated the stadium lights above Wrigley Field. At this moment the Cubs became the last major-league baseball franchise to inaugurate nighttime ballgames. This event, rather than the contest between two also-ran National League Eastern Division ball clubs, had drawn the blimp, the out-of-town media, the huge crowd, and the crush of onlookers. It had been preceded by years of

negotiation among Cubs officials, local politicians, and neighborhood activists, action in the Chicago City Council and the state legislature, and debate on television and radio, in the press, and on the street.

What the management of the Cubs viewed as its prerogative—updating Wrigley Field in order to meet the demands of the baseball commissioner's office and the major television networks—was challenged by residents of Wrigleyville and several of their political representatives. Neighborhood critics of the Cubs organization advanced a number of distinct and sometimes clashing perspectives. For example, a portion of Wrigleyville's residents found the status quo—daytime baseball and limited parking, some unruliness by baseball spectators—unsatisfactory and wished that existing state and municipal statutes prohibiting evening games would drive the Cubs to relocate in the suburbs. Others found the status quo tolerable but argued that evening baseball in Wrigleyville would cause unacceptable disruptions. A third group contended that the unlighted Wrigley Field contributed to a unique neighborhood environment, and that the advent of nighttime baseball would upset the subtle and overlapping rhythms of its commercial and residential life. Conversely, some local residents, notably merchants, feared that the Cubs' departure from the neighborhood would undermine the viability of local businesses. This group actually supported the baseball franchise's efforts to repeal the statutory bans on baseball after dark, if only to retain the Cubs as a local economic anchor.

Ultimately, enough consensus was achieved among neighborhood residents to force the Cubs organization to accept restrictions proposed by the city government, most notably a limitation on the number of evening games to be scheduled in any given playing season. The franchise, while modernizing the stadium, also installed antique-style street lamps on the adjoining sidewalks in an effort to preserve the neighborhood ambience. For its part, the city developed a parking plan to ease neighborhood congestion and reserve streetside parking for local residents. Nonetheless, some neighborhood activists claimed that they were excluded from the final phase of bargaining, and they pledged to continue legal action against the Cubs.

The Wrigley Field lights debate turns on a number of issues

characteristic of planning and land-use disputes in contemporary American cities. How do new construction and rehabilitation of older buildings affect the street life and social make-up of surrounding areas? Are neighborhood economic welfare and residential welfare necessarily contradictory? What role should neighborhood residents play in affecting municipal development initiatives, or the decisions of corporations that affect local land use, traffic, and street life?

These kinds of questions form the backdrop of this book, whose subject is the changing physical character of American cities. Its principal objectives are to explore the relationship of social, cultural, economic, and political factors to the redesigned built environment of U.S. cities since World War II, and to suggest how these physical changes are likely to affect the future use of American cities by their residents. Through the exploration of these parallel issues I will develop my central argument, which is that the characteristic feature of contemporary urban design is the segmentation of urban space, and that this spatial segmentation has a variety of consequences for patterns of public space use, neighboring and popular assumptions about "good" and "bad" neighborhoods, and even the tactics and objectives of neighborhood political mobilization. I will further argue that, for the most part, these consequences of urban spatial segmentation undermine the capacity of cities to provide an exciting, stimulating, and creative environment.

My starting point in developing these themes is the assumption that the city's physical form is an important register of the content of culture at large. Those buildings and urban spaces that are prized by the residents of a particular city, or by a broader population, are prized in large part because of the way they underscore widely held social values. Conversely, the neglect and avoidance of some urban spaces, such as the public housing complexes that dot many inner cities, reflect another popular consensus: that the residents of such places deserve nothing better.

But, in addition, the physical structure of cities—their arrangement of different neighborhoods, the location and accessibility of different modes of transportation, the characteristic design features of public and private spaces—plays an autonomous role in shaping human action. Without making claims that

smack of physical determinism, one can observe that the way we structure neighborhoods has some bearing on our attitude toward different racial and ethnic groups, that our images of urban society are affected by the different means we use to move about the city, that public spaces can be designed to encourage or discourage interaction by pedestrians.

My motivation for taking this particular approach to the city as a social artifact and physical entity transcends the desire to provide an account of the interaction between "social" factors and the built form of cities. It is my conviction that the city as an environment has, historically, been a significant impetus for important social developments. And with such social critics as Marshall Berman I share the assumption that urban culture, in recent generations, has provided the most fruitful responses to the challenges of life in the modern world.[1]

I can best illustrate how the urban environment cradles society and contributes to some of its principal virtues by discussing three places in my home city of Chicago. The first of these is a street on Chicago's near Northwest Side. I discovered West Cortland Street while riding my bicycle. I had just crossed a major commercial street and passed under an expressway overpass when I found myself in a mainly residential neighborhood. I emphasize mainly residential, because a large Roman Catholic church and a small park center the surrounding neighborhood's rows of detached brick houses. To my right I found a well-maintained delicatessen and grocery. Beyond the deli-grocery were several small factories and warehouses. This stretch of West Cortland, whose character I would have never anticipated, is very close to my office, so I have returned to it often and eaten in the delicatessen several times. The deli is, itself, a remarkable spot: on most weekdays it is busy with a diverse crowd of local residents, workers from nearby businesses, and peripatetic sandwich gourmets such as myself. In short, this stretch of West Cortland Street and the surrounding blocks function as a social oasis in a larger district given over to commercial and transportation uses.

The second place is further north and nearer Chicago's lakefront: the corner of Belmont Avenue and Clark Street. This intersection is much busier than West Cortland. To the west about a block is an elevated train station, and in the general

vicinity are dozens of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs. The point at Belmont and Clark that I find striking is not a physically noteworthy location. In fact, it is the parking area in front of a chain restaurant. What was remarkable about this parking area in the spring and summer of 1985 was its use. For reasons that are not easily discernible, this parking lot became a hangout for teenagers either posing as punks or quite immersed in punk culture.

For several months, most evenings of the week, an ongoing "scene" was created in this parking lot. In front of a structure of the most banal, suburban design dozens of kids in black chatted, joked, danced, huddled, and occasionally shouted at passersby. Once when watching this corner I was censured for my T-shirt, one of the parking-lot punks claiming that I knew nothing of anarchy, whose symbol was emblazoned on my shirt front. I was taken aback, but the kid's assessment of my "fellow traveling" forced me to reconsider how important the symbols of punk rebellion, and even this space, had become for the Belmont-Clark revelers. After a few months the Belmont-Clark parking lot lost its distinctive character—possibly overtaxed by its very popularity, or maybe killed off by winter winds—but during its time it was a most interesting locale within a generally diverse and exciting neighborhood.

Traveling a few blocks north of Belmont and Clark, one arrives at where we began this chapter, Wrigley Field. By describing the stadium and its neighborhood, we can identify some of the concerns expressed by the neighborhood residents who opposed evening baseball. Wrigley Field, which was built before World War I, is a compact structure, fitting within the city's street grid on a single large block. Beyond its outfield walls stand typical Chicago two- and three-floor single-family homes and apartment buildings. Several of these dwellings are distinguished, however, by their roof decks. On game days, and now evenings, small crowds of nonpaying fans assemble on these decks to observe the game. On the side streets adjoining Wrigley Field, an array of taverns, souvenir shops, and other businesses take advantage of Cubs traffic.

On game days in the spring, summer, and early fall, the presence of the stadium still gives the neighborhood a most remarkable temporal character. In the morning, after many neigh-

borhood residents have gone to work, a few very committed fans begin to assemble, waiting at the gates to observe batting practice before the game, or standing outside the outfield walls to shag batting practice home runs. In early afternoon, the whole neighborhood is busy as the game-time crowd gathers, stops at taverns and shops, and finally enters the stadium. During the game, the surrounding streets are once again without substantial traffic, but the stadium itself becomes a presence as fans vocally react to the turns of the contest within. After the game, the crowd rushes out, many fans once more stopping in local businesses for souvenirs and refreshments. By evening, Wrigleyville reassumes a character like that of many other North Side Chicago neighborhoods.

With the advent of evening baseball, this fragile temporal relationship between residential use of the neighborhood and professional baseball has been undercut. Just as residents return to their houses and apartments from work, the game-time crowds arrive. Where once these two uses overlapped without much inconvenience for either, residents now worry about parking, noise from the park, and unruly street behavior. It remains to be seen whether Wrigley Field will continue to be the good neighbor that it has been in the past.

URBAN FORM AND URBAN SOCIETY

These three places in Chicago provide a context for considering four crucial attributes of urban life that grow from the intersection of human use and built form. These are surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic participation. For some readers, this quartet of urban virtues may seem incongruous, because much of the commentary on cities in the United States has interpreted these characteristics less optimistically, and indeed, has sought to find contrary, compensating values, such as security and stability, in particular pieces of the urban fabric.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the most influential approach to interpretation of cities in the United States has emerged from the "Chicago School" of urban sociology, notably through the work of such pioneering members as Robert Park and Louis Wirth. As a rule, Chicago School sociologists and their

followers have described an overarching urban environment in which economic differentiation, huge populations in concentrated space, and race and class polarities threaten the ability of individuals to find personal satisfaction, hold together families, and avoid physical harm.[2] For example, Park wrote: "The social problem is fundamentally a city problem. It is the problem of achieving in the freedom of the city a social order and a social control equivalent to that which grew up naturally in the family, the clan, and the tribe."[3] A similar pessimism is expressed in Louis Wirth's classic interpretation of the city as a social system, "Urbanism as a Way of Life,' and more recent Chicago School sociologists, such as Gerald Suttles, continue to interpret the city as an essentially dangerous place.[4]

In reaction to this attitude, many researchers have sought to locate stable, secure "communities" within the city, and studies such as Herbert Gans's *The Urban Villagers* and Robert Slayton's *Back of the Yards* provide convincing portraits of neighborhoods in which streetside sociability, maintenance of family ties, and successful individual adjustment have been the norm.[5]

Yet even as such writers as Gans and Slayton have advanced the proposition that the city neighborhood can be a place in which satisfactory social relations develop, other strands of urban analysis have seemed to accept the Park/Wirth formulation of cities as risky environments while designating neighborhoods as *the place* where contented, involved urban residents may be found. In the first half of the twentieth century, professional city planners in this country fixed on a spatially autonomous "neighborhood unit" as the principal building block of successful cities.[6] More recently, activist and social critic Harry Boyte has advanced the argument that neighborhood activism, freed of the complications and reductionism of larger ideological debates, is the best route to building a more egalitarian political order in this country.[7]

In separate but complementary ways, both the neighborhood unit and Boyte's "backyard revolution" assume that life in the city beyond the secure neighborhood can be physically dangerous and normatively unhinged, and is unlikely to stimulate the individual's imaginative powers or the group's capacity for collective action. There is, however, another, rather loosely allied, school of urban observers whose vision of the city is more

optimistic than that of most of the writers just surveyed. Among its practitioners are Jane Jacobs, Richard Sennett, and Marshall Berman; and to give an extremely brief, collective summary of their work, their view of the city finds vitality in diversity and judges its unsettledness as a virtue rather than a liability.[8] In practice, successful cities require generally accessible and lively public spaces as well as rooted neighborhoods and a public ethos that encourages expressive personal styles as well as secure streets. Thus, in emphasizing the virtues of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation, I am following a line of analysis that seeks to balance the often overly pessimistic picture of weak, middling, and strong local communities beset by an ocean of urban disarray.

Throughout history, accounts of urban life have included reference to the sense of surprise so often felt by visitors to, and residents of, cities. Sometimes this is a sense of fearful surprise, as in Nathaniel Hawthorne's story "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," in which a boy from the country visits Boston in search of a wealthy relative. Most of the boy's encounters are unpleasant, as his life in the country has not prepared him for the people and sights of the city.[9]

Other narratives attach a more favorable interpretation to the sensations of surprise and wonderment evoked by the city. In *Dombey and Son,* Charles Dickens imagines the progress through London of another child, Florence Dombey, in this fashion:

> The roar soon grew more loud, the passengers more numerous, the shops more busy, until she was carried onward in a stream of life setting that way, and flowing, indifferently, past marts and mansions, prisons, churches, market-places, wealth, poverty, good, and evil, like the broad river side by side with it. . . .[10]

This vision of London does not portray a city that is unequivocally pleasant. Among marts, mansions, and churches are also prisons and poverty. Yet it does evoke just the sense of possibility that motivates so many people to come to the city: the possibility to meet new people, to make a living as one desires rather than as one is directed, to discover modes of life that one can hardly even imagine in advance.

A city's capacity to surprise in this fashion is one key to its

maintenance of vitality. When I first rode through West Cortland Street, I anticipated a continuation of the commercial district through which I had been passing. I do not recall just where I intended to go, but when I suddenly discovered this quiet street with its church, park, and delicatessen, my surprise and pleasure were palpable. In a city that I knew very well, I had found a new spot that would draw me back again and again.

For me, the punks' use of the corner of Belmont and Clark was another kind of surprise. An essentially banal space was transformed by kids who had nowhere better to go. Of course, for many of the proto-, true, or posing rebels occupying the parking lot, this space had probably been an even more memorable place of surprise. They had in some fashion discovered it, and then used it to make connections with new friends, music, or ideas. It is when a city sustains and indeed continues to produce such places that it manages to communicate the kind of excitement that makes urban life attractive to so many people.

Urban society is also a tolerant society, in part some may claim because city residents encounter so many surprises. In cities we live among a wider spectrum of occupations, a more diverse mixture of ethnic and religious groups, and some people who are quite simply eccentric. Many of us who live in cities do not merely tolerate such differences; we consider the variety of human life to be one of the main attractions of city life.

Furthermore, throughout history cities as social collectivities have developed institutions to both highlight and allow individuals to cope with this diversity. Note, for example, historian Gunther Barth's description of turn-of-the-century vaudeville houses:

> In the vaudeville house, a distinctly urban form of popular theatrical entertainment drew the residents of the modern city together and gave them a glimpse of themselves. The show dramatized the spectrum of humanity in the city and diversity of urban life through its subject matter and variety. Consequently, it attracted the entire range of city people and, after exposing them through comedy and song to a diverse set of human problems, provided them with a fleeting measure of harmony.[11]

Each of the three Chicago locales that I have described is a place that breeds social tolerance. The deli-grocery on West

Cortland Street caters to several distinct audiences: local housewives purchasing traditional ethnic cooking ingredients, lunching workers, urban explorers on the lookout for good sandwiches. The Belmont and Clark parking lot was a setting for punks to display themselves, probably to the chagrin of the fast-food restaurant's management and some neighbors, but also to demonstrate that in spite of their wild clothes and hairdos they were just kids having fun. Wrigley Field, until its recent modernization the big-city stadium that most clearly evoked the nineteenth century, is one of the very institutions that Barth identifies as integrating the American industrial city's population.

The city's built form and social structure also intersect to generate innovative action. Jane Jacobs has written

> . . . that cities are settlements where much new work is added to older work and that this new work multiplies and diversifies a city's division of labor; that cities develop because of this process, not because of events outside of themselves; that cities invent and reinvent rural economic life; that developing new work is different from merely repeating and expanding efficiently the production of already existing goods and services. . . .[12]

Those who are familiar with Jacobs's commentary on cities, running from her early criticism of urban renewal in the United States to her later analysis of the place of urban economies in the world economy, will recognize in this quotation some of her continuing themes: the creativity set in motion by the city's large and densely packed population, the overlapping of various land uses and activities, and the efforts of individuals to mount successful economic enterprises in such an environment.

While commenting on Jacobs's interpretation of the city, Marshall Berman expands on her view of innovation in the urban environment:

> This celebration of urban vitality, diversity and fullness of life is . . . one of the oldest themes in modern culture. Throughout the age of Haussmann and Baudelaire, and well into the twentieth century, this urban romance crystallized around the street, which emerged as a primary symbol of modern life. From the small-town "Main Street" to the metropolitan "Great White Way" and "Dream Street," the street was experienced as the medium in which the totality of modern material and spiritual

> forces could meet, clash, interfuse and work out their ultimate meanings and fate.[13]

Berman speaks of an innovation that transcends the production of new goods or services and the exploitation of new markets. It is innovation in the broadest cultural sense, by which individuals come to terms with the changing character of society, express the meanings of these changes, and propose answers to the problems produced by these changes.

Among the three locations I have described in Chicago, the Belmont and Clark corner most directly expresses the sense of social innovation—including its ambiguities—described by Berman. No one planned that the fast-food parking lot would become a punk hangout, and their choice of meeting place suggests some degree of desperation on the part of the Belmont and Clark scene makers. Nonetheless, confronted with the high cost of entrance to some local nightspots and their inability to enter clubs selling alcoholic drinks, these teenagers founded their own gathering spot. In many respects it was a brilliant choice: very visible at the intersection of two major streets, easy to locate, and, given the formal economic mission of the site—the sale of quickly produced, inexpensive, low-quality food—a place laden with irony. As a location for social innovation, the Belmont and Clark parking lot had its limitations, but for a time, for its crowd, it served a purpose.

Finally, the conjunction of urban physical structure and local social forces often elicits democratic, participatory action. At most times and in most places this has been a potential attribute of cities, but it is a possibility that colors the interpretation of urban life by many commentators. The achievements of classical Athens are one source of this vision, as noted by social theorist Murray Bookchin: "What strikes us at once about Athens, the most advanced of the Greek cities, is that civic activity involves an exceptionally high degree of public participation."[14]

A different but equally powerful sense of this possibility for meaningful participation in collective life is reflected in Lewis Mumford's comments on a contemporary description of a religious procession in medieval Antwerp:

> Note the vast number of people arrayed in this procession. As in the church itself, the spectators were also communicants and

> participants: they engaged in the spectacle, watching it from within, not just from without: or rather, feeling it from within, acting in unison, not dismembered beings, reduced to a single specialized role. Prayer, mass, pageant, life-ceremony, baptism, marriage, or funeral—the city itself was stage for these separate scenes of the drama. . . .[15]

In contrast to Bookchin's attention to public participation in reaching explicitly political decisions and seeing to their implementation, Mumford focuses on the individual's sense of membership and participation in a meaningful community. Cities can be the seat of both kinds of participation, as well as a third discussed by Manuel Castells in his comparative study of urban social movements, *The City and the Grassroots*.[16] Castells contends that the urban environment typically has been the setting for popular movements seeking to redefine such fundamental social relationships as landlord and tenant, boss and employee, male and female.

The Wrigley Field debate clearly demonstrates how efforts to reshape the city's built environment can generate unforeseen political mobilization. For many residents of Wrigleyville, the ballpark is a central and extremely evocative part of their community. For others it is an important economic stimulus. As a result, the Cubs management was unable to make decisions regarding the stadium as if it were merely a piece of private property. Although some neighborhood activists criticized the means by which the settlement permitting lights in Wrigley Field was achieved, and others disliked the details of the settlement, their efforts had ensured that the public nature of this space was accepted by all parties to the dispute.

THE MYSTERY OF CITIES

Far more challenging than describing these socially beneficial attributes of urban form is the prospect of explaining how cities generate them. This is, indeed, the mystery of cities, which any number of observers have sought to understand. Louis Wirth, although obviously wary of such social consequences of urbanization as juvenile crime and the attenuation of family ties, nonetheless contributed an important insight in "Urbanism as a

Way of Life" by linking the quantitative uniqueness of cities to qualitative differences in their social life.

Wirth may not have anticipated that succeeding generations of urban ethnographers would find that urban neighborhoods could be characterized as "communities" in which resident solidarity was substantial and upon which political action could be based. But this finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the broad line of Wirth's argument—that urban society is different. Nor should it be surprising that an acute observer of cities working outside the sociological tradition, Jane Jacobs, might make an important extension of Wirth's line of reasoning. This is the notion that the apparent physical disorder of cities masks a peculiar kind of social order, which, further, is the source of tremendous creative energy.

Yet the materialistic analysis that links Wirth, the ethnographic tradition, and Jacobs does not uncover the whole mystery. Observers of the city whose visions are shaped by utopian considerations, such as Berman, Bookchin, and Mumford, also find something of great value in cities. This is the power of urban spaces and the historical legacy of particular cities to give life to political visions and provide a setting for political dialogue and mobilization. Not all cities hold this power, and there are particular cities—one thinks of Berlin during the Nazi era and Moscow during the Stalinist era—in which the suppression of vision and political discourse was the norm. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Castells in *The City and the Grassroots,* across the centuries and in widely varying social, economic, and political contexts, cities have given shape to and provided a backdrop for the most liberating of political action. This we must attribute to some force beyond the quantitative uniqueness of cities.

This brief account of how the city comes to be a place of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation is not intended as a comprehensive explanation, which probably exceeds my powers as an analyst. What this discussion has sought, however, is to underline the significance of these four attributes of cities and suggest why their maintenance is crucial to the preservation of congenial urban communities. The bulk of this book is devoted to an exploration of how the physical restructuring of the post–World War II American city has impinged on these special

virtues of cities as physical space and unique social system. In the next section of this chapter we examine a group of events and trends that during the postwar period has affected popular thinking about cities in this country, the availability of resources to bring to bear on urban problems, and the political and economic structure of American cities.

SOURCES OF THE POST–WORLD WAR II CITY IN THE UNITED STATES

In the four decades since the conclusion of World War II, the city in the United States has changed dramatically. On the one hand, big cities are a more pervasive part of the American landscape. In the South, Southwest, and West there are more cities than there were before the war, and across the country a greater share of the population now lives in metropolitan regions. On the other hand, central cities typically are now surrounded by miles of suburbs. The latter are less densely settled than central cities, and their characteristic physical pattern of single-family-home residential communities linked to commercial and industrial nodes by expressways represents a new form of urbanization.

The focus of this book, however, is central cities, and during this same postwar period a series of events and trends has substantially recast their particular physical, economic, and political character. These include the large-scale public works initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s (notably urban renewal projects and urban expressways), the racial violence of the mid- and late 1960s, the gentrification movement of the 1970s and 1980s, economic restructuring in the wake of the long post–World War II boom, and political reordering associated with the decline of urban political parties and the rise of neighborhood activism.

Urban Public Works

The primary impetus for the massive urban renewal projects and highway building in the two decades following World War II was federal legislation.[17] Principal among these initiatives were the U.S. Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, which introduced urban renewal, and the Highway Act of 1956, which appropriated

funds for the 40,000-mile interstate highway system, whose planning had occupied the previous decade.

Supporters of these initiatives included members of Congress, local public officials, and business leaders who were concerned about the decline of central cities but were optimistic that a major federal commitment to rebuilding cities could cure their principal ills. Simultaneously, visions of a new kind of city—highrise structures arrayed in park-like settings, automobiles racing from one area to another on high-speed expressways—were at large in our culture. The accomplishments of public works leaders such as Robert Moses of New York were already beginning to give concrete form to these visions, and legislative action followed.[18] Both urban renewal and the interstate expressway network received support from extremely broad political coalitions.

By the late 1950s, a number of cities had begun urban renewal and expressway construction, and the unforeseen effects of these two initiatives were becoming visible. Huge sections of cities had to make way for urban renewal clearance and expressway routes. Often, residential neighborhoods were bisected or altogether removed by these projects, which antagonized many incumbent residents and set in motion waves of relocation that affected surrounding neighborhoods. Some of these public works projects also wiped out numerous commercial and industrial enterprises, leading to their closing or relocating outside the city, which in turn led to considerable local unemployment near their former sites.[19]

The ultimate consequence of the physical and social turmoil produced by urban renewal and central city expressways was political. Neighborhoods slated for these "improvements" began to object, and in many instances city officials were forced to alter their initial plans or drop them altogether.[20] In the long run, neighborhood resistance to urban renewal and expressway construction was the seed of the "neighborhood movement" of the 1970s.[21]

Racial Violence

In the second half of the 1960s, hundreds of violent, racially motivated incidents occurred in American cities. Some of these

incidents pitted a few inner-city blacks against a similar number of local police officers. On other occasions, outright warfare broke out. Burning and looting of property accompanied these large-scale riots. Hundreds of local residents and police were injured, and for a few hours or days the maintenance of basic civil order was impossible.[22]

The sources of these civil disturbances were several. Mainly black, inner-city neighborhoods were among those hardest hit by urban renewal and expressway construction. By the mid-1960s, residents of these neighborhoods were quite hostile to the municipal governments that had initiated such projects. Furthermore, the national civil rights movement reached its high-water mark in the first years of the Johnson administration, during which time major legislative initiatives promised to provide full political rights to southern blacks and "equal opportunity" to racial minorities across the country. Nonetheless, local municipal governments often seemed to resist the prescriptions of these enactments. Police forces were still overwhelmingly white and presented an unfriendly face to inner-city black residents. Local school systems seemed to move ever so slowly in integrating neighborhood schools.[23] Finally, in spite of economic gains growing out of the postwar boom economy, many inner-city blacks perceived themselves to be falling behind in the overall rise to affluence of the American population. In short, there was much frustration in inner-city minority neighborhoods at this time, which was easily kindled to violence by the provocations of police officers or other representatives of municipal government.

The consequences of these racial disturbances ranged from the very specific and physical to broader effects that began to reshape thinking about cities and the nature of their political order. In several cities, racial violence decimated extensive areas, driving out residents and merchants. It was already difficult to attract investment to these neighborhoods, and the aftermath of the rioting left burnt-out territories which in many instances have yet to be rebuilt. The residents of adjoining mixed or mainly white neighborhoods felt threatened by these events, and it appears that inner-city violence gave additional impetus to the ongoing trend of "white flight" to the suburbs.

Politically, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the

election of several "law and order" mayors in big cities. Mayors such as Frank Rizzo of Philadelphia spoke for white ethnic populations and municipal employees who were intimidated by the civil rights revolution and the recent urban disturbances.[24] Their agendas emphasized increased expenditures for police departments; their rhetoric contributed to the racial polarization already fragmenting urban white and minority populations.

At the national level, in 1968 Richard Nixon's successful campaign for president featured a platform that proposed that federal programs had contributed to urban unrest. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration, with the approval of Congress, increased local municipal governments' discretion in spending federal funds. Ultimately, this resulted in less spending on such social programs as job training and other neighborhood services and greater use of federal funds to underwrite basic service provision and physical redevelopment.[25] Finally, the rise of the "law and order" mayors and the initiatives of the Nixon administration helped fuel the development of the "new right" political agenda in the United States.[26]

Gentrification

Gentrification is the term popularly used to describe the rehabilitation of older neighborhoods by young, affluent homeowners. It came into wide currency in the mid-1970s, when local officials and social scientists began to observe an influx of new residents to older, scenic neighborhoods, such as Brooklyn Heights and Park Slope in New York, Society Hill in Philadelphia, and Lincoln Park in Chicago.[27]

The gentrification process represents something of a paradox because its appearance corresponds to the end of the massive urban renewal era. One of the intentions of most urban renewal projects was to lure typical gentrifiers, young professionals and entrepreneurs with the cash to purchase property and invest in its upkeep, yet much gentrification has occurred in neighborhoods that were bypassed by urban renewal. The charm and historical resonance of such neighborhoods are, of course, at the opposite end of the aesthetic spectrum from the highrise communities built under the auspices of urban renewal. Nonetheless, both critics and supporters of urban renewal note

that much subsequent gentrification might not have proceeded had not urban renewal cleared "slums" in adjoining communities, provided assistance to pioneering rehabbers, or through "spot clearance" permitted some new construction in otherwise renovating neighborhoods.[28]

Four factors account for gentrification. One was the substantial inflation of housing prices during the 1970s, which for a time made real estate in central-city neighborhoods a more attractive investment. At the outset, this was a major impetus for gentrification. A second factor was the coming of age of a huge population cohort, the postwar "baby boom" generation, from which many gentrifiers have been drawn. Third, the restructuring of urban economies has generated many new white-collar jobs in corporate management, firms providing business services, and traditional professions such as law. Many of the new recruits to these occupations work in the central city, and for them residing in a near-downtown neighborhood can be highly attractive. Fourth, in her discussion of loft living in lower Manhattan, sociologist Sharon Zukin makes a point that can be applied to the process of gentrification in general: substantial portions of the middle class, because of nostalgia and an aversion to 1950s-style suburbia, have once more embraced the urban neighborhood as a place of residence.[29] Of course, the steadfastness of many gentrifiers remains to be seen. Although many singles and couples in their twenties and thirties may consider suburban bedroom communities, with their isolation, uniform physical settings, and circumscribed entertainment options, to be sterile, the arrival of middle age and children may reveal the compensatory virtues of these same communities.

The direct consequences of gentrification have yet to play out. Neighborhood rehabilitation continues in dozens of cities; however, in no major U.S. city does the number of gentrifying neighborhoods represent more than a small fraction of the local housing stock. Thus, gentrification, of itself, does not promise to reconstitute the property base of local municipalities or rebuild whole cities. Gentrification in some cities has dislocated poorer incumbent residents who can no longer afford the rents asked in "upscale" neighborhoods. This effect has continued the interneighborhood stresses observable since the urban renewal era. Lastly, in a few cities loft conversion in industrial areas has

pitted real estate developers against incumbent commercial and industrial enterprises, the latter being threatened by the rent and tax increases that can strike properties that are proximate to such conversions.[30]

Economic Restructuring

Cities in the United States, as in other parts of the world, increasingly are subject to the vicissitudes of a world economy that is dominated by huge multinational corporations. The contemporary world economy permits the extremely rapid movement of capital, which means that particular locales can quite suddenly feel the pinch of capital flight, or, conversely, experience economic boom because of the arrival of massive investment. At present, U.S. cities, as high-cost production sites, are often in a disadvantaged position within this order.[31]

In the United States, the most visible urban sign of this international economic order has been the decades-long process of suburbanization, by which firms have taken advantage of cheap land, lower taxes, and expressway access to remove large portions of their facilities and work force to locations outside the central city.[32] During the 1970s, much attention also was directed at interregional economic shifts, in particular at the plight of the deindustrializing "snowbelt" coupled with the economic boom of the "southern rim" or "sunbelt."[33] Ironically, within a few years of the discovery of the snowbelt/sunbelt dichotomy, economic forces, including the plunge in oil prices, brought a bust to portions of the sunbelt (notably Louisiana and Texas) and renewed economic growth in parts of the snowbelt (such as New England). Nevertheless, this turnabout, as well as the subsequent collapse of northeastern booms such as the "Massachusetts Miracle," teaches a familiar lesson: what the international corporate economy gives, it may also take away.

Aside from the long-term trend toward suburbanization, there are several other urban effects of the world economic order. Cities that house or attract significant pieces of the corporate control apparatus—headquarters, major business service enterprises, and the like—have received tremendous downtown investment.[34] Even as New York and Chicago, for example, have failed to hold on to their industrial bases, their downtown cores

have received huge capital injections from corporations and speculative real estate developers. This downtown "renaissance" is also visible in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and several other major cities.

Accompanying the downtown renaissance is the gentrification process in adjoining neighborhoods, which, as we have noted, should be viewed as part of the process of economic restructuring. However, even in cities with booming downtowns and some neighborhood gentrification, once one leaves the central core one is likely to find neighborhood upon neighborhood that has not benefited from this restructuring. In these areas, unemployment is high, local public services are often inadequate, and maintenance of the housing stock is tenuous. The extreme examples of this trend are the many small and medium-sized factory towns of the old industrial belt stretching from the eastern seaboard to the upper Midwest that have lost much of their industry and experienced very little corporate-management or service-sector growth. In these cities, neighborhoods in decline surround downtowns that are equally starved for investment.

Political Restructuring

In the two decades following World War II, some characteristic features linked the otherwise diverse political systems of American cities. Political parties continued to play an important role in recruiting municipal leaders and mobilizing voting blocks. A generation of postwar mayors, such as Richard Lee in New Haven, Richard Daley in Chicago, John Collins in Boston, and William Hartsfield in Atlanta, came to power pledging to rebuild their cities. Their primary tool was the federal urban renewal legislation, and within their cities these and other "building mayors" cultivated supportive coalitions of business and labor leaders, party operatives, and professional planners in the municipal bureaucracy. Until the mid- or late 1960s, these "pro-growth coalitions" were the single most powerful force in city politics across the United States.[35]

Little remains of this early postwar concentration of local political power. As is true at the national level, political parties

at the urban level can manage only a weak hold on the allegiance of their constituencies. With two or three exceptions, building mayors are artifacts of the past, and their progrowth coalitions are discredited in many cities. Across the country there is a rising urban political force—neighborhood organizations—whose ultimate effect on local politics and the more general character of cities remains to be seen.[36]

The sources of these changes are relatively obvious. The failures of urban renewal and other major public works expenditures tended to undercut support for building mayors and the programs of progrowth coalitions. Moreover, reductions in federal aid for redevelopment, as well as the shifting terms of the federal aid process, have reduced the ability of mayors to orchestrate the publicly initiated rebuilding projects that characterized the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the coming of age of neighborhood mobilization has created a base for local political mobilization that is an alternative to party organizations, and given force to the opposition of grand-scale redevelopment projects. The rebuilding of American cities has, of course, continued, but it is directed largely by banks and ambitious developers and is less subject to the veto of opponents with access to public decision-making mechanisms.[37]

The contemporary political economy of U.S. cities has produced three basic power arrangements.[38] In the first, the politics of corporate caretakership, fiscal constraints on municipal government have, in effect, dictated public officials' absolute dependence on the local corporate sector. In cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, and New York, mayors, city council representatives, and development officials accept an economic development agenda set in the private sector and commit substantial resources to help underwrite this agenda.[39]

In the second power arrangement, the politics of mayoral intermediation, a relatively strong local economy matched to a municipal administration that has avoided absolute fiscal impoverishment allows mayors to negotiate a middle course between corporate expectations and neighborhood demands. Among the cities in this category are Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco, whose recent mayors have pursued variants of the "middle course."[40]

Characterizing the third power arrangement are a few "move-

ment cities," or, as planner Pierre Clavel has labeled them, "progressive cities."[41] In smaller communities—such as Berkeley and Santa Monica, California, and Burlington, Vermont—neighborhood-based coalitions have come to power and dictated alternative modes of municipal decision making and representation of local interests, economic development, and government regulation of private property. These cities are a small minority in the United States, and their neighborhood movements' hold on city government has sometimes been transitory, but they do represent a distinctly different pattern of local political power.

THE BOOK TO COME

Reconstruction by massive public works, racial violence, gentrification, and economic and political reordering are the main contextual elements that have affected the postwar rebuilding of American cities. These are also the subjects of a rich literature that analyzes their sources in and implications for federal and local public policy, their impact on urban housing markets, and their effect on the future of urban economies. Less attention has been directed at the connection between urban rebuilding as a strictly physical phenomenon and the use of public space, neighborhood life, and the evolution of political movements in cities.

In the chapters that follow we will explore how the peculiar forms of contemporary urban rebuilding can be traced back to these contextual phenomena, and give lengthy consideration to how this rebuilding will affect urban life in the emergent American city. In particular, to recall the normative foundation of this book's approach to urban rebuilding, we will examine how urban rebuilding will affect the American city as a place of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic participation. Chapter 2 examines the reorganization of downtowns in the United States, focusing on the social sources and implications of typical design strategies. Chapter 3 considers residential rebuilding by contrasting the recent evolution of two neighborhoods in Chicago.

Chapters 4 and 5 move from the largely descriptive concerns of the preceding two chapters to interpret downtown and neighborhood reordering from two standpoints. Chapter 4 is devoted

to "visions" of the American city, identifying three predominant visions of the contemporary city, explaining the sources of these visions, and suggesting the likely social consequences of implementing these visions. Chapter 5 looks at the impact of urban rebuilding on neighborhood politics, using the experience of a neighborhood movement in Chicago to suggest that neighborhood mobilization can express some of the same values as the urban rebuilding that local activists often criticize.

Chapter 6 concludes the book by first examining the influence of Jane Jacobs's critique of city planning on urban design since the 1960s. Finally, we return to the neighborhood movement to suggest, in general terms, its limitations as a force in support of surprising, tolerant, innovative, and participatory cities; but also to indicate how the neighborhood movement could link its program to more inclusive movements for social transformation.

2

The Downtown Renaissance

Writing in the early 1950s, housing expert Catharine Bauer recalled that the disparate alliance supporting the 1949 U.S. Housing Act, and in particular its provisions for urban redevelopment, had coalesced because " . . different groups of people, like the blind men feeling the elephant, made entirely different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this legislation." Public housing advocates and such congressional sponsors as Senator Taft of Ohio envisaged a program that would deliver decent, affordable shelter to poorly housed urbanites. Leading city planners proposed that the legislation would permit the rebuilding of cities to enhance their physical amenity and economic efficiency. Downtown business leaders expected redevelopment to prop up their investments in department stores, hotels, and corporate headquarters. Municipal officials looked forward to reinvigorated central-area tax bases.[1]

By the mid-1950s, urban redevelopment was renamed urban renewal, and in many cities the complementary views of downtown business leaders, real estate developers, and politicians produced a consensus that proclaimed downtown rebuilding to be its principal objective. Yet the road to achieving this

objective appeared to be impassable. The process of program approval and execution was debilitatingly slow, and cities sometimes cleared huge sites for renewal only to find that they elicited little or no interest from real estate developers. This impasse left ugly holes in the downtown fabric of many cities, and these municipally held, empty sites contributed nothing to the local tax rolls.

The perception of downtown decline began to shift some time in the late 1960s or the early 1970s. Private investment in downtown areas accelerated, and architects and urban planners developed new approaches to downtown building and organizing the movement of people through urban space. What has been called the downtown renaissance is directly related to the success of these new designs for downtown use. In this chapter we examine the evolving functions of downtown areas as expressed by these design formulas and consider the new downtown's likely impacts on how people use the city.

THE LONG SLIDE

The best way to begin an exploration of the purposes and consequences of the new downtowns is with a review of the evolution of American downtowns since the nineteenth century.[2] On the eastern seaboard, cities such as Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, of course, predate the nineteenth century. However, these cities, as well as the more recently settled centers of the Midwest, grew to metropolitan scale during the nineteenth century as the national economy shifted from a predominantly agricultural base and the United States became an industrial giant.

Characteristically, these cities grew from settlements located on natural transportation links, such as ocean, lake, or river, or they capitalized on access to the preeminent man-made transportation innovation of the nineteenth century, railroads. As a rule, the initial settlement point continued to be the center or downtown of these communities, and the imperative of access to transportation yielded very concentrated development at the core. The fabrication of products required transportation access in order to receive raw materials and ship finished products.

Management of production was on-site, and with the growth of huge industrial corporations, the location of management operations remained in the urban core. Other sectors of the local urban economy also had a stake in central locations: banks that did business with the rising industrial combines, retail establishments that themselves depended on transportation facilities and required selling points accessible to the greatest number of consumers.

Until the midnineteenth century, these communities remained "walking cities." Local transit was quite primitive, and residential districts clustered near commerce and industry, enabling employees to walk to work. Although the movement by affluent urbanites to suburban developments was evident in the decades preceding the Civil War, even those sylvan retreats were quite close to the urban core by today's standards.[3]

During this period, the concentration of activities in the urban core produced an extremely mixed pattern of land uses. Department stores abutted train depots, and factories stood alongside residential blocks. Nineteenth-century industrializing cities experienced massive growth, with soaring demand yielding soaring property values and, in turn, the rapid turnover of property. Property moved not just from owner to owner, but also from use to use.

The withdrawal of exclusive residential districts from the south end of Chicago's downtown is an example of this process. At midcentury, on the west side of South Michigan Avenue, across from what is now Grant Park, were several blocks of elegant rowhouses whose owners included prominent members of the city's commercial elite. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, these blocks had been given over to hotels, theaters, and office buildings, and a more opulent residential enclave had been established just half a mile to the southeast on Prairie Avenue. Here were the truly palatial homes of industrialists such as George Pullman, founder of the Pullman Palace Car Company. However, within a few more years the encroachment of factories and railyards greatly reduced the attractiveness of Prairie Avenue, and its affluent residents moved elsewhere.[4]

This case is not unique. The following description of residential upheaval in Manhattan appeared in *Putnam's Monthly* in 1853:

> Aristocracy, startled and disgusted with the near approach of plebeian trade which already threatened to lay its insolvent hand upon her mantle, and to come tramping into her silken parlors with its heavy boots and rough attire, fled by dignified degrees up Broadway, lingered for a time in Greenwich-Street, Park Place, and Barclay-Street, until at length finding the enemy still persistent, she took a great leap into the wilderness above Bleeker-Street.[5]

The consequence of this accelerated process of property development and turnover was a truly labyrinthine pattern of downtown land use, as one wave of construction followed another, with the succeeding developments seldom totally obliterating the remnants of their predecessors.

The pressure of downtown development relaxed somewhat at the end of the nineteenth century. With the arrival of electrified mass transit (and later the automobile), cities' growing middle-class populations could reside in newly developing neighborhoods at some distance from the downtown core.[6] The mass of industrial workers also could travel greater distances to work, and the larger industrial complexes then being erected could be placed on cheaper, less congested sites away from the central city. In fact, some industrial facilities were planned on such a grand scale that more or less complete communities were developed around them. U.S. Steel's development of Gary, Indiana, is such a case, and also a sign of the centrifugal tendencies beginning to characterize metropolitan growth.[7]

Nonetheless, it was not until after World War II that the deconcentration of downtowns became a source of broad public and official concern. The factors promoting this concern had roots in both the perception of downtowns and in the objective character of postwar development patterns. When one considers the economic context immediately following World War II, it is not difficult to imagine the widespread perception of downtown decline. Following the onset of the Great Depression, there had been a hiatus in private construction. Thus, aside from federally sponsored public facilities, few new commercial structures had been built downtown, nor had cities experienced much residential construction or rehabilitation since the 1920s. Yet with boom conditions spawned by World War II, large numbers of work seekers had flooded into the cities and crowded into whatever

housing was available. With little new construction to meet this demand, the wear and tear on already aging housing stock was magnified. Following the war, the hyperactivity in frayed downtown cores subsided, and the consequent concern of town fathers, especially those holding downtown real estate, was probably predictable.

In fact, postwar development trends were reshaping metropolitan regions, at some cost to the vitality of the old downtown areas. The wartime mobilization that brought so many workers to central cities also stimulated even more growth outside cities.[8] Further, after World War II, firms seeking modernized plant capacity increasingly looked to suburban locations (or locations quite outside the mid-Atlantic–to–Great Lakes manufacturing belt), where larger parcels were available, real estate prices and local tax levies were low, and the new interstate highway network could be used to transport products.

Accompanying the postwar deconcentration of industry was the explosion of suburban residence. The federal government played a substantial role in adding luster to the prospect of a home and lot on the metropolitan periphery by financing the urban spurs of the interstate highway system and by initiating the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration home mortgage insurance programs.[9] Yet even in the absence of government sponsorship of suburban residential development, the lure of jobs would have drawn many urbanites out to the suburbs.

As metropolitan regions grew in size and the distribution of population shifted toward the metropolitan periphery, downtowns experienced a reduction in use by shoppers. By the mid-1950s, suburban shopping malls were becoming commonplace and offering direct competition both to downtown department stores and to smaller retailers. Thus, it is not surprising that retailers were among the segments of the downtown business community that contributed most to the call for urban renewal.[10]

In a little more than a decade, the ambience of urban core areas must have seemed quite transformed. The old downtowns, with their jumble of structures and land uses, were often unsightly, but as late as World War II the industrial boom, administrative personnel, and job seekers that had descended on the cities had filled them with activity. Then came demobilization. Central-city factories reduced the scale of their opera-

tions, or they relocated to new suburban facilities. Government offices related to wartime production closed, and many middle-class urbanites sought new homes in the suburbs. After the war, the use of urban mass transit declined quite dramatically; fewer people traveled downtown, and those who did increasingly relied on automobiles.[11] The contents of downtowns suddenly escaped, as if from a high-pressure balloon that had sprung a leak. What remained were aging commercial, industrial, and some residential structures. Also troubling to business leaders and government officials was the increasingly black population of the residential neighborhoods nearest the central city. Often living in the oldest and most decayed housing, blacks were viewed as the harbinger of further physical deterioration and, as such, a threat to the economic viability of the downtown.

Ironically, the first wave of government-sponsored redevelopment efforts only exacerbated the emptying of downtowns. Urban renewal and the construction of the central city links of the interstate highway system required the clearance of large downtown tracts. The initial urban renewal strategy was total clearance of large sites, which redevelopment planners presumed would be most to the liking of private developers. However, in their zeal to clear, redevelopment planners in such cities as Newark, New Jersey, substantially overestimated the demand for these sites, leaving large, vacant eyesores in close proximity to the downtown core.[12]

The intent of the expressway planners was to reconnect the downtown with burgeoning suburban populations, thereby easing the commutation of employees and shoppers from the metropolitan periphery to the core. The result, however, was that the circumferential links in the expressway system made it convenient and economical to avoid the downtown altogether. Furthermore, the broad swaths cut by highway rights of way forced much residential demolition, sometimes crowding displaced people into adjoining neighborhoods, sometimes inducing them to relocate outside the city. Finally, the increasing use of automobiles by those who did enter the downtown increased demand for another type of space: parking. Many vacant urban renewal sites were adapted to this purpose, and owners of underused downtown structures also discovered that they could reduce taxes and increase revenue (while waiting for a

good offer) by demolishing their buildings and renting space for parking.

The physical features of downtowns that resulted from this mixture of historical circumstances, centrifugal development trends, and public policy are still visible. Underused and abandoned manufacturing and transportation complexes can be found in the vicinity of most downtown areas. On the fringes of many downtowns, one observes seas of surface parking where more substantial investment has not followed public or private demolition of structures. Central city expressways everywhere cut into the downtown; in a few cities, massive parking garages have been erected in proximity to entrance/exit ramps and house automobiles during the workday. Mass transit service and facilities are still present, but they serve a relatively small portion of the downtown population. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century office and commercial structures, many decayed, underused, or abandoned, are scattered among postwar structures. Were this picture all that could be drawn of contemporary downtowns, the fears of those business leaders and municipal officials who two generations ago had called for a war on urban blight would be realized. However, this picture does not include all the elements of the new downtowns, and it is to the remainder that we now turn.

UP FROM URBAN RENEWAL

Even as the decentralizing economic trends and misguided public policies of the 1950s and 1960s were working their effects, other trends anchored some functions in the downtown cores of major cities. Downtowns continued to be the chief location for corporate management and government administration, as well as such ancillary services as banking, accounting, and advertising. Moreover, as multinational corporations decentralized production there was, in fact, an accompanying imperative to centralize control functions. As a result, cities that had been sites of corporate headquarters and had efficiently provided the array of business services necessary for corporate management were able to attract additional headquarters operations. Thus, a handful of headquarters cities, such as Chicago, New York, and San

Francisco, became more prominent as management centers during the post–World War II period.[13]

Nevertheless, for at least two decades following World War II, the construction associated with the agglomeration of management functions only enhanced the perception of downtown decay. For this sort of work takes place in offices, and quite unlike retailers, who usually require street frontage, or even manufacturers, who require ground-level floor space, offices can be piled high atop one another. Because of the high price of central-city real estate throughout the postwar period, developers of office buildings in many cities erected structures of unprecedented height. These office towers often appealed to the grandiose ambitions of municipal boosters, but their effects on surrounding real estate were not so favorable. The huge new structures attracted tenants away from older and therefore less prestigious office buildings, undermining their economic viability. As late as the early 1970s, and in a real estate market as extensive as lower Manhattan, the construction of the huge World Trade Center complex had just this impact.[14] In short, office development in the early postwar period, in many instances, only aggravated the physical decline evident in downtown areas.

The central problem confronting architects and planners thus was to discover ways to transform urban space so that residents of the city and, even more importantly, visitors would willingly use the downtown area. The downtown core's preeminence as a center for management functions was demonstrated; and closely associated with these business uses was the growing importance of conference–, convention–, and trade show–derived tourism. In addition, downtowns continued to be the preferred location for metropolitan-scale cultural institutions and major sporting facilities.

Yet, with the spreading out of the metropolitan population, downtowns had to entice people in a fashion that was once unnecessary. Suburban shopping malls and movie complexes were close at hand for residents of the metropolitan periphery. The predominantly white suburban population, as well as many out-of-town visitors attending conventions and trade shows, were afraid of urban crime or nasty street encounters. Consequently, the downtown renaissance can be traced to the appear-

ance of design solutions that grew out of the economic functions held by the downtowns and were predicated on a restructuring of central-city space that was consistent with the expectations of the desired users of that space.

The Design of the New Downtowns

The architectural vocabulary that has been developed in response to this dilemma, and whose mark is apparent in virtually every contemporary American downtown, includes three main elements: the multiuse office/commercial/residential structure, frequently called the "megastructure"[15]; the enclosed shopping arcade; and the pedestrian mall. Although the sources and applications of these urban design elements may be discussed separately, contemporary urban architects and planners typically combine them as a means of organizing large pieces of the urban fabric. Just how these elements are combined is dependent, of course, on the predilections of particular designers and the particular design problem presented by specific downtown areas.

The first principal design element, the megastructure, is, in many cities, linked to enclosed arcades, pedestrian malls, and conventional structures by underground passageways or above-street-level "skywalks."[16] As a rule, skywalks and underground passageways are employed as pedestrian links and, as such, may be considered auxiliary elements in the design of the new downtowns. However, in Montreal and Toronto, Canada, systems of underground passageways featuring a wide array of shops and other establishments are integral parts of downtown commercial complexes.

Megastructures are ubiquitous components of the contemporary American downtown.[17] Among the most renowned are Atlanta's Peachtree Center, Chicago's Water Tower Place, the Renaissance Center in Detroit, the Bonaventure Hotel complex in Los Angeles, and the IDS Center in Minneapolis. In small and medium-size cities, scaled-down megastructures often are the centerpieces of downtown redevelopment plans.[18] Integrated within such complexes are space for conventions and trade shows, accommodations for conventioneers and other visitors, and retail and office space. Typically, megastructures are isolated

from the surrounding city, either by their location or by design features that limit pedestrian access. By maintaining a continuous schedule of conferences, trade shows, and other special events, however, their managements seek to sustain a high volume of consumer expenditures for their commercial tenants.

Such megastructures as the Citicorp Center in New York, the John Hancock Center in Chicago, and the IDS Center in Minneapolis offer their corporate sponsors unique use, investment, and environmental benefits. In each of these cases, the offices of the sponsoring firm occupy substantial portions of the building, but a large part of the structure is leased to commercial tenants seeking shop or office space. Residential condominiums also may be sold. In any event, space for the sponsor's future expansion is available, and commercial tenants and residential purchasers provide cash flow in the meantime. Finally, the array of shops and services offered within the confines of the megastructure constitutes an amenity for the sponsoring firm's employees.

The second principal design element of the new downtowns is the enclosed shopping arcade. Sometimes these arcades are units within megastructures, as in the case of Chicago's Water Tower Place. However, some ambitious arcade developments, such as James Rouse's waterfront complexes in Baltimore, Boston, and New York, have been situated directly within the urban fabric. Rouse's Quincy Market in Boston and the renowned Ghirardelli Square complex in San Francisco are sympathetic remodelings of older commercial structures. In contrast, Rouse's Gallery complex in central Philadelphia is a new structure inserted within an existing commercial block.

Unlike the megastructure, which in fact represents a design innovation, the enclosed arcades of contemporary American downtowns are descendants of the shopping arcades, some dating from the early nineteenth century, that one observes in many European cities. And like these European precursors, the contemporary American arcades typically attract visitors by offering a wide array of shops and a protected physical environment.

The third design element in the new American downtown is the pedestrian mall. In many smaller cities, the main shopping street has been closed to vehicular traffic and pedestrians are free to wander among benches, kiosks, sculpture, and ornamen-

tal plantings between shopping visits to adjoining retail establishments. In large cities such as Chicago, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia, downtown pedestrian malls do permit buses, taxis, and delivery trucks, but otherwise their design elements are much the same as such malls in other cities.[19]

Most pedestrian malls, in contrast to megastructures and enclosed shopping arcades, are planned and executed by municipal governments.[20] Often, their sponsors accept the proposition that the midcentury decline of downtown shopping districts resulted from the ascendancy of the automobile as the preferred mode of urban transportation. Thus, mall sponsors hope that the exclusion of automobiles from certain commercial streets will invigorate the economic atmosphere. Proponents and planners of pedestrian malls also cite as a source of inspiration the squares, fountains, and other public spaces that abound in European cities. In this case, the pedestrian mall is viewed as a relaxed locale in which the social conviviality sought by design theorists such as Camillo Sitte may be promoted.[21]

The New Downtowns and the Segmented City

In practice, the design of the new downtowns serves to segment the city by reserving portions of the cityscape for specific kinds of users and reducing the likelihood of different kinds of people sharing the same spaces.

The most apparent form of this segmentation is spatial, in particular the tendency to develop new downtown commercial districts at some distance from the old central business area.[22] There are obvious economic factors that contribute to this trend. Site assemblage is easier away from the traditional downtown core, and developers are likely to pay far less per square foot for these sites. But, in addition, the merchants housed in these new districts cater to a different class of customers than do retailers in the old downtown cores.

In Chicago, north Michigan Avenue, about one-half mile northeast of the city's old commercial core on State Street has become the city's preeminent shopping area. North Michigan Avenue is anchored by Water Tower Place, a characteristic commercial-retail megastructure that houses a new Marshall Field's department store as well as Lord & Taylor and numerous smaller

retailers. Although pedestrian access to Water Tower Place is not as limited as in some other megastructures, such as Detroit's Renaissance Center, the merchants of Water Tower Place cater to an overwhelmingly white, affluent, and largely out-of-town clientele. Back on State Street, the remaining department stores are older, and for the most part they do not compete with the north Michigan Avenue establishments. Their clientele includes far more downtown workers, blacks, and Hispanics.

A second type of spatial segmentation characteristic of the new downtowns is their detachment from the surrounding city. In many cities, quite imposing physical barriers, notably urban expressway links, separate the core from adjoining neighborhoods. Many downtowns are also sealed off from the outlying city by broad tracts of cleared land or abandoned buildings left in the wake of urban renewal.

However, the extreme example of spatial segmentation is provided by a new breed of structures whose internal functions do not require connection with the extant city street system and whose design reinforces this functional isolation. In Chicago's North Loop redevelopment area, the Transportation Center, a megastructure housing offices, retail space, parking facilities, and travel-related services, and linked with surrounding buildings by enclosed walkways, was described in this way by a real estate writer: "Visitors to Chicago will be able to land at O'Hare in the dead of winter, ride the CTA rapid transit line to the Transportation Center, conduct business at such places as City Hall, the Brunswick Building, and the First National Bank Building and return home without venturing outside."[23] Admittedly, for the January or February visitor to Chicago, avoidance of the city's climate is a reasonable desire. However, this description is more interesting as a commentary on the expected clientele of the building, out-of-town visitors, and the way in which design features conform to the economic function of the building. The Transportation Center is a transfer point for individuals engaged in commercial activities linking Chicago to other cities. It is not intended to be a part of the city.

The spatial segmentation of the new downtowns also contributes to their temporal segmentation, the tendency of different groups of people to use downtowns at different times. For example, from early morning until evening, Chicago's State

Street commercial corridor, like the old downtown cores of many cities, has a diverse group of users. However, as sundown approaches, its more affluent and white population vanishes, and the clusters of people that remain on State Street are mainly young blacks and Hispanics. These groups are attracted by the restaurants and movie houses that remain open for business into the evening hours.

In part, the temporal segmentation of downtowns, with racial minorities becoming the principal users of the urban core after working hours, is related to neighborhood residential and economic patterns. A large share of the white, middle-class downtown work force resides in the suburbs or in city neighborhoods that are well away from the downtown; moreover, many of these neighborhoods are likely to be close to their own entertainment and commercial districts. In contrast, the minority users of the evening downtown often live relatively close by, and in neighborhoods where entertainment and retail establishments are in short supply.

Yet this temporal segmentation is clearly amplified by the means used to design the new downtowns. Sociologist Murray Melbin notes that after-hours activities have been viewed for centuries as "crime-ridden and outside of ordinary social control."[24] This concern is the source of design strategies typically used to limit pedestrian access to urban megastructures: long exterior walls without storefront entrances, points of entrance that are physically small and few in number, and empty street-level foyers that buffer commercial and office space on the floors above.

Here we have arrived at the considerations that yield designs such as that of the Renaissance Center in Detroit, a megastructure that includes substantial hotel space and is oriented to service for out-of-town visitors. Access from the city outside is limited, and inside, the wary guest finds an array of commercial outlets, restaurants, and taverns. Thus, for out-of-town visitors who may want to "cut loose" outside the parameters of routine business hours, and who may be vulnerable to foul play in the city at large, the megastructure offers a pleasingly safe and superficially varied environment.

This pattern of segmented downtown use also affects the deployment of municipal public safety resources and popular

assumptions about danger in the city. Local police forces can adopt a less aggressive presence in portions of the city away from the new downtown, as they are not much needed to protect visitors, or ultimately, the reputation of their city. In addition, the segmentation of after-hours activities serves to associate racial minorities with the perception of late-night deviance described by Melbin. For the city outside the new downtown is unsafe, and its lack of security must be because of the people who inhabit it.

THE DOWNTOWN AS PLATFORM

Raymond Williams begins *The Country and the City* by noting a paradoxical and longstanding English cultural theme, the decline of the countryside. Williams observes that literary figures and social critics have lamented the loss of the yeomanry and "merry olde England" for more than three centuries, with each succeeding generation placing the demise of authentic country life near its own time and interpreting the meaning of this loss from the standpoint of its own experience. Thus, modern writers allege that the disappearance of occupations, village culture, and sensibility occurred around the turn of the century, whereas Ben Jonson was recording the same phenomena from his own perspective at the outset of the seventeenth century.[25]

A somewhat analogous paradox is evident in American culture, only this time the city and city life are its subjects. It is widely supposed that at some time in the past city life in this country was better than it is at present.[26] However, when one examines the real conditions in cities of the late nineteenth or mideighteenth century, it is easy to produce a lengthy inventory of unpleasant physical conditions: residential overcrowding, street crime, epidemics, ubiquitous filth, and so on. In fact, the source of this nostalgia is probably our perception that these earlier American cities, in spite of their physical unpleasantness, managed to sustain among their residents a sense of community that eludes cities of our era.[27]

Until at least World War I, American cities seem to have developed institutions that elicited a degree of community loyalty, even among highly diverse populations whose class and

ethnic cleavages might otherwise have seemed unbreachable. In making this point, Gunther Barth describes a set of institutions that arose in American cities at the middle of the nineteenth century:

> The new ways of life identified city people who shared a growing awareness of a distinctly urban world. . . . As a result they moved with growing confidence through the strange setting of the modern city, their progress assured by the styles of thinking and acting they derived from the culture created out of new social and economic institutions. The world of city people thrived on their ability to use the apartment house, metropolitan press, department store, ball park, and vaudeville house for cultural ends, and that ability gave their ways of life distinctly American features.[28]

What is interesting about the five institutions identified by Barth is that three, the department store, ballpark, and vaudeville house, almost without exception were located in nineteenth-century downtown areas. The press primarily covered political and business activities, whose locus was the urban core, and the apartment house was most pervasive as a residential environment in the still-concentrated, pre-automobile-dependent city.

Barth's description of the vaudeville show, quoted in chapter 1, adds an important nuance to his characterization of the community-building role played by these five institutions. For the sense of community he describes, paradoxically enough, is built in large measure on a base of cosmopolitan curiosity and tolerance of diversity. Such an attitude toward the city was, during this era, most likely to be cultivated by frequenting the downtown areas of big cities. Thus, although Barth's attention is directed at the common process of socialization effected by these five institutions, it is reasonable to infer that these institutions, as well as more specifically indigenous ones (such as city halls, municipal museums or auditoriums, and historical sites, all of which, as a rule, were located downtown) also managed to give resonance to the sense of a particular community's character and heritage. In sort, these institutions were communicating a complicated and fragile set of social messages.

Ironically, it is also from the middle of the nineteenth century that the rising industrial city brought with it the sorting out

of urban functions and land uses that was so uncharacteristic of cities before industrialization. Indeed, our modern notion of the downtown, with its specified functions of business management and banking, retailing, and cultural propagation, is a consequence of this process. Accompanying this reorganization of space, according to sociologist Lynn Lofland, was a shift in the perceptual practices of city dwellers: "The modern urbanite, then, in contrast to his preindustrial counterpart, primarily uses location rather than appearance to identify the strange others who surround him. In the preindustrial city, a man was what he wore. In the modern city, a man is where he stands."[29]

The nineteenth-century industrial city, whose population size and geographic span far surpassed that of mercantile communities, was also a city of far more specialized districts and neighborhoods. Its spatial order provided a grounding for its residents, but at the same time this segmentation of urban space, activities, and residents divided the city. For a time, the downtown and the institutions located there provided a focal point for the residents of this otherwise divided city, reminding them of their diversity yet binding them to their city. Indeed, one of the persistent themes of nineteenth-century urban history is the effort by municipal officials and civic notables to build institutions that underlined the special character of their communities.[30] Yet in the long run, the segmentation of the city continued; and as we have described in the preceding section, it presently fragments that portion of the city that a few generations ago gave some sense of variety, place, and community to individual cities.

The new downtown's specialized role as a location for business headquarters, government, and tourist-oriented facilities has substantially reduced the variety of activities, structures, and districts within the urban core. The real estate required for the megastructures and office highrises characteristic of the new downtowns is substantial. Often, the site assemblage process for these developments forces out a variety of incumbent tenants. Soaring property values in the vicinity of new downtown developments further squeeze small-scale merchants, single-room-occupancy hotels, snack bars, and unrenovated taverns. Municipal planning officials may also determine that "nonconforming" uses should be zoned out of gleaming new downtown districts. In the short run, the new downtown separates itself from the old

downtown and excludes from its precincts the old downtown's occupants. Ultimately, the new downtown will vastly simplify the urban core's land use and activity patterns, thus ending its role as locus for urban diversity.

The physical uniformity of the new downtowns is, in the first place, rooted in their functional uniformity; but, in addition, the character of the architecture profession in the late twentieth century undercuts downtown uniqueness. As new architectural philosophies, styles, and techniques are developed, their transmission among practitioners separated by region and country is quite rapid.[31] There is much less chance than there was even fifty years ago for the evolution of regionally distinguishable approaches to building. Moreover, the multinational firms whose commissions comprise much of the demand for major architects, and whose structures comprise a large part of the new downtowns, have developed a taste for the work of a handful of prestigious firms whose buildings can be found across the country. In short, what goes on in the downtowns of most major cities is much the same, and it is not coincidental that the structural envelopes of downtown areas appear increasingly similar.

The functional character of the new downtowns gives rise to another aspect of their "placelessness. Historically, cities have been "a world of strangers" in which individuals carry out occupational and personal chores among large numbers of other people, most of whom they do not know.[32] Urban residents become skilled at coping with this strangeness: learning satisfactory modes of interaction with unknown fellow urbanites, learning how to anticipate the actions of strangers on the street, learning how to move from one part of the city to another. Experience teaches these skills, and often this experience must be gathered in a particular location. Negotiating with police officers is likely to be quite different in New York City than in Birmingham, Alabama.

Increasingly, however, the principal users of downtown areas cannot call upon such experience, as they are corporate employees who live miles away, visiting businesspersons, conventioneers, or tourists. Design theorist Amos Rappoport, in speculating on the success of chain businesses such as McDonald's, argues that the uniformity of McDonald's physical presence,

even in widely disparate locales, is an important asset.[33] Visually, McDonald's outlets, like all national chain restaurants, are easily recognizable, and their uniform appearance implies the predictability of their cuisine and prices. The food may not be grand, but it never surprises. Much the same can be said about megastructures such as the Renaissance Center or Peachtree Center. Their familiar ambiences, defined in terms of structural design, characteristic retail tenants, and predictable users, make them quite congenial for suburbanites and out-of-towners whose direct experience with the outlying city and its world of strangers is limited.

The new American downtown is, in fact, a "global downtown."[34] Its principal functions of corporate and government management, investment, and entertainment and tourism form the local links in an international system of economic activity and intergovernmental relations. Its design is consistent with these functions. What its design does not seem capable of doing is contributing to the sense of place of particular cities or expressing in physical terms the individual city's unique accomplishments and heritage. Moreover, the physical uniformity of the new downtowns is at odds with the diversity, capacity to surprise, and social tolerance that characterized nineteenth-century downtowns. Given the functions of the new downtown, and the design strategies chosen for it, this is not surprising. Yet, to the extent that the physical form of cities historically has expressed important civic and larger social values, and the expression of these values has confirmed popular notions of citizenship and community, this failure is quite significant.

THE REVIVAL OF DOWNTOWN RESIDENCE

For much of the post–World War II period, the downtowns of American cities usually were not associated with residence. Most of the core-area housing that was characteristic of the mercantile city was demolished or adapted to different uses during the period of urban industrialization. The skid row residential hotels and rooming houses in and around the downtowns of many cities were considered an aberrant and essentially unwholesome variety of housing. Yet housing for the affluent never disappeared

from central cities. Neighborhoods such as Beacon Hill in Boston, the Gold Coast in Chicago, Gramercy Park and West Greenwich Village in New York, and Nob Hill in San Francisco retained their attractiveness and well-to-do residents throughout the postwar period. Yet since the 1970s there has been a substantial upswing in downtown residential use, whose character is in many respects consistent with the trend toward downtown segmentation evident in the commercial downtown.

The residential resettlement of downtowns has followed two courses, which can be distinguished as "sponsored resettlement" and "residential invasion." Sponsored resettlement has occurred when municipal governments or private investors have planned large-scale residential developments for core areas. In the early postwar period, some major urban renewal projects, such as Boston's West End redevelopment and the near South Side redevelopment of Chicago, took the form of highrise residential complexes for middle-class tenants.[35] More recently, abandoned railroad property and riverside landfill have been the sites for Dearborn Park in Chicago and Battery Park City in New York, respectively. Dearborn Park was financed mostly by private investors, whereas Battery Park City has been built under the auspices of a more complicated public sector–private developer partnership.[36]

Residential invasion better describes the process of resettlement in neighborhoods such as SoHo, in Manhattan. SoHo, lying south of Greenwich Village and north of the lower Manhattan financial district, was at one time the province of small manufacturers and warehousers. By the late 1960s and early 1970s many of the neighborhood's loft buildings had been vacated by their previous industrial and commercial occupants, and a variety of artists and other low-rent seekers began to make homes in these structures. Over the course of the following decade, a large portion of the SoHo loft space was converted to residential use, property values soared, and many of the original settlers were displaced by more-affluent residents attracted by the mystique of "loft living."[37] In the 1980s, this pattern of older manufacturing and warehousing districts yielding to residential and retail use has been duplicated in a number of other American cities.

There are several positive attributes of the recent trend toward downtown residential resettlement. First, and most



Internal green space and walkways (above and below)

Facing east along State Street

notably, the reemergence of the downtown as a place of residence seems to work at cross-purposes to downtown segmentation. Having more residents downtown leads to more local-oriented shopping, schools, and other institutions that can give variety to the urban core.

Second, and in marked contrast to early postwar urban renewal, much of the recent downtown resettlement has proceeded with little residential displacement. The use of landfill and abandoned industrial sites means that increments to the housing stock available to affluent city residents are not being removed from the housing stock available to less-affluent central-city residents.

Finally, at least some of the new downtown residential areas are the result, for the most part, of private investment. Again, unlike urban renewal, large public subsidies have not been used to underwrite the transfer of property from less-affluent to more-affluent hands. However, this general observation must be qualified by noting that in the post–urban renewal era, cities have found many new ways to induce private investment in downtowns, and many ostensibly private residential developments have in fact received substantial indirect public subsidies.[38]

In other respects, downtown residential resettlement proceeds under the same assumptions and by way of some of the same practices as the development of the new downtowns. On Chicago's near South Side, the sponsors of Dearborn Park hoped to attract affluent residents, including families with children, and designed a residential enclave that in most respects turns its back to the surrounding city.[39] Dearborn Park's street system does not connect with Chicago's street gridiron, and entrance to the project is limited by extensive fencing. In effect, this designed isolation expresses the sponsors' and many residents' uncertainty about the city and living within it. On the one hand, Chicago is viewed as a place of great attraction and excitement; on the other, its excitement is threatening and physically dangerous. As one stands in the middle of Dearborn Park and observes its quiet streets and well-manicured green spaces, it is easy to forget that one is in a big city; that is, until one glances up and sees the dark bulk of the Sears Tower rising over the community's northern edge.

Dearborn Park's physical separation from Chicago and the ambiguity toward urban life expressed by its design have been reflected in its local politics. In 1987 a public elementary school opened in Dearborn Park. Many of Dearborn Park's residents had assumed that only their children would enter the new school, and they were disturbed when residents of nearby low-income neighborhoods also sought to enroll their children. Without directly impugning the children and residents of nearby public housing projects, such as the Raymond Hilliard Homes, the Dearborn Park residents were adamant in opposing a reduction of "standards" in the new school. After months of negotiation, the Chicago Board of Education arrived at a compromise plan that allowed some integration of Dearborn Park and non-Dearborn Park students.[40]

Whereas Dearborn Park, a sponsored downtown residential settlement, segments itself physically from the surrounding city, the process of residential invasion also may produce what Richard Sennett has called "purified communities."[41] Sociologist Sharon Zukin's account of the resettlement of SoHo emphasizes that the polyglot neighborhood invaded by artists, but still occupied by industrial and commercial firms involved in a variety of trades, soon enough gave away to a more homogeneous locale of affluent residents, boutiques, and galleries. What arriving loft dwellers in SoHo desired, instead of the busily noisy industrial district their neighborhood had been, was a quieter and more predictable descendant of that neighborhood. The new SoHo is enclosed by the same structures and occupies the same spaces as the old neighborhood, but its use has changed and taken on a much more quietly predictable character.[42]

Dearborn Park and SoHo demonstrate that residential resettlement does not necessarily deviate from the tendency to segment and homogenize use of the contemporary downtown. In other respects, their experiences touch on tensions that are prevalent in neighborhoods away from the downtown, as incumbent residents seek to preserve their communities and pioneers move into changing neighborhoods. The restructuring of neighborhoods is another important part of the rebuilding of the American city, and it is the subject of chapter 3.

3

Neighborhood or Enclave?

Certain highly visible signs suggest that this is a time not only of downtown rebuilding, but also of great neighborhood vitality. Neighborhood festivals and street fairs are a ubiquitous feature of summer life in the big cities of the United States. The historical preservation movement devotes much of its energy to documenting the wide variety of vernacular building styles found in residential neighborhoods around the country. Moreover, the rehabilitation of older structures that in many cases had been left to decay for decades receives great attention in the media. In most major cities there are at present at least a handful of residential areas whose property values are shooting skyward—in marked contrast to the nearly universal patterns of decline and stagnation that prevailed during the first three decades following World War II.

In fact, the downtown and neighborhood rebuilding currently taking place in American cities are parts of the same process. The growth of employment in corporate management, business services, and tourism/entertainment has created a rapidly expanding demand for near-downtown residences. The impact of these economic and occupational shifts would not have been as great without the change in consumer preferences evident among young urban professionals, many of whom have

decided against settling in the suburbs where they grew up. Nonetheless, were members of this generation not in a position to find city neighborhoods attractive because of the location of their jobs, there would be far less gentrification today.

These visible signs of neighborhood vitality are part of a larger picture that is more ambiguous. The vast majority of big-city neighborhoods are not gentrifying; and in gentrifying neighborhoods themselves, the tendency to segment space and reduce the likelihood of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation is discernible.

This chapter begins with a discussion of orthodox explanations of neighborhood change and notes how recent research has amended the paradigmatic invasion/succession model. Following this general discussion of neighborhood change are case studies of two neighborhoods in Chicago, Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park, whose contrasting paths during the post–World War II period underline the important general factors explaining differential routes of neighborhood change. Their stories also represent alternative routes to neighborhood segmentation. Whereas the physical and social isolation of contemporary East Garfield Park conforms to a pattern that has been analyzed in the extensive literature on slum neighborhoods, the segmentation characteristic of gentrifying neighborhoods such as Lincoln Park is not widely recognized. This is the subject of the chapter's concluding section.

POST–WORLD WAR II NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

In the years following the end of World War II, the deconcentration of metropolitan areas, which had begun in some cities in the nineteenth century but was slowed by the Great Depression and the war, resumed. Central-city population figures leveled and in some cases began to decline, while on the edge of the city suburban population growth exploded.[1] This larger process set in motion a parallel pattern of inner-city neighborhood decline, as local populations turned over and physical decay of the housing stock accelerated.

For the residents of many big-city neighborhoods, and for



Chicago, Lincoln Park, and East Garfield Park

some academic urban-affairs experts, postwar neighborhood decline was a terrifying new phenomenon. A research team examining neighborhood change in St. Louis described this attitude in the following terms: "The shock of these huge shifts in the socio-economic character of the city population and their devastating impact on neighborhoods has understandably been difficult for many to assimilate. They have perceived the phenomenon as a strange new visitation of the times, as bewildering as it has been dismaying."[2]

Many observers concluded that the neighborhood turnover

visible in so many American cities was a magnified expression of the invasion/succession model of neighborhood change developed by Chicago School sociologists early in the twentieth century.[3] The invasion/succession model was one of the principal elements of the human ecology approach to urban life. In this account of urban development, the land-use pattern of modern cities typically included a dense core devoted to commerce, business, and some residence. A "zone of transition" adjoined the core, in which older, run-down, and inexpensive housing served as a port of entry for new immigrant groups. However, housing in the zone of transition was constantly under siege by businesses expanding their overcrowded core-area operations. This competition for space tended to hold down housing maintenance and rents in the zone of transition, but business encroachment also tended to propel residents into the neighborhoods beyond. Outside the zone of transition was a series of neighborhood areas, with resident affluence and housing-stock quality increasing as one moved to the periphery.

As time passed, observers of urban real estate began to note exceptions to this "concentric zone" model of land use. For example, in the 1930s Homer Hoyt proposed that neighborhood residential development occupied distinguishable "sectors" that were aligned along transportation paths radiating from the urban core.[4] However, most students of urban neighborhoods remained of one mind regarding invasion and succession. Thus, Hoyt, who proposed the sectoral model of urban residential land use as an alternative to the concentric zone model, also observed: "Occupants of houses in the low rent categories tend to move out in bands from the center of the city mainly by filtering up into houses left behind by the high income groups, or by erecting shacks on the periphery of the city."[5] This is the essence of the invasion/succession model. Different population groups compete for space within the city, and within particular locales lower-status, less-established groups tend to replace groups with the wherewithal to relocate in newer, higher-quality housing.

This formulation of invasion/succession describes an ongoing process that is not inherently threatening to neighborhood residents. Indeed, housing analysts inferred from the invasion/succession model a related concept, filtering, whose connotation was quite positive. As economically successful families

sought larger and higher-quality residences on the periphery of the city, their relocation from older neighborhoods "freed up" usable housing for newly arrived lower-income groups.[6]

Nonetheless, in the context of post–World War II neighborhood decline, invasion/succession was not a comforting concept. The movement of affluent white residents from inner-city neighborhoods was called "white flight" and linked to the rhyming notion of "urban blight." In particular, as hundreds of thousands of southern blacks immigrated to cities such as Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New York, Detroit, and Chicago—and the natural increase of urban black populations exceeded that of the white populations—the neighborhood invasion/succession model assumed an air of inevitability. Poor blacks poured into cities, and the area of their residential neighborhoods expanded. Some whites, fearful of the threat of racial turnover, abandoned their neighborhoods. As homeowner and landlord confidence in such neighborhoods declined, buildings deteriorated, and thus low-income minority groups could establish a foothold. From this point, racial turnover and further physical decline seemed guaranteed.

These circumstances and expectations formed the context in which the urban renewal program was implemented; and indeed, in the 1954 revision of the 1949 Housing Act, the preservation of threatened housing joined slum clearance as a program objective.[7] In practice, many neighborhoods were lost through urban renewal. In their haste to clear slum areas, local governments often demolished socially viable communities whose physical appearance offended planners and downtown business groups. Herbert Gans's study of Boston's West End, *The Urban Villagers,* reported one of the clearest examples of this circumstance. A physically decrepit area on the back side of Boston's Beacon Hill, the West End, nonetheless provided a congenial residential environment for a longstanding, mainly Italian-American community. However, because it was located so close to the core of the city, which was the focus of early urban renewal in Boston, and was damned by narrow streets and shabby building facades, the West End was classified as a slum and demolished.[8]

Urban renewal also demolished more housing units than it built, and, as a rule, newly built housing was too expensive for neighborhood incumbents.[9] The resulting residential disloca-

tion accelerated decay in adjoining neighborhoods as dislocated residents of renewal areas squeezed into whatever housing was available. Probably the most egregious failing of local redevelopment authorities was their inability or unwillingness to provide assistance for individuals unhoused by urban renewal.[10]

Finally, as Jane Jacobs observed in the late 1950s, the type of residential environment that was characteristic of urban renewal projects worked very poorly as urban "tissue." Physically isolated highrise apartment complexes provided very anonymous environments for their residents, and they did little to enhance street life in adjoining areas.[11] Indeed, the substantial residential dislocation that preceded construction of the bigger urban renewal projects often added to overcrowding in the areas adjoining these sites.

Yet even during the era of what seemed to be universal neighborhood decline, and despite the ineffectiveness of the public policy prescribed to remedy that decline, acute observers of American cities found exceptions to the general trend. For instance, sociologist Walter Firey noted that some neighborhoods were the object of emotional attachments that worked to preserve property values and residential incumbency. Beacon Hill was an example of such an area: "Associated with this persistence of the Hill's reputation is the existence of certain spatially referred values that are shared by residents of the neighborhood. These values, articulated in and symbolized by Beacon Hill, seem to be a genuine attractive force to certain old families of Boston."[12]

There were also instances of less-distinguished neighborhoods that managed to arrest decay. Jane Jacobs, by way of her concept of "unslumming," offered examples in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* of two neighborhoods that reversed their declining fortunes in the years after World War II. In the first case, Boston's North End (which, like the West End, was a central-area neighborhood with a predominantly Italian-American population), housing rehabilitation was accomplished by individual homeowners who shared skills and tools with their neighbors.[13] Although the term was not yet invented, this was a harbinger of what is now called sweat equity.

In the second instance of unslumming, Jacobs discussed how the Back-of-the-Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) in

Chicago organized residents into a political force that could pressure local politicians.[14] Unlike the more or less informal unslumming that had occurred in the North End, the BYNC used organizational power to win resources for its community. In the years since the founding of the BYNC, which was one of Saul Alinsky's pioneering projects, the organizational approach to neighborhood preservation has been widely adopted.[15]

More-recent academic research has added some nuances to these accounts of neighborhood revitalization, although many of the substantive processes are quite in line with Firey's and Jacobs's descriptions. In a study of five neighborhoods in St. Louis, Sandra Perlman Schoenberg and Patricia L. Rosenbaum found that one local area, the Hill, had sustained a high degree of continuity in recent decades. As in Boston's North End, community leaders in the Hill capitalized on ethnic ties, and in particular on a network of organizations that adopted preservationist agendas. Schoenberg and Rosenbaum emphasize the latter circumstance because it has allowed the Hill to bring into the neighborhood resources, such as funds to support housing rehabilitation, that are essential for local stabilization.[16] In a sense, their analysis of the Hill fuses the factors noted by Jacobs in the North End and the Back-of-the-Yards.

Quite different chains of events and causality mark the evolution of Lafayette Park. Lafayette Park, the first St. Louis neighborhood to achieve national historic district status, is a characteristic example of gentrification. Young, affluent purchasers of the area's grand old homes invested substantial sums of money in renovation, and these incoming gentrifiers ultimately replaced a much poorer incumbent population.[17] Of course, the gentrification of Lafayette Park is a story that has been played out in many cities since the early 1970s.

In a study of eight Chicago neighborhoods in the late 1970s, three University of Chicago researchers, Richard P. Taub, D. Garth Taylor, and Jan D. Dunham, also sought to identify the crucial factors affecting neighborhood change and stability. Their assessment of why some neighborhoods achieved greater stability than others turned, in large part, on an argument quite at odds with the old ecological model—but not inconsistent with some of the observations we have discussed. Taub, Taylor, and Dunham placed special emphasis on the behavior of "corporate

actors," entities such as banks or savings and loan associations and local institutions such as universities, hospitals, and large-scale businesses. When these corporate actors invest in communities, whether by adding to their own facilities, or, in the case of lending institutions, by financing home purchases and improvements, neighborhoods can hold residents and maintain housing quality. When such corporate actors are not present in or abandon neighborhoods, physical decline and resident turnover are more likely.[18]

Also in the late 1970s, planning scholar Philip Clay surveyed officials and agencies in thirty cities in reference to local efforts at neighborhood rejuvenation. From his research, Clay identified two processes of neighborhood revitalization: gentrification and incumbent upgrading. The first and more-familiar term describes the process of affluent newcomers purchasing old but aesthetically or historically significant structures, renovating them, and in the end physically transforming a neighborhood.[19] This transformation usually means that incumbent populations must relocate.

The second process that Clay identified, incumbent upgrading, usually occurs in neighborhoods that are less physically and locationally attractive than gentrifying areas and that have been preserved by long-term residents. Demographically, upgraders can be distinguished from gentrifiers: they tend to be older and less affluent and to have larger families.[20] Had Clay toured the North End with Jane Jacobs in the late 1950s, he would have observed a characteristic case of incumbent upgrading.

By the 1980s, observation and research in residential neighborhoods around the country had brought to light many exceptions to the invasion/succession model of neighborhood change. Some researchers and many neighborhood activists propose that organization building is an essential technique for stabilizing communities and avoiding physical decline. Others, sharing the general perspective offered by Taub, Taylor, and Dunham, argue that access to outside resources distinguishes "successful" from "unsuccessful" neighborhoods. However, relatively little attention has been devoted to discussing what kinds of neighborhoods are most able to build organizations and attract outside resources. Nor have many observers questioned the presumed "goodness" of the more common of Clay's two

types of neighborhood renewal, gentrification. Community activists and some social scientists have sought to draw attention to the displacement of lower-status groups as neighborhoods gentrify, but there is little commentary on the kind of physical environment that is characteristic of gentrifying areas and how this physical environment may shape their local social systems. In the next section of this chapter we look at the contrasting post-World War II evolution of two Chicago neighborhoods, Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park, as a means of illuminating these issues.

LINCOLN PARK AND EAST GARFIELD PARK

In some ways, Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park[21] are quite comparable. Both neighborhoods took shape in the half-century following the great Chicago Fire of 1871, when the city's stupendous growth was one of the wonders of the western world. In part because of the coincidence of their physical development, their housing stocks also reveal some similarities. In each community, along the principal streets one observes a significant number of the large, heavily ornamented, stone-fronted mansions that were favored by prosperous Chicago families at the turn of the century. On the side streets are the narrow brick rowhouses and frame "Chicago cottages" that were built by less-distinguished residents. "Six-flats" and some larger apartment houses are found on many corner lots.

Although any long-time Chicagoan would be quick to distinguish between Lincoln Park as a North Side and East Garfield Park as a West Side neighborhood, in fact the two neighborhoods are situated rather similarly in relation to the city's downtown core, the Loop. Lincoln Park covers an area extending west from the shore of Lake Michigan. The neighborhood's southern boundary is about three miles north of the Loop. East Garfield Park is a similar distance from the Loop, but directly to the west; two of its important thoroughfares, Washington Boulevard and Madison Street, are also major downtown streets. Both neighborhoods are named for large public parks. Lincoln Park, paralleling the shore of Lake Michigan, forms the entire eastern boundary of its neighborhood namesake. Garfield Park forms

Table 3-1
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park in 1940

	LP	EGP
% of the work force in clerical, craft, operative, or service positions*	75.0	77.7
median school years completed by those 25 years of age or above	8.5	8.3
% single-family dwellings	6.1	7.0
% owner-occupied dwellings	12.7	15.3
% dwelling units built before 1920	79.2	86.6

*the four largest occupational categories in each community

Source: *Local Community Fact Book of Chicago,* Louis Wirth and Eleanor H. Bernet, eds. (University of Chicago, 1949).

the western boundary of the neighborhood of East Garfield Park.

As table 3-1 indicates, a half-century ago the similarities between Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park included social as well as physical and locational characteristics. The occupational structures of the two communities were comparable, as were the educational levels of their populations. Although most housing in both communities was multiunit, somewhat more than 10 percent of the dwellings in each was owner occupied. However, since the 1940s the paths of Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park have diverged. The purpose of looking at this particular pair of neighborhoods is to highlight the sources of these divergent paths.

Lincoln Park was initially settled in the middle of the nineteenth century, and for some time afterward maintained a rather pastoral character. Lying north of the Chicago River, the community was isolated from the remainder of the city. Indeed, truck farming was a principal activity of its Irish, Scottish, and German immigrant population. In 1871 the Chicago Fire destroyed most of the community's housing, but rebuilding proceeded quickly. The western margin of the neighborhood is formed by the north branch of the Chicago River, and in the latter decades of the century factories located beside the river. The housing built for the work force of this factory district was



Lincoln Park

consistent with previous construction; however, the composition of the residents was different. This part of Lincoln Park became home to a variety of eastern and southern European immigrant groups.

By 1889 the entirety of present-day Lincoln Park was within the corporate limits of Chicago, and after the turn of the century there was relatively little new construction in the community. There were some exceptions, such as the expansion of the industrial facilities in western Lincoln Park. Also, between the two World Wars a row of imposing ten- to fifteen-story apartment buildings took their place at the eastern edge of the neighborhood, overlooking the park and Lake Michigan.

At this point Lincoln Park had assumed the physical character that it sustains to this day. The most-affluent areas of the community formed a band along the lakefront, with the apart-

ment towers overlooking the lake giving way to blocks of single-family dwellings and smaller apartment buildings. Housing quality declined as one moved from the lakefront to the north branch of the river, and increasingly one encountered small manufacturers and warehouses amid mainly residential blocks. West of Clybourn Avenue, industry predominated.

In 1940, when the census reported Lincoln Park's population at just over 100,000, a quarter of the population was still foreign born. Following World War II, the neighborhood's population declined substantially: to 88,836 in 1960; to 57,146 in 1980. At the southern end of the community, blacks began to replace whites, and by 1970 a more widely distributed Hispanic population approached 10,000.[22]

Following World War II, a number of neighborhood organizations appeared in Lincoln Park, most notably the Lincoln Park Conservation Association (LPCA), which was constituted in March 1954. Initially formed by several private institutions and two existing neighborhood organizations, the LPCA ultimately spoke for seven neighborhood groups covering most of the Lincoln Park area. Reacting to signs of the community's physical decline, such as the large number of substandard dwelling units, throughout the late 1950s and the 1960s the LPCA and its constituent groups were insistent proponents of neighborhood improvement.[23] The city of Chicago began planning for a Lincoln Park urban renewal program in 1956. In 1962 it published the "Lincoln Park General Neighborhood Renewal Plan," which proposed the clearance of 2,000 structures as well as an aggressive program of building rehabilitation. The plan also envisaged the expansion of several local institutions, including DePaul University and a number of hospitals.[24] In the years that followed, the city worked closely with the LPCA, which provided most of the members of the local urban renewal board, the Lincoln Park Community Conservation Council.

Urban renewal cleared a broad swath of territory along North Avenue, the southern border of the neighborhood, and by the mid-1960s observers of Chicago already were calling Lincoln Park a neighborhood "on the way back."[25] Yet probably more important than slum clearance in yielding this quick turnaround were the efforts of the local neighborhood organizations to promote building rehabilitation and, in turn, the work of

thousands of rehabbers. The LPCA's constituent groups trumpeted the charms of their local areas through neighborhood fairs, garden walks, and housing tours. By the 1970s two LPCA-affiliated neighborhood organizations, the Old Town Triangle Association and the Mid-North Association, had portions of their territories declared historical districts, thus providing tax advantages for rehabbers. The LPCA itself sponsored workshops on rehabilitating structures, offered annual prizes for the best building renovations, and in the late 1950s and 1960s shamed building code "infractors" by publishing their names and properties in its newsletter.[26]

In fact, in the early 1960s investment in Lincoln Park was occurring at such a pace that the LPCA and city planners were concerned that new development threatened to render the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan obsolete before its final approval. In 1963 one of the planners working in Lincoln Park commented: "Lincoln Park is unique. In any other area, a dilapidated building will almost certainly get worse. But in Lincoln Park very often someone buys and rehabilitates it almost before you can drive past again."[27]

Major developers certainly retained their faith in the neighborhood. In the 1960s a second generation of much larger highrise apartment buildings joined the lakefront skyline. Just south of Lincoln Park, and adjoining the prestigious Gold Coast area, developer Arthur Rubloff bought an urban renewal site and built the huge Carl Sandburg Village housing complex.[28] By the 1970s smaller developers were building in-fill apartments and condominiums in the previously suspect blocks well west of the lakefront.

The gentrification of Lincoln Park has progressed so far that short-term residents are often unaware that at one time the "turnaround" was uncertain, and that there was resistance to the urban renewal effort. Like many other neighborhoods in Chicago, in April 1968 Lincoln Park was touched by the rioting that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Residents who recall the street disturbances in the vicinity of Waller High School also note their sense of uncertainty as to whether they should remain in the neighborhood. At about the same time, representatives of the black community at the southern end of the neighborhood were seeking to stop



Industrial building renovated for residential use



Award-winning new home



Historicist new construction—



featuring private alleyway and off-street garages

building demolitions authorized by the community conservation council.[29]

In general, though, the gentrification of Lincoln Park did proceed in a remarkably expeditious fashion. In its wake, the neighborhood's minority population declined substantially, and by 1980 the median value of owner-occupied houses was $123,700, well in excess of the citywide figure of $47,200.[30] Whereas neighborhood conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s turned on issues such as the maintenance practices of landlords, urban renewal–authorized displacement of minority residents, and the unresponsiveness of city politicians, in the 1980s a new set of issues emerged. Homeowners in areas adjoining some of Lincoln Park's busy commercial districts complained of rowdiness by bar patrons. At the eastern end of the neighborhood, highrise apartment construction and commercial development had produced so much traffic congestion that a movement to forestall future high-density construction sought to "downzone" lower-density blocks in the vicinity of the lakefront. To the west along Clybourn Avenue, developers sought to convert old factories and warehouses to residential use. Some manufacturers, fearful of rising property tax assessments and complaints from adjoining residential neighbors, supported the establishment of a planned manufacturing district.[31]

Although the area that would become East Garfield Park was within the Chicago city limits before the complete annexation of Lincoln Park, the development of this neighborhood proceeded more slowly. The creation of the large public park on the western edge of the community produced some real estate speculation in the 1870s, and at this time a horse-drawn trolley line ran from the downtown. However, substantial building in this neighborhood awaited two transportation-related developments. At the end of the nineteenth century, commuter rail service to the Loop was improved, and the convergence of several long-haul rail lines within the neighborhood yielded the construction of an adjacent cluster of manufacturing facilities. In the years before World War I, Irish and German immigrants were the most numerous population groups. After the war, East Garfield Park became a point of settlement for Italian and Russian Jewish immigrants.

Residential construction in East Garfield Park came to a halt



East Garfield Park

after the 1920s, and for much of the 1930s and 1940s this was a relatively stable community of single-family homes, apartment buildings, and, at the northern end, manufacturers. In 1940, the point when East Garfield Park's physical and social character bore substantial resemblance to Lincoln Park's, the black proportion of the population was 4.5 percent. By 1950 this figure had increased to 16.7 percent, and in the subsequent decade blacks became the majority population group in East Garfield Park.[32]

A number of factors account for the sudden postwar population shift in East Garfield Park. Before World War II, Chicago's black population was concentrated on the near South Side, but following the war the geographic reach of black residence in-

creased dramatically.[33] In part, this was due to the housing pressures created by the wartime immigration of southern blacks; but as historian Arnold Hirsch demonstrated in *Making the Second Ghetto,* central area redevelopment also pushed blacks outside the prewar "Black Belt."[34]

East Garfield Park was in the line of black movement into the West Side of the city. By 1960 less than 40 percent of the residents of East Garfield and three adjoining communities (the near West Side, North Lawndale, and South Lawndale) had lived in the same housing unit five years previously. Moreover, in each of these areas 5 percent or more of the 1960 residents had lived in a southern state five years previously.[35]

During this period extensive building demolition occurred in East Garfield Park and the surrounding communities. In the northeastern corner of the neighborhood, space was cleared to make way for commercial and industrial development. At the southern end of the community, the right-of-way for the Eisenhower Expressway took space that had been devoted to housing. In addition, neighborhood residents complained of irresponsible landlords who allowed buildings to deteriorate before abandoning them or, in some cases, having them torched.[36] In 1950, East Garfield Park's population had peaked at 70,091; by 1980 it was a mere 31,580.[37] But in contrast to Lincoln Park, where depopulation occurred without a substantial loss of housing units (37,538 in 1960; 35,315 in 1980), in East Garfield Park housing was lost at about the same rate as the decrease of residents. In 1960 there were 20,353 housing units; in 1980 there were only 10,933.[38]

As in Lincoln Park, postwar changes in East Garfield Park led to substantial organizational mobilization. In 1947 the Midwest Community Council (MCC) was founded, and by the late 1950s the council had approximately fifty block clubs affiliated with it. Over the years the MCC has focused community attention on such local problems as youth crime and has pressured city government to provide better services. In the past decade the MCC has shifted emphasis to a degree by seeking corporate financial assistance for local economic development initiatives.[39] Another important neighborhood organization is Fifth City, which since its initiation in 1962 has organized a series of social service and economic development enterprises. Among these are a pre-

Table 3-2
Estimated Cost of All Building Permits:
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park

	LP	EGP
1968	$19,717,052	$2,637,731
1969	18,049,314	710,943
1970	17,720,418	1,146,712
1971	55,885,989	3,262,205
1972	36,689,983	2,117,286

Source: City of Chicago, Department of Buildings, "Summary of Work Classification Permits," 1968–1972.

school, job-training and building rehabilitation programs, and an auto repair center.[40]

In short, East Garfield Park's transition elicited a considerable organizational response. However, this organizational mobilization was not able to counter economic disinvestment in the community. During the 1950s and 1960s lending institutions redlined East Garfield Park. As a consequence, many current homeowners in the neighborhood bought their houses by "contract"; that is, through monthly payments on a high-interest loan in which equity was transferred only at the point of full payment of principal and interest.

Table 3-2 compares investment figures for East Garfield Park and Lincoln Park during a key period in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and gives some idea of the degree of capital starvation experienced in the former community. It should be noted that the population and number of housing units are larger in Lincoln Park, but this numerical disparity does not account for the huge excess of building investment in Lincoln Park.

These years are critical in the evolution of East Garfield Park, because most observers agree that the neighborhood's greatest trauma can be traced to a specific date in 1968—April 5. On that Friday evening, the West Side of Chicago exploded in reaction to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and at the center of that explosion were the adjoining neighborhoods of East Garfield Park and North Lawndale. Madison Street, the principal commercial avenue in East Garfield Park, went up in flames on

the evening of April 5, 1968.[41] Twenty years later, there has been no rebuilding along several stretches of Madison Street. In the aftermath of the West Side riots, most of the neighborhood's remaining white residents and businesspersons left East Garfield Park. The economic effect of the riot is registered quite dramatically in table 3-2. In 1969 building permits were issued for about 25 percent of the value of the already low 1968 investment figure.

By 1970 East Garfield Park was 98 percent black.[42] Moreover, the community had become home to thousands of unemployed and poor people. In 1980, 30 percent of the families reported incomes below $5,000 per year; the annual incomes of 43 percent of the population fell below the poverty line.[43] Physically, East Garfield Park has become a neighborhood of old, poorly maintained buildings punctuated by large open spaces where uncut grass and weeds invade the broken sidewalks. There are, scattered throughout the neighborhood, isolated blocks in which buildings and yards are well tended. The residents of these blocks often are active in block clubs and feel quite a proprietary interest in the larger neighborhood. They wish for development in the blocks decimated by urban renewal or the 1968 riots. They also speak derisively of the landlords who have allowed their apartment buildings to deteriorate, and of the police, who seem to do nothing to stop the prostitution and drug dealing on the sidewalks in front of these buildings.

In the 1980s East Garfield Park has experienced a few signs of economic rejuvenation. The city opened a large bus-maintenance facility at the eastern edge of the community, and to the south Bethany Hospital carried out a substantial expansion. In 1982 a local development corporation collaborated with the state of Illinois and used federal funding to open Ike Sims Village, a well-designed and maintained senior citizens' complex that faces Garfield Park on the western border of the neighborhood. There are even a few signs of gentrification by black professionals attracted by East Garfield Park's location, low real estate prices, and remaining turn-of-the-century mansions.[44] In 1987 the neighborhood's leaders confronted a new issue: the likely effects of a proposed football stadium housing the Chicago Bears NFL franchise, whose sponsors sought to locate it just to the east of East Garfield Park. Supporters of the stadium pointed to its

potential for generating jobs and, possibly, some housing development. Opponents wondered if the new stadium would yield anything other than residential dislocation and Sunday afternoon traffic congestion.[45]

NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION: SOURCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Since the mid-1970s, neighborhood revitalization has taken its place among the important subjects of urban affairs research. Observers of American cities have offered a variety of explanations for what at one time appeared to be a most unlikely trend. Some observers have emphasized very broad-scale factors, such as the restructuring of urban economies and shifts in taste among young professional urban residents. For a time, early in the observation of gentrification, such environmental factors as the aesthetic quality of housing and the location of neighborhoods experiencing new investment were given considerable attention. More recent commentators often have turned to "political economic" explanations, notably organization building and access to outside resources.[46]

In practice, varying combinations of all of these factors have influenced the course of gentrification and incumbent upgrading in particular neighborhoods. From our recounting of the recent evolution of Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park we cannot infer a general model of neighborhood revitalization—indeed, no such general model is likely to exist—but we can discuss some of the significant connections, or lack of connection, among these factors.

For example, the gentrification of Lincoln Park, and more recently other North Side neighborhoods in Chicago, has occurred in the midst of a substantial restructuring of Chicago's economy. This restructuring has assumed a familiar shape, as manufacturing firms and employment have declined even as substantial downtown investment has created new jobs in corporate management, business services, and travel/tourism/entertainment.[47] Moreover, a casual observation of Lincoln Park reveals the physical expansion of gentrifying areas, the appearance of hardware stores catering to rehabbers, and the

Signs of gentrification

One of the neighborhood's many decimated blocks

Tidy 3600 block of West Walnut and its block association rules

mushrooming of upscale restaurants, boutiques, and health clubs, providing evidence of the new taste for urban living noted by observers such as Sharon Zukin.

However, these conditions do not produce gentrification in all available neighborhoods, and, of course, they have little to do with incumbent upgrading. In East Garfield Park, which is very near the Loop and has many solid old homes available at very low prices, there has been only limited gentrification. The reason is fairly obvious: though close to the downtown, this neighborhood is also on the "other" side of the racial divide and thus quite unattractive to many prospective gentrifiers. Indeed, for many black professionals interested in central-city living, East Garfield Park can be just as unattractive as for whites—if it happens that these individuals seek a racially mixed residential environment.

The absence of gentrification in East Garfield Park is thus also related to environmental factors. As a site for gentrification, Lincoln Park's particular locational advantage over East Garfield Park was its proximity to a longstanding upper-income enclave, the Gold Coast. This meant that early rehabbers could search for promising inexpensive properties in an area not so distant from a demonstrably "solid" residential neighborhood. As for realtors, they were able to sell Lincoln Park as a neighborhood "on the way up" by characterizing it as the natural extension of a locale that had always been "up."

At least until the 1968 riots in Chicago, some intrepid rehabbers or very aspiring realtors might have moved into East Garfield Park—trumpeting the beauty of its adjoining public park, noting its coupling of cheap and architecturally distinguished houses, and pointing to the downtown skyline rising close by to the east. Promoting areas that are isolated from a city's existing centers of residential investment is not impossible, though it is uncommon. In fact, from the 1960s most rehabbers and realtors looking for opportunities to gentrify or to profit from gentrification in Chicago took the more conservative course, which was to look to near North Side neighborhoods such as Lincoln Park.

What hindsight may characterize as the conservative course of action—to rehabilitate and trade real estate in an environmentally attractive area that also adjoined existing prestigious areas—at the time, to many gentrifiers, did not seem so conser-

vative. Indeed, the pioneering gentrifiers of Lincoln Park did not simply fix old houses, they modified these structures with an eye to, among other things, maximizing personal safety. Rehabbed homes and newly built single-family structures and apartment buildings typically included such security precautions as electronic entrance and alarm systems; iron gates, fences, and window grates; and attached garages. As gentrification advanced, the very cautious building designs of the 1960s gave way to lower fences, more windows, and greater accessibility to the street; but developers of large condominium complexes still use security systems as a primary tool in advertising their properties. Even close observers of Lincoln Park seldom note this subtle modernization of a "historic" neighborhood, but we shall return to discuss how this physical redesign affects the social character of the area.

Just as architectural and locational factors interact in rather complicated ways, so do the political and economic factors of organizational development and resource access. If one views the activation of political resources as simply a matter of the degree of mobilization, there is little to distinguish Lincoln Park from East Garfield Park. In both neighborhoods, the years following World War II brought the appearance of a wide array of community organizations. However, neighborhood organizations in Lincoln Park managed to work more congenially with city officials than did those in East Garfield Park, their indigenous resource bases were greater, and their community received substantial infusions of external resources—most notably, capital.

The different paths of the two neighborhoods lead to an obvious question: could organizations in East Garfield Park have done better? Possibly organization leaders could have set and achieved objectives more effectively. Some current East Garfield Park leaders suggest that community groups in the 1960s were overly confrontational in dealing with city leaders and private firms. Nonetheless, when one considers the degree of change occurring in the community, the relative poverty of the incoming population, the consequences of redlining, and the dearth of local "corporate actors," one is hard-pressed to conclude that more effective organization would have yielded a substantially different East Garfield Park in the mid-1980s.

The contrasting stories of Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park suggest that organization building in itself is unlikely to slow neighborhood decline. However, when organizational development is able to mobilize and "import" resources, it can make a difference. Yet contrary to the usual assumption of causality, access to resources—via institutional commitments to maintain or expand facilities, lending by banks, or the personal wealth of neighborhood newcomers—is more likely to be the antecedent than the result of organization building. In other words, neighborhood organizations that successfully promote local revitalization are located in areas that otherwise have access to resources. Certainly, the resource disparity between Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park has been monumental, and the relative availability of resources has played a large part in determining the character of organizational mobilization in each neighborhood.

From the foregoing discussion of why Lincoln Park gentrified while East Garfield Park experienced neither gentrification nor upgrading, one might suppose that we have traced a simple contrast of neighborhood success versus neighborhood failure. East Garfield Park is indeed a troubled community. Located a mere two miles from Chicago's imposing downtown, the neighborhood's abandoned buildings and vacant lots cry out for even a trickle of investment. Meanwhile, a sizable share of the local population suffers from the array of social ailments that characterize slum neighborhoods across the country. However, Lincoln Park is in some important ways less of a success story than its boosters and local realtors would have one believe.

The gentrification of Lincoln Park has changed the character of the community in subtle ways that can be defined, in part, by considering the evolution of land-use and development disputes over a thirty-year period. During the 1950s and 1960s, the underlying issue of public debate over development was the fate of the local minority population: would the black and Hispanic population continue to increase? As an element in the neighborhood's political discourse, the racial issue was raised through competing views of how urban renewal sites should be disposed. Representatives of the minority population called for the construction of subsidized housing; members of the urban renewal board favored the sale of sites to private developers.[48] As

a rule, private developers built for Lincoln Park's more affluent incoming population.

During the 1970s Lincoln Park was secured for gentrification, but the disputes over physical development continued. However, the subjects of debate shifted considerably. For example, some of the homeowners on the side streets that adjoin the neighborhood's several entertainment districts sought to restrict commercial development. Along the lakefront, residents—including some who themselves lived in highrises—sought to downzone adjoining areas to prevent future high-density development. On the western edge of the community, residential developers sought to move into the manufacturing area along the north branch of the Chicago River.

As in other gentrifying areas, these disputes were bound to more fundamental disagreements over the appropriate uses of public space and different individuals' and groups' tolerance of social and physical diversity. In general, newcomers to Lincoln Park, again like gentrifiers in other cities, attach great importance to the isolation of private spaces in and around the home and disapprove of public socializing, which they feel often turns to rowdiness.[49] We have already noted that Lincoln Park rehabbers and developers have used a variety of physical design techniques to separate private and public space.

Similarly, as gentrification has proceeded, residents increasingly speak of the neighborhood as a "residential community." This is in spite of the fact that some part of Lincoln Park's initial attraction for gentrifiers was its active nightlife. In addition, the neighborhood's restaurants, clubs, and theaters continue to be important economic stimuli. Anthropologist Brett Williams, in characterizing similar sentiments among gentrifiers in a Washington, D.C., neighborhood, notes "that if they could they would transform Main Street into a different kind of place."[50] In the case of Lincoln Park, many gentrifiers would opt for a quieter, less diverse neighborhood than the one into which they moved. For these individuals, the neighborhood's bustling commercial streets, such as Clark Street and Lincoln and Armitage avenues, are too close for comfort to their homes and a source of recurring irritation.

The preference for insulated private space and less diverse public space is also expressed by recent trends in local commer-

cial development. As gentrification has spread west in Lincoln Park, developers have taken over old industrial and warehouse sites for commercial projects, such as shopping centers and theater complexes. These sites are desirable in part because developers can accede to the growing preference for commercial/residential separation—this in a neighborhood where apartments above storefronts were once commonplace. Within these complexes, individual storefronts are located off the neighborhood street system. The proximate reason for isolating stores in this fashion is to provide parking. The practical effect is to reduce the prospect of these developments knitting themselves into the pedestrian network of the surrounding neighborhood. In fact, the assumptions regarding land-use segmentation and automobile dependence that are revealed by these designs are indistinguishable from those employed by suburban shopping center developers.

One subtext to this pattern of evolving land-use disputes, characterizations of the neighborhood, and design practice is Lincoln Park's emergence as a high-status residential enclave. But beyond this fairly obvious trend is a more important development. Lincoln Park is defining a new form of high-status, homogeneous neighborhood. Not only are poor and most minority people excluded from residence and shopping, but the physical design of the community aims to hamper street life, chance encounters, and the opportunities for surprise that are characteristic of older neighborhoods. Furthermore, Lincoln Park's accommodation to the automobile removes residents from the sidewalk in favor of the insulated yet expansive physical movement usually associated with suburban life. Like the downtown megastructures discussed in chapter 2, Lincoln Park is in its city without really being a part of its city.

4

Three Visions of the Prospective American City

In the preceding two chapters we examined changes in the physical environment of American cities. These discussions looked at downtowns and neighborhoods, in turn, and in each instance we discussed the physical rebuilding of cities as a function of and influence upon the social character of cities. However, in locating and discussing the sources of urban redesign, we for the most part related contextual factors, such as economic transformations, public policy, and demographic shifts, to the process of urban rebuilding. Thus, we connected national and international economic restructuring to the redefinition of downtown space and neighborhood gentrification. Similarly, urban renewal as practiced in the 1950s and 1960s appears in both discussions as a factor contributing to later trends in downtown and neighborhood rebuilding.

In this chapter we approach urban rebuilding from a different perspective. Our focus is on the intentions of urban designers and the degree to which their designs "fit" the emergent American city. In this analysis, the built form of cities is employed as an indicator of social values and, more specifically, of society's "vision" of the urban future. The effort to shape the physical

form of cities is one of the primary methods of reshaping urban society. Through their designs, architects and associated urban designers seek to provide physical environments that inspire sociability, meet socially defined standards for human shelter, and structure the movement of people and products. The process of design is seldom, if ever, a straightforward expression of designers' intent. To varying degrees sponsors, contractors, and even users play a part in shaping the final product. Nonetheless, if one assumes that the intentions of designers register prevalent social values as well as their personal visions and commitments, the interpretation of intent as expressed through their work is a meaningful enterprise.

However, urban designers do not necessarily succeed in achieving their objectives, so we also inquire as to how intentions, built structures, and human use interact. How well do designs conform to the actual needs of urban residents? Are new urban designs compatible with evolving patterns of city settlement and the use of public space? This relationship is problematic for a number of reasons. For instance, urban structures sometimes fail to have the social effects intended by their designers because inhabitants or visitors impose their own pattern of use. William H. Whyte has documented the highly convivial use by pedestrians of the Seagram Building plaza in New York City, a circumstance that is apparently quite at variance with the expectations of the building's architects, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson.[1] In other instances, architects misconstrue the physical form that their designs will take. As a rule, architects possess an imperfect understanding of the needs of their buildings' presumed users, the uses of adjoining structures and districts, and even the composition of the population inhabiting the neighborhoods in which their structures are located.

In this chapter we will examine three distinctive "visions" that animate the practice of architects and the associated urban design professions. I refer to these three visions as the "city-as-megaforum," the "city functional," and the "city-as-glass menagerie. Each of these visions is observable in the physical structure of cities around the United States. Although no particular city is systematically designed according to any one of these visions, they represent three characteristic strategies for ordering urban space. The purpose of identifying these visions is not

primarily to distinguish among architectural styles, but rather to evaluate how designers of the urban environment envision the urban order, and how their designs are likely to affect the urban order. In other words, how will the structural redefinition of urban space interact with and redirect day-to-day use of the city, as well as the patterns of economic action, residential settlement, and leisure activities?

THE CITY AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT

In chapter 1 we noted Jane Jacobs's comment that cities " . are settlements where much new work is added to older work and that this work multiplies and diversifies. " This characterization of the city as the principal location of economic enterprise, which is the consistent theme of Jacobs's extensive analysis of the dynamics of contemporary cities, is an unobjectionable proposition, yet it clearly construes the functional importance of cities too narrowly. One might amplify it by stating that the built form of cities is the physical container of core social processes, such as economic production and distribution, governance, and the dissemination of valued cultural artifacts.

In this sense, a city is a mechanism whose structural components are buildings, open space, and pathways. David Harvey's neo-Marxian formulation identifies the physical form of the city as an important part of a society's "mode of production. In relating mode of production to urban form, Harvey divides the concept of mode of production into two components. The first is "social relations of production, including the physical processes of goods fabrication and service production, the ownership and direction of these processes, and such support activities as public administration, legal practice, banking, real estate manipulation, and advertising. This enumeration of activities and social relationships summarizes the core economic activities in any advanced industrial country. Invariably, such societies are heavily urbanized.

The second component of mode of production is "social reproduction." Here Harvey refers to those activities, products, and services that contribute to the perpetuation of society as a physical and social entity. The provision of shelter is an impor-

tant aspect of social reproduction, as well as a longstanding urban problem. More generally, urban form's contribution to social reproduction may be gauged by considering how a city's commercial, industrial, residential, and recreational configurations permit amenable family development, hospitable relations among individuals of different ages, genders, ethnicities, and social preferences, and the orderly movement of individuals through day-to-day activities as well as the life cycle.[2]

Harvey's conceptualization can be summarized to suggest that the city contains society's primary economic units and means of governance (relations of production), and also serves to sustain and modify individual, family, and community development (social reproduction). Lewis Mumford, though working in an intellectual tradition quite different from Harvey's, had earlier made a similar distinction: "The city is both a physical entity for collective living and a symbol of those collective purposes and unanimities that arise under such favoring circumstances. Through its concrete, visible command over space the city lends itself, not only to the practical offices of production, but to the daily communion of its citizens. . . "[3] Mumford thus augments the identification of productive and reproductive functions with a particular emphasis on the symbolic role of the city's built form. In essence, the designers of urban space seek to communicate a variety of values through urban structure.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz's description of a Balinese royal palace captures one of the symbolic uses of urban space:

> the *puri* was itself, in its sheer material form, a sacred symbol, a replica of the order it was constructed to symbolize."[4]

The Balinese *puri* was a structure intended to express the heavenly order with which its worldly society identified. Mumford has drawn a similar connection in relating the structure of the Bernini forecourt to St. Peter's Cathedral to the absolutist philosophy of the Baroque Papacy.[5]

In other instances, the form of cities underlies social relations within society. Architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri's interpretation of workers' housing blocks in Weimar Germany notes this symbolic function. In Tafuri's view, the functionalist architectural elements that would later be assimilated in the "international style" were used to extend the factory aesthetic directly into the residential environment of the urban working

class. The city as a whole was conceptualized as a machine; given this principle, the repetitive, blockish apartment complexes were integral components of the larger urban order.[6] Similarly, historian Lauro Martines notes the correlation between aristocratic families' social prominence and the sumptuousness of their *palazzi* in Renaissance Florence, Milan, and Siena.[7] This interfamilial architectural competition is not so different from the efforts by contemporary corporations to build headquarters that are more architecturally distinguished or at least bigger than those of their competitors.

Urban form can also symbolize conflict over use of the city. In the late 1960s the University of California at Berkeley cleared some housing adjacent to campus. While the university contemplated how the site might be redeveloped, neighborhood activists converted the vacant space to what they called the People's Park, a symbol of their opposition to the university's expansion at the expense of Berkeley's stock of rental housing.[8] In the two decades since the declaration of the People's Park, dozens of examples of urban space as a symbol of social conflict have been reported in American, European, and Third World cities.[9]

These examples suggest two extensions of the observations by Harvey and Mumford. The first, which is salient to Harvey's discussion of social relations of production and social reproduction, is that the physical form of individual cities varies in its capacity to structure these functions. In other words, some cities are more efficient producers than others; in some cities housing or leisure opportunities may be more accessible. Second, and not explicitly addressed by either Harvey or Mumford, is the prospect of dissonance between functional designs or their symbolic content and the response of urban residents. That is, the meaning of particular facilities or spaces is not strictly a matter of designer–sponsor intention. It is also affected by the reactions of users or other urban residents. The evolution of People's Park exemplifies this relationship.

My goal in identifying and describing three basic strategies used by urban designers in the United States to organize urban space is to explore how applied visions of the city both interact with the extant city and seek to shape the future city. Specifically, the following sections of the chapter address three lines of inquiry. The first grows out of Harvey's concept of social rela-

tions of production. What understanding of the material process of production is expressed by these visions? Relatedly, what assumptions regarding the social composition of cities animate each of these visions? In effect, how do these visions define the contents of the city?

The city as a communicator of symbolic messages anchors the second line of inquiry. How do these visions rationalize the urban order and relations among different groups within the city? Moreover, through its acknowledgment of the possibility of dissonance between message and reaction, the discussion of the symbolic content points to the third line of inquiry. How is social reproduction specified, and how do different classes of people within the city react to these visions?

These are, of course, large questions that defy any effort to provide unqualified answers. However, by applying them to the three urban visions defined in the following pages, and by considering prevalent trends in local urban economic development, patterns in the use of urban public space, and widely observed stresses in the social fabric of American cities, one is forced to some very uncomfortable realizations. Among these are that these three urban visions are not likely to lead to cities in which economic opportunity is widely available, street-level, face-to-face congeniality is promoted, or fundamental human needs, such as access to decent shelter and public services, are generally met.

The City-as-Megaforum

The city-as-megaforum is a widely applied vision of urban form that in the United States is typically associated with monumental complexes of public buildings. The most ambitious example of the city-as-megaforum is the Mall and its environs in Washington, D.C. Other important examples are the civic centers in Cleveland and San Francisco, whose initial plans were prepared by Daniel Burnham's firm, the Benjamin Franklin Parkway in Philadelphia, and the Government Center in Boston.

In midtown Manhattan, Rockefeller Center is the rare example of a wholly private development cast as a megaforum. Nevertheless, the special circumstances of its creation—construction during the Great Depression well away from the center of

Boston City Hall

Lincoln Center, Manhattan's Upper West Side

development in Manhattan, financing by the formidable wealth of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.—help account for its ambitious design.[10] More recent private megaforums in Manhattan, such as the row of office-towers-with-plazas along the Avenue of the Americas, were induced by zoning regulations that awarded developers height bonuses in exchange for street-level plazas.[11] In this case the zoning ordinance was used to produce a public amenity through private construction.

The city-as-megaforum punctuates urban space with monumental buildings, uses structures, gardens, and pathways to create highly symmetrical arrangements of space, and seeks dramatic visual effects through focused lighting and the closing of vistas with prominent buildings or statuary. This highly self-conscious manipulation of urban space often has an analogue in the treatment of component buildings' interiors, but for the most part the city-as-megaforum is a vision of the outdoor city. The important public spaces and buildings that it includes are usually directly accessible to the surrounding city by streets, pedestrian paths, and mass transit lines. Given the function of most megaforums—to give focus to a community by highlighting the structures that house its chief governmental and cultural institutions—this connectedness with the city at large is essential.

In the United States the city-as-megaforum can be traced to the City Beautiful movement at the turn of the century. However, the grand manipulation of urban space that is the core of the city-as-megaforum can be linked to European city plans that are several centuries older. Lewis Mumford has identified Burnham's 1909 Plan of Chicago, which sought to apply megaforum principles to an entire metropolitan region, as a remnant of "baroque" city planning.[12]

Since the apex of the City Beautiful movement at the beginning of this century, there has been considerable change in the design vocabulary of the city-as-megaforum. For example, the classical architectural style of the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago and of the older structures along the Washington Mall is no longer an essential ingredient. The structures forming the Government Center in Boston are only vaguely classical, and the City Hall at the heart of the complex is a starkly modernist building. Nonetheless, this is a characteristic megaforum. The Government Center is located at the convergence of several

major downtown streets. The buildings, though not in a classical vocabulary, are imposing edifices. Set well back from Cambridge Street, the City Hall faces a huge plaza, which is available for large-scale outdoor civic events. In this and other cities, the megaforum seeks to communicate a sense of civic power and pride by housing government in imposing quarters and locating these imposing quarters at a highly visible, generally accessible point in the central city.

The City Functional

Like the city-as-megaforum, the city functional manipulates urban space in a highly self-conscious manner. However, unlike the city-as-megaforum, the city functional's principal method of spatial manipulation is enclosure. It is epitomized by downtown commercial megastructures such as the Renaissance Center in Detroit and Peachtree Center in Atlanta. These complexes enclose a variety of enterprises and activities, including shopping areas, offices, and hotel accommodations. The layout of their shopping arcades approximates that of city streets, with shops facing onto landscaped pedestrian paths, but this internal structure does not connect with the street system of the "outdoor" city. For example, the Renaissance Center, which is separated from Detroit's old downtown by a busy boulevard, Jefferson Avenue, is nearly inaccessible to pedestrians. A landscaped barrier faces the street, and the main access points to the complex are the entrances to its parking garage.

Also unlike the megaforum, the city functional's principles have been applied to residential as well as commercial and public buildings. On Chicago's North Side, Carl Sandburg Village provides residences for several thousand people. Its site plan orients activity to the center of its superblocks by arranging tall residential towers around plazas, with townhouse units substituted for highrise structures at some points in the plan. The plazas are set a few feet above the street level, and access to the complex is provided by a limited number of walkways. Underground parking garages relieve residents from vying for street-side parking spaces.

The city functional's characteristic enclosure and separation of urban space is sometimes carried to such an extreme that this

Renaissance Center, Detroit



Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles

Atrium of the IDS Center, Minneapolis

urban vision, in effect, replaces the older city. The Crown Center in Kansas City, Missouri, and Water Tower Place in Chicago were built at some distance from the old downtown districts, and each has supplanted the old urban core as its city's premier shopping district.[13] On the periphery of metropolitan areas, the city functional is the characteristic form of the new communities that develop at the intersections of major expressways.[14]

The intellectual lineage of the city functional can be traced to the futuristic urban schemes proposed by several early twentieth-century architects, of which Le Corbusier's have had the greatest impact.[15] The famous Swiss-French architect contended that the historic European city, with its clotted, serpentine street system, must be replaced by an efficient city of "straight lines," separation of pedestrian and auto traffic, and orderly segmentation of urban functions.[16] In the "city of tomorrow," a modernist architectural vocabulary and an advanced system of highways would not only enhance efficiency in a material sense, they would also symbolize the arrival of the new machine age. Although the city functional does not always adopt Le Corbusier's central image of the new city—the modernist tower placed in a park—its adaptation to the automobile, generally modernist architectural vocabulary, and dislocation from the surrounding city are direct descendants of Le Corbusier's city of tomorrow.

The City-as-Glass Menagerie

The city-as-glass menagerie may be easily distinguished from the city functional by its attitude toward the historic city. The city-as-glass menagerie seeks to preserve older structures and districts, although the means of preservation and ultimate use of such remnants of the pre–World War II urban fabric vary widely. Certainly the most pervasive settings for the glass menagerie are the dozens of gentrifying residential neighborhoods across the United States. In these neighborhoods, middle-class urbanites have restored homes from a potpourri of periods and architectural styles, among them Federal, Victorian, and Art Deco.[17]

Since the 1970s, the practice of adaptive reuse of older structures has added a second element to the city-as-glass menagerie. In many cities, underused and abandoned industrial structures, including railroad terminals, warehouses, and facto-

ries, have been renovated for use as residential and commercial spaces. Conversely, in several East Coast cities, formerly residential rowhouses have been recycled as shops and professional offices.[18]

In all of these instances, rehabilitators have expressed reverence for the craftsmanship typically found in older structures and an understanding that these structures were often built on a more human scale than much mid-twentieth-century architecture. In the case of some larger structures, such as railroad terminals, which are in fact quite massive buildings, there is a related romantic appreciation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century engineering. The scale is immense, but the structure is comprehensible to the layperson. Interestingly, the city-as-glass menagerie vision can also be identified as an agent in the evolution of an emergent philosophy of new architecture, postmodernism. Through their interest in reintroducing ornament to buildings, by seeking to evoke premodernist architectural styles, and by sometimes reducing the scale of their buildings, postmodernist architects are struggling to root new architecture within the extant urban fabric.[19]

The degree to which the city-as-glass menagerie seeks to reknit the city's physical fabric is not always matched by its capacity to weave itself into the social fabric. It is no longer argued that the rehabilitation of older structures is an assured means of producing low-cost housing; in many cities where residential gentrification is widespread, dislocation of low-income neighborhood incumbents has been substantial.[20] Indeed, as we noted in the preceding chapter's examination of the gentrification of Lincoln Park, gentrifiers and merchants in gentrifying neighborhoods employ a variety of techniques to protect their quarters from outside intrusion: formidable walls and gates, electronic entry systems, garages discreetly located on the ground floor or at the back of lots. Thus, like the city functional, the city-as-glass menagerie is not available to all.

The sources of the city-as-glass menagerie are quite distinguishable from those of the city-as-megaforum and the city functional, each of which began with the dreams of professional architects. There can be no question that Jane Jacobs's powerful indictment of post–World War II city planning and celebration of the densely settled, street-dominated industrial city, *The*

Death and Life of Great American Cities, helped give rise to the city-as-glass menagerie. However, the direct influence of Jacobs's book was greatest upon architects and city planners; the gentrification movement, in particular, came about through the independent action of thousands of rehabilitators. The renewed affection for older urban neighborhoods represents a substantial transformation of popular taste, principally among young adults who were raised in postwar suburbs and who harbor nostalgic images of prewar city life.[21]

THE CITY-AS-MEGAFORUM, CITY FUNCTIONAL, AND CITY-AS-GLASS MENAGERIE AND THE PROSPECTIVE AMERICAN CITY

One can locate examples of the city-as-megaforum, city functional, and city-as-glass menagerie in nearly every major city and in many smaller communities across the country. The rebuilding of downtown cores, which was frequently the prime objective of post–World War II local urban renewal efforts, has proceeded at an accelerated pace in the past decade.[22] Countless architects have used either the city functional or the city-as-megaforum as their guiding principle in reworking the downtown fabric, although the city functional is the more prevalent of the two. Downtown rebuilding, in many cities, has been accompanied by residential gentrification, which characteristically produces the city-as-glass menagerie. Yet throughout the post–World War II period, it has been on the edge of metropolitan regions that the greatest development has occurred. The decentralization of business management, retailing, and other commercial activities has led to a need to shape peripheral "urban villages," and in this part of the metropolis the city functional has reigned supreme.[23]

Thus, in identifying and describing the city-as-megaforum, city functional, and city-as-glass menagerie, we are not simply categorizing design strategies. Each of these three urban visions has been used repeatedly to shape urban space, and collectively they summarize how practicing urban designers are seeking to structure the city of the future. We shall turn now to the questions growing out of our earlier consideration of the func-

tions of the city's built form: What assumptions regarding the contents of the city give form to these visions? What is their symbolic intent? How do various groups in the city react to these visions?

The Contents of the City

Of these three urban visions, the city-as-megaforum is the most puzzling in its interpretation of the city's composition. As a design strategy, the city-as-megaforum is usually employed in city hall and state capitol complexes, museums and other edifices of high culture, parks, and some private office developments. Aside from these uses, one does not often observe this design strategy; in particular, the city-as-megaforum is not used to structure housing.

We have noted that the source of the city-as-megaforum in the United States was the City Beautiful movement, and by considering the social context of the City Beautiful, we can begin to understand the truncated application of the city-as-megaforum. Most commentators agree that the City Beautiful was both a reaction against the sprawling industrial city of the late nineteenth century and an effort to dignify and express the importance of cities to the United States' performance as a world economic and political power.[24] Given the laissez-faire attitude of American capitalists at the time, the architects and landscape designers who created particular projects, such as the 1893 Columbian Exposition, and later began to define a new profession, city planning, articulated a rather narrow-gauged urban vision. For instance, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., characterized the City Beautiful's agenda in the following fashion: "First, the sizes, shapes and slopes of the streets; second, the sizes and characters of the buildings and their location in respect to each other and the street spaces; third, the distribution of the unbuilt land not included in the streets; and fourth, the surface treatment of the unbuilt land both with and without the street limits, and the character and distribution of objects that rise from these surfaces, whether trees, telegraph poles, fences or what not."[25] In short, the objects of planning were streets, buildings, and undeveloped space.

Peter Marcuse has described how the early city planning

movement in the United States excluded housing from its policy priorities.[26] The intellectual predilections of many early planners, as well as the ideology and interest of the private sponsors of early planning efforts, account for this circumscription of planning practice. In the ensuing decades, this produced a profession that devoted much attention to comprehending and seeking to enhance the city's existing physical system as a device for private economic activity.[27]

There also remained a commitment to reshape the city, but this was channeled largely in the direction of planning impressive public edifices. Advocates of this enterprise took it quite seriously, as evidenced by this statement by Charles Mulford Robinson, publicist of both the City Beautiful movement and the city planning profession: "The moral and spiritual standards of the people will be advanced by this art, and their political ideals will rise with a civic pride and community spirit born of the appreciation that they are citizens of 'no mean city' "[28] Implicit in Robinson's observation is the recognition that the turn-of-the-century metropolis included many residents whose "moral and spiritual standards" should be improved. He was referring, no doubt, to the thousands of European immigrants who poured annually into New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other industrial centers, as well as to the many unpolished industrialists and machine bosses who were assuming leadership roles in these same cities. The City Beautiful, thus, observed the industrial city's growing ethnic and class stratification. However, through its designs for the city, the City Beautiful sought to relieve these social differences, as well as resultant social tensions, by drawing attention to an idealized vision of the community that was embodied by monumental buildings and grand public spaces.

The City Beautiful's failure to reshape American cities has been attributed to a variety of technical problems, such as inadequate land-use controls, but a more fundamental flaw was its very understanding of the city.[29] The City Beautiful's classical architecture, sculptural manipulation of urban space, and lovely vistas were simply irrelevant to the underlying needs of the evolving industrial city. Not only were its planners unable to articulate how the City Beautiful might impinge on housing development, but private capital could find nothing in its urban vision to help in organizing factory complexes, speeding the

transportation of raw materials and finished products, or assisting communication between buyers and sellers.

The city-as-megaforum is a vestige of City Beautiful planning. Its application is limited to governmental and cultural complexes or, in rare instances, to the office complexes of benevolent corporations. Like its antecedent, it offers no vision of an integrated urban complex. This is not surprising, as its impetus was the desire to turn away from the emerging character of the real industrial city.

The city functional is likewise a truncated vision of the city, but in contrast to the city-as-megaforum, it is an urban vision that is wholly in keeping with emergent trends in the private economy of cities. As the industrial sectors of the national economy, as well as the industrial base of particular American cities, have shrunk, the city as a center for corporate management, place of residence for managers, professionals, and service workers, and setting for "upscale" private consumption has emerged as the predominant model of urban development.[30]

This model appears in its purest form on the metropolitan periphery, where open space and agricultural land have been converted to suburban and exurban development nodes. Enclosed city-functional complexes permit convenient pedestrian movement. Communication with other locations is provided by an array of technological innovations, and the primary mode of interlocal transportation in the automobile. When used in the central city, this design strategy produces the kind of disconnection from the urban fabric that characterizes the Renaissance Center and Sandburg Village.

In effect, the city functional produces two cities that correspond to the dual economy of contemporary American cities. The city functional houses the growing sectors of corporate management and business services, personal services, and retailing to the affluent. The outlying city holds declining industrial belts, small-scale enterprises on decaying neighborhood shopping strips, and neighborhoods with minimal housing investment.[31]

The city-as-glass menagerie also gives form to important conditions within the emerging urban economy. And like the other two urban visions, it offers only a partial vision of the city. Its residential form, in gentrifying neighborhoods across the

country, reflects the renewed taste for rowhouses, highly ornamental facades, and eccentric interior spaces. Typically, the process of physically rehabilitating neighborhoods whose structures meet these expectations is accompanied by a parallel process of resident substitution. Gentrifiers, whose jobs in the city's growth sectors give them sufficient income to finance expensive house repairs or pay steep prices for newly constructed residences, move into neighborhoods previously occupied by low-income residents.

Incumbent dislocation proceeds along several paths. Low-income tenants may lose their leases, or in some cases their landlords may allow properties to run down to the point of inhabitability. Homeowners on fixed incomes may feel financial pressure from upward tax reassessments. In any case, the factors that attract gentrifiers—architectural charm, solid construction, romantic ambience—raise real estate prices to the point that the factors that once attracted less-affluent incumbents—aging, therefore less-expensive housing; access to the central-city job market—are no longer meaningful. In short, the gentrifying neighborhood serves a new function, and a different residential population, within a shifting local economy.

Glass menagerie neighborhoods quite frequently are located near resurgent downtown areas. For the high-income managers, professionals, and service workers who prefer the physical character of such neighborhoods, their proximity to work, restaurants and entertainment, and cultural facilities is a major attraction. The city-as-glass menagerie thus defines a vision of the city that is consistent with individual consumption patterns arising from the economic restructuring of the new downtowns. As such, it is an urban vision that complements the city functional. In practice, it is commonplace for the corporate manager to awaken in the morning in a restored townhouse, proceed to an off-street parking area to pick up the family car, drive to a work place located in a downtown megastructure, and once more park in an off-street garage.

Symbolic Intent

The intentions underpinning the city-as-megaforum include the representation of community virtues, the cultivation of alle-

giance to the community, and the communication of refined cultural values. Its constituent buildings' monumentality expresses the city's achievement. The spaciousness of its public areas also expresses achievement and, more importantly, provides room for large gatherings to attend speeches or artistic performances.

To connect the megaforum, once more, with its sources in the City Beautiful movement, this approach to urban monumentality seeks to use structures and space to transmit desirable civic values, which, it is thought, may not be in wide circulation among the population. One of the visitors to the Columbian Exposition observed that the fair in Chicago "revealed to many Americans, whose lives were necessarily colorless and narrow, the splendid possibilities of art, and the compelling power of the beautiful."[32] The proposition that public buildings should communicate such values is hardly unique to American urban culture. However, the burden of this responsibility may be greater in the United States, given the widespread perception of sprawling, unattractive development in the city at large. In essence, powerful and uplifting urban space will compensate for the banality of most urban space and the lack of civic and cultural models for the urban population.

The partial urban vision offered by the city-as-megaforum is attenuated by the inability of municipal governments to maintain important components of their megaforum plans. For example, turn-of-the-century advocates of public parks in cities such as Boston, Chicago, and New York envisioned their ambitious systems as oases of calm amid the bustle of the industrial metropolis.[33] By developing citywide park systems, the benefits of these oases would be available to all local residents. In the long run, this image of democratic urban parks has turned into an empty dream. The typical park system in the American city of the late twentieth century features one or two "showcase" parks that are accessible primarily to central-area workers, residents, and visitors. Less-visible parks away from core areas usually suffer from inadequate staffing and poor maintenance. These latter parks are the elements of the city-as-megaforum that are in closest proximity to most urban residents.

Unlike the city-as-megaforum, which seeks to give form to collective sentiments, the city functional expresses shifting class

divisions within the contemporary city. The city functional's enclosure of space reserves a new city for qualified visitors and inhabitants, and its generally characterless architectural modernism in no way invites the outsider. Typically, the city functional challenges the pedestrian's courage and industriousness and is simply inaccessible by mass transit.

Inside the city functional are business offices, upscale shopping, and high-priced hotel and residential space. These uses define the principal segments of the new urban management and service economy. Thus, their separation from the extant, outdoor city expresses the proposition that this new city can operate quite independently of the older city. Indeed, just as few laid-off industrial workers find jobs in the urban service economy, few former auto workers or steelworkers or their spouses shop in Detroit's Renaissance Center or Chicago's Water Tower Place.

The city-as-glass menagerie's partial urban vision is also related to the emerging urban economy. Gentrifiers are usually high-income managers, professionals, or service workers. Their preference for particular neighborhoods often turns on proximity to work as much as intrinsic environmental attributes. However, the glass menagerie throws its own peculiar light on local social divisions. The restored rowhouses and lofts, factories converted to shops, and upgraded commercial districts of the city-as-glass menagerie represent, in essence, the commoditization of urban history.[34] Most of these restored properties are held as private property. As a rule, the restoration process is an expensive enterprise, so only very well-off individuals or businesses can afford it. These individuals or businesses thus have bought and restored some of the most visible artifacts of their city's heritage.

Moreover, glass-menagerie districts usually appear in sections of the city that have undergone a cycle of physical decay. In most cases, if in the past there has been a substantial residential population, a disproportionate share of the population consisted of racial minorities. Thus, gentrifiers and commercial renovators often "reclaim" the city from some of its most disadvantaged residents. The reclamation process is usually perilous, with incumbent residents feeling much resentment toward newcomers, and with newcomers often indifferent to the higher rents and pressure to move effected by their arrival.[35]

These dislocations, however, are not the concern of the developers, designers, and inhabitants of the city-as-glass menagerie, nor have public officials shown great interest in the fate of those unhoused by gentrification. Enhanced street ambiences and property tax bases are the valued consequences of neighborhood revitalization. In the typical calculations of public decision makers, these benefits far outweigh costs associated with reducing the stock of low-cost housing. Less-visible consequences of gentrification, such as the inconvenience visited upon dislocated populations, are not even tallied in these accountings.

Responses to the City-as-Megaforum, City Functional, and City-as-Glass Menagerie

The city-as-megaforum presumes that cleavages in urban society are inconsequential, or at least subject to reduction through the inculcation of civic values. This urban vision also assumes that the public spaces of cities are widely accessible to the urban population, and that urban residents regularly make use of these spaces.

Although the era of the industrial city in the United States is long past, the postindustrial city is no less socially stratified. Moreover, the differential use of urban space is a principal indicator of social divisions. Although less-affluent inner-city residents still shop in old downtowns and use the recreational facilities of the central area, their more-affluent fellow urbanites often commute to work on the periphery of the metropolis and seldom visit downtown commercial areas or cultural edifices. As a consequence, the monumental public spaces of the contemporary city cannot transmit a common set of civic values.

To the degree that today's Americans do share a common culture, or participate in public affairs, the media that facilitate this participation are electronic: television, radio, and cinema. The city is not a space for participation in a collective enterprise; its spaces can no longer express a sense of common purpose. Given these conditions, the city-as-megaforum is an obsolete urban vision.

If the city-as-megaforum provides space for dialogue and common action, but is used by only a fraction of the population for these or any other purposes, the city functional actively

works to delineate class and racial divisions. The explicit purpose of enclosed shopping arcades is to restrict entry of undesirable individuals, and the owners of these complexes make the legal claim that their internal paths are private property.[36]

Although the city functional begins as an expression of the divisions in urban society, its ultimate impact is to increase these divisions. For the privileged users of the city functional, the ambiguity of urban life is reduced. In particular, the affluent, largely white population that inhabits the city functional has no need to cope with the human diversity that is characteristic of generally accessible public spaces. The city functional explicitly works to reduce the likelihood of surprising encounters by liberating its users from the chance situations and social mixing that are the essence of life on the streets of the outdoor city. For those who are unwelcome within the city functional, it becomes the object of envy. Indeed, even if they can gain entrance, they cannot possibly afford to purchase the products it markets or join the lucrative professions it houses. Thus, the city functional is also the enemy of tolerance, whether one's perspective is safely inside looking out, or out on the street looking in.

Nonetheless, when compared to the city-as-glass menagerie, the class divisions expressed and amplified by the city functional are often muted. Police surveillance of city-functional districts is intense; and although shoplifting is a pervasive problem in the city functional, explicitly violent reactions to it are limited. The city-as-glass menagerie reveals urban class tensions in rawer form. For example, gentrifiers are the frequent victims of break-ins or property defacement, most notably turf-claiming graffiti left by youth gangs.

Daily newspapers regularly report the rigors of gentrification, typically from the standpoint of newcomers. Yet the violence can have other sources and objects. On Chicago's near Northwest Side, the Wicker Park neighborhood has, since the late 1970s, been the focus of intense real estate speculation. A small number of gentrifiers have renovated some of the community's grand old homes, and several realtors and developers have promoted Wicker Park as the city's "next Lincoln Park.' At the same time, organizations representing the area's incumbent low-income population have fought displacement, and a non-profit developer, Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation, has

sought to meet this need by building subsidized low-cost in-fill housing. In the winter of 1983, vandals disrupted Bickerdike's building sites in Wicker Park. Neighborhood newcomers, concerned that the subsidized housing might undercut property values and provide shelter to undesirables, were responsible.[37] In the years to come, such incidents are likely to recur, for the city-as-glass menagerie permits the most direct of confrontations between hostile urban populations.

At its heart, the city-as-glass menagerie is a vision of social reproduction. It is also a nostalgic urban vision, filled as it is with historic homes and charming shops. It evokes a city in which children were safe and families could remain in the same house for decades. Yet the people who can afford to live in gentrifying areas typically hold jobs in the most advanced sectors of the local urban economy: corporate management, business services, and the professions. Furthermore, in spite of the variety of means they use to protect their homes, they live in the extant city with its streets, alleys, and adjoining neighborhoods. The good fortune of the residents of the city-as-glass menagerie can be observed by their less-advantaged neighbors. Conversely, gentrifiers are well aware that further gentrification enhances their own property values. Thus, political disputes over access to the neighborhood are the subtext of physical confrontations such as the one in Wicker Park, and are a characteristic feature of the city-as-glass menagerie.

THE FAILURE OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN VISIONS

A comprehensive vision of the city would address the functions of social relations of production, symbolic meaning, and social reproduction in some kind of consistent manner. In this sense, each of the visions identified in this chapter must be judged a failure. The city-as-megaforum offers a symbolic representation of community while neglecting how the city produces, who produces for whom in the city, and how urban society is to be reproduced. The city functional presents a bountiful vision of urban production and consumption joined to a dissonant symbolic message. By turning away from public space as well as the

extant city of older factories, municipal facilities, and neighborhoods, the city functional communicates exclusiveness. In an analogous manner, the city-as-glass menagerie represents a narrow type of social reproduction, available to only a few and the source of envy to many urbanites.

At the heart of this failure to define comprehensive and consistent urban visions is a more fundamental problem. The city-as-megaforum, city functional, and city-as-glass menagerie do not use physical structure as a vehicle in service of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation. On the contrary, they seek to overcome or suppress the open-endedness of life in the city. As such, each in its own way evades or seeks to reduce the diversity of cities, and none of these visions pretends to give form to a city in which jobs, shelter, public services, and leisure are available to the full range of urban residents. In short, the strategies of urban rebuilding that we discussed in chapters 2 and 3 not only reflect contextual factors reshaping urban economies and amplifying tensions among different classes of urban residents; as elements of these three urban visions they further undercut urban diversity and give form to the proposition that valued urban space must be reserved for economically advantaged residents. It appears that the practitioners of these urban visions cannot even imagine a diverse and egalitarian urban order.

5

The Environmental Politics of Neighborhood

In *A Theory of Good City Form,* Kevin Lynch writes that the

> . . . idea of the urban neighborhood has ridden a professional rollercoaster. In the first quarter of this century, it was a unit of social analysis used by pioneers in urban sociology. The idea then grew that the neighborhood was the proper territorial base of a socially supportive group, among whom there would be many personal contracts. Planning theorists, reassured by their organic models, picked up the idea of the neighborhood as the basic building block of a city. It was to be a defined spatial unit, free of through traffic and as self-sufficient in daily services as possible. . Later, the social assumption of this idea was thoroughly debunked.[1]

However, the debunking of the planners' neighborhood unit concept was not the end of the story. Lynch continues: "Just after the neighborhood idea had been thoroughly demolished at the highest levels it flared up again from below." The flaring up of the neighborhood "from below" resulted from, among other things, the massive public works initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s. Residents of inner-city neighborhoods scheduled for

clearance or falling within the rights of way of proposed expressways fought to save their homes, streets, and local businesses. Their resistance, in turn, piqued the attention of politicians and social scientists, who began to question the logic of this first wave of post–World War II urban rebuilding.

Thus, since the 1960s the idea of neighborhood has ridden a political as well as professional roller coaster as neighborhood activists have sought to grasp power from municipal bureaucracies and to develop autonomous mechanisms for promoting residential stability and local economic development. This is the sense in which current neighborhood politics are environmental: massive shifts in the physical structure of cities have yielded political movements that seek to preserve specific neighborhood areas. Movements to protect neighborhoods as physical entities have overlapped with forces seeking to restructure decision making in cities, producing in the 1980s what became known as the neighborhood movement. Many observers argue that this recent neighborhood mobilization represents the best hope for recreating congenial urban communities.

In the first portion of this chapter, we examine the three principal "pivots" around which the postwar politics of neighborhoods have revolved, each of which is connected to urban physical rebuilding. In the second half of the chapter, we trace the development of a Chicago neighborhood movement, the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City (SON/SOC) Coalition. The story of SON/SOC makes for an illuminating case study because each of the three neighborhood political pivots has affected the group's sense of identity and definition of objectives. Moreover, one observes in SON/SOC's activities and programs the same preference for spatial and social segmentation found in the designs of the new downtowns and gentrifying neighborhoods.

THE THREE PIVOTS OF POSTWAR NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS

Since the era of publicly sponsored urban rebuilding in the 1950s and 1960s, three characteristic themes, or pivots, have grounded neighborhood political disputes. The first of these

involves competing definitions of satisfactory neighborhood physical conditions. The second concerns access to neighborhoods: who has the best claim to changing neighborhoods? The third is the issue of neighborhood decision making. How much authority should city governments devolve to neighborhoods? Within neighborhoods, should activists channel their activities through formal institutions, such as neighborhood councils, or stand apart as a means of maintaining their political autonomy?

Whose Idea of Neighborhood?

The original premise of urban redevelopment was to substitute new, soundly constructed housing for the slums of American cities. Business and some legislative supporters of urban renewal added to this objective a desire to rebuild downtown business districts, and with the passage of legislation mandating urban expressways, a reasonably comprehensive urban vision emerged. The old urban core was to be rebuilt and linked with the expanding metropolitan periphery by high-speed expressways. Inner-city neighborhoods dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be replaced or substantially augmented by new residential districts, comprehensively planned and set apart from the extant city.

From the outset, there were objections to this program. Carole Rifkind, in her examination of the physical appearance of American communities, *Main Street,* notes that urban renewal and expressway demolition robbed cities of a wealth of physical landmarks as well as historically resonant public spaces and residential areas.[2] In addition, there were critics of neighborhood demolition in such heretofore obscure places as Boston's West End, New York's East Tremont, and Chicago's near West Side.[3]

The West End was one of Boston's first urban renewal sites, and although there was little mobilized resident opposition to its demolition, a number of social scientists observed and were disturbed by project execution. The comments of two of these researchers, Marc Fried and Peggy Gleicher, identify the Boston Redevelopment Area's (BRA) misunderstanding of the West End, a neighborhood that was much liked by its residents: "On the one hand, the residential area is the region in which a vast

and interlocking set of social networks is localized. And, on the other, the physical area has considerable meaning as an extension of home, in which various parts are delineated and structured on the basis of a sense of belonging."[4] The contrast between BRA and resident views can be summarized quite simply. The redevelopment authority observed an untidy-looking neighborhood whose residential structures fell below professionally defined standards of housing quality. Residents viewed the West End as a friendly place, which, because of low rents and easy access to public transportation, was also affordable and convenient.

Not only did researchers and neighborhood activists begin to argue that planners' definitions of neighborhood blight underestimated the virtues of older residential areas, but other critics also began to question the purported virtues of the new projects. W. L. Yancey, in an article published in 1971, discussed residents' attitudes toward and use of public space in the high-rise Pruitt-Igoe housing project, which had opened in St. Louis in 1954. Yancey reported that his interviewees appreciated the more commodious apartments available in Pruitt-Igoe, but that they considered the project's public spaces inconvenient and even hazardous: "In Pruitt-Igoe, the familiar aspects of slum living, such as fires and burning, freezing and cold, poor plumbing, dangerous electrical wiring, thin walls, and overcrowding of children and parents into single rooms are somewhat abated. Yet the amenities of lower-class neighborhoods are apparently lost."[5] Pruitt-Igoe's privatistic design undermined the formation of the informal social networks used in poor neighborhoods to channel mutual aid and as means of social control.

In accounting for the inhospitability of Pruitt-Igoe, Yancey notes how front stoops, the street, and adjoining backyards provide space that is amenable to the formation of social networks. The work of Jane Jacobs, the celebrant of the urban street and stoop, as well as of the mixed-use neighborhood with permeable "edges," represents the overturning of the planning mentality that gave urban renewal its physical vision. Like the planners she criticized so roundly, Jacobs was an advocate of the neighborhood. However, Jacobs's idea of the good city neighborhood contrasted with the planners' model not only in form, but also in function. Jacobs attacked the mechanical vision of the

city embodied in the work of Le Corbusier and his followers that defined neighborhoods as discrete, subordinate residential entities within an overarching urban order. Reversing the line of causality, Jacobs's conceptualization began with the city's set of neighborhoods, arguing that healthy neighborhoods produced a safe, economically vital city at large.[6] The upshot of this approach is to question even well-designed patching of the urban fabric, as the new cloth may not truly substitute for the old. What newly planned districts may offer in orderliness is likely to be offset by the loss of multifaceted connectedness that is characteristic of older urban neighborhoods.

Practically speaking, by the early 1960s residents of older neighborhoods slated for urban renewal often called for renovation rather than demolition, but their demands for the preservation of homes and existing, familiar public spaces overlapped with the second pivot of postwar neighborhood politics. This was the concern over who would live in cleared and other changing neighborhoods.

Whose Neighborhood?

In the early years of slum clearance, municipal redevelopment agencies often designated areas as slums, acquired property, and carried through demolition without encountering much neighborhood opposition.[7] Typically, residents of neighborhoods slated for demolition received assurances that they would be assisted in relocating, or even would be able to return to their rebuilt neighborhood. These pledges were often met with skepticism, but in the face of seemingly determined city governments armed with federal approval and funding, most people saw little use in fighting urban renewal. Harold Kaplan, explaining the lack of controversy surrounding clearance in Newark's Central Ward, notes that " . several Negro leaders emphasized how pointless any opposition would have been."[8]

This situation did not last. Two characteristics of the first wave of urban redevelopment quickly became evident to neighborhood activists. First, a substantial portion of the cleared areas seemed more compatible with upgrading and expanding downtown business districts than with improving slum housing. Second, the incumbent residents of cleared neighborhoods were

seldom able to return. In many cases commercial and institutional facilities replaced the old neighborhoods' houses and apartments. When apartments were constructed, their internal configurations and rents often precluded the return of neighborhood incumbents. Thus, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, urban renewal proposals in Atlanta (Buttermilk Bottom), Boston (the South End and Charlestown), San Francisco (the Western Addition), and several other cities generated loud neighborhood disapproval.[9]

By the late 1960s fiscally strained municipal governments pushed urban renewal and expressway construction less aggressively. Federal aid was shrinking, and neighborhoods had learned to make effective use of local approval requirements to block unpopular proposals. Although hundreds of thousands of people had been dislocated by urban renewal and expressway projects, and their scrambling for new places to live had sent tremors through the neighborhood terrain of many cities, given federal and municipal fiscal constraints, as well as the erection of procedural safeguards for neighborhoods, the twin issues of residential displacement and subsequent housing pressures in adjoining neighborhoods might have been expected to lose their force. In fact, during the 1970s these issues emerged in new guise.

The 1970s marked the beginning of substantial neighborhood gentrification, which typically proceeds without the initial publicity attendant to urban renewal. Also, in the early stages of a neighborhood's gentrification, when individual rehabbers are in the vanguard, the process of physical transformation is more elusive. The upgrading of individual structures occurs more or less randomly: one house on this block, a small apartment building two blocks over, and so on. As a result, the political controversies that greeted the announcement of later urban renewal plans tend to be absent in the early stage of gentrification.[10]

Nonetheless, there are local social tensions created by gentrification. We have already noted that neighborhood newcomers and incumbents often divide over issues of use of public space.[11] In addition, once there is enough momentum to a locale's gentrification to attract large numbers of purchaser/rehabbers and developers interested in renovating larger buildings or constructing new residential complexes, then incumbent displacement may emerge once more as a political issue. At present, the

pressures of downtown expansion and residential gentrification are so strong in Manhattan that incumbent residents of several previously neglected peripheral neighborhoods are voicing concern over displacement.[12] In Chicago, displacement concerns have emerged in the long-suffering Uptown neighborhood as gentrification has proceeded north along the lakefront from Lincoln Park.[13]

In the 1960s, although substitute housing for those displaced by urban renewal was uncongenial, at least there were walls and roofs made available to the unhoused. In the late 1980s, federal housing subsidies were unavailable to produce substitute housing. As a result, groups seeking to fight displacement resulting from gentrification have had to fight on a second front. In addition to their efforts at blocking or at least slowing displacement, they have also sought to define new means of producing low-cost substitute shelter. These efforts have included "linked development" proposals that tax downtown development and appropriate the proceeds to low-cost housing funds, litigation specifying that developers set aside some of their new housing units for low- and moderate-income residents, and the establishment of nonprofit housing development corporations.[14] In each case, these efforts make demands on institutions located outside particular neighborhoods and developers operating in a number of neighborhoods. Consequently, these confrontations often spill over from particular neighborhoods onto the political stage of the city at large.

Who Decides?

Even as the physical disruption of urban neighborhoods reached its peak in the early 1960s, a series of political forces were shaping a new perspective on the role of neighborhoods in cities. The political salience of this new perspective was in its presumption that local residents should have some say in decisions affecting their neighborhoods. The cluster of issues centering on the question of who should determine the fate of neighborhoods constitutes the third pivot of neighborhood politics.

Among the sources of this new perspective were the federal officials in charge of programs such as urban renewal. By the early 1960s these officials were cognizant of local resistance to

neighborhood demolition and began to require that redevelopment agencies engage in more thorough consultation with neighborhood residents in advance of project execution.[15] Likewise, the Johnson administration's Community Action Program specified the "maximum feasible participation" of poverty-area residents in designing and executing local programs.[16] However, just as important in promoting the idea of neighborhood participation in the development and execution of policy were pressures "from below." Among blacks and other racial minorities, the civil rights movement not only circulated the idea that those affected by municipal and federal programs should have a role in shaping these initiatives, but also defined a set of unconventional political techniques for turning the heads of elected officials and bureaucrats.[17] Although less subject to comment at the time, the philosophy and practice of neighborhood organizer Saul Alinsky were teaching some of the same lessons in white working-class neighborhoods around the country.[18]

By the mid-1960s a new term, community control, had entered the vocabulary of urban politics. Its genesis was a dispute between the New York City school system, which had been under pressure for a decade to produce a comprehensive desegregation program, and black parents in Harlem. In East Harlem, a new intermediate school (IS 201) was to open in the fall of 1966, and residents of the neighborhood had been assured that it would be racially integrated. However, the siting of the structure and its proposed attendance area promised otherwise. Local parents reacted harshly to the school administration's apparent duplicity. One of their leaders contended that if the New York school system can do no more than it is doing, then the communities of the poor must be prepared to act for themselves just as they must become involved in the direction of all the programs set up to serve their needs."[19] This viewpoint was crystallized in a conflict between local residents and the school administration over the appointment of the IS 201 principal, with the neighborhood activists making the novel claim that they should oversee the selection process. The IS 201 group articulated its case powerfully enough that the school system, with financial support from the Ford Foundation, subsequently established three experimental decentralized school districts. The performance of these three districts, especially the Ocean

Hill-Brownsville district in Brooklyn, became an inflammatory political issue in New York.[20] Nonetheless, the city adopted a system-wide decentralization plan in 1970, and in succeeding years community school boards, neighborhood planning councils, police review boards, and other types of neighborhood boards were adopted in major cities across the country.

Community control was a proposition that was subject to varying interpretations. For some, such as Milton Kotler, author of *Neighborhood Government,* the neighborhood was viewed as a ' political settlement of small territory and familiar association, whose absolute property is its capacity for deliberative democracy."[21] Adherents of this view proposed that neighborhood boards ought to exercise substantial authority over policy definition, resource allocation, and municipal service delivery. But for many elected officials and municipal administrators, the appropriate role of such boards was advisory, assisting municipal government by improving communications between neighborhood and city. In effect, their response to demands for community control was decentralization of city services, not the empowerment of local communities envisioned by the IS 201 parents, Milton Kotler, and others.

Since the early 1970s, a considerable body of research has sought to assess the operations of these neighborhood institutions. Typically, the researchers' evaluations turn on whether they envision neighborhood boards as a means of local empowerment or a vehicle for increasing administrative effectiveness. For example, political scientist Richard Rich writes of the neighborhood councils in New York City, Raleigh, North Carolina, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Washington, D.C.:

> It appears that neighborhood councils in these four cities are on the lower rungs of Sherri Arnstein's oft-cited "ladder of citizen participation," serving to routinize community input into the policy process and render it safe. They had clearly done very little to alter the class bias of local participation. NC leaders and staff frequently complained that they were so overloaded with requests for action from the city government that they had little time to devote to defining or executing their own agenda. Many councils had very few ties to the neighborhoods they were to represent and did not operate as true community organizations.[22]

In short, these councils permit their respective city governments to engage in formal communication with neighborhoods over matters such as public works planning and applications for zoning variances, but they do not permit neighborhoods to control these decisions. Rich's evaluative criteria specify that local councils that do not empower their communities have not substantially shifted the balance between municipality and neighborhood.

However, when the observer's expectations focus on the more modest objectives of bureaucratic accessibility and the quality of decision making, the appraisal of local boards improves. The following comments by John Clayton Thomas describe Cincinnati's community councils: "New segments of the population have been mobilized, contributing to broader participation in community life. The municipal decisionmaking process has become much more permeable than it was twenty or thirty years ago. Equity, too, may have been enhanced as funding has been distributed to more neighborhoods, rather than going primarily to commercial renewal areas."[23] It is altogether likely that the actual performances of the boards observed by Rich and Thomas differed less than did the expectations of their respective observers.

In the early 1970s, political scientist Ira Katznelson concluded from his observation of municipal decentralization in New York that the new neighborhood institutions in that city were intended to "render harmless" minority demands for political power.[24] Katznelson's characterization of municipal intent may have been to the point, but in practice, the subsequent decade witnessed a considerable broadening of the demand by urban neighborhood residents for control of their affairs. In affluent white neighborhoods as well as poor minority areas, activists spawned a "backyard revolution" that sought to preserve communities, improve service delivery, and rethink strategies of economic development.[25] Proponents of this new neighborhood movement, such as Harry Boyte, go so far as to claim that it will dramatically redistribute political power in cities and the nation at large. As a practical matter, these backyard revolutionists must determine whether or not to use the neighborhood institutions introduced in the preceding decade and a half, or to rely on autonomous, often confrontational

political action and nonbureaucratic service production. At the same time, critics of the new neighborhood movement argue that its objectives are merely reformist and that its advocates do not, in fact, envision a real transformation of society.[26]

THE SAVE OUR NEIGHBORHOODS/ SAVE OUR CITY COALITION

On April 29, 1983, Harold Washington traveled by limousine to Chicago's Navy Pier, where he would be inaugurated as mayor. Along the way he passed a cluster of residents from the city's Northwest and Southwest Sides, which in Chicago are widely known as the "bungalow belt." The principal occupants of these neighborhoods are "white ethnic" Catholics of Irish, Italian, and Polish descent, although on both the Northwest and Southwest Sides Hispanics are growing in number. In most parts of the Northwest and Southwest sides, single-family homes are the norm, and these are communities in which many residents express a fierce local loyalty. Most of this group beside the street probably had not voted for Washington, but on this day they carried with them a "candle of understanding" in the hope that the mayor-elect would notice it, stop, and in so doing begin a dialogue concerning their neighborhoods' needs. Washington's limousine did not stop, but over the course of the next four years, these Northwest and Southwest Siders formed an alliance called the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City (SON/SOC) Coalition and entered into an intense, frequently rancorous dialogue with the Washington administration.[27]

The Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation was formed in 1971, and it presently includes eight Roman Catholic parish associations. The organization's membership is overwhelmingly white, and for the past two decades the Southwest Federation's neighborhoods have adjoined what is often called the city's "racial divide." To the east are neighborhoods such as West Englewood, which underwent rapid racial turnover in the 1960s, and quite close at hand is Marquette Park, a public recreational area that has been the site of violent clashes between blacks and whites.[28] Since its formation, the Southwest Federation's principal objective has been neighborhood stabi-

lization, which it has promoted in a variety of ways. The group is always on the lookout for "panic-peddling" real estate agents, who, once they are identified, are relentlessly pressured to rethink their practices. In the 1970s, the federation initiated a "greenlining" campaign to expose and reverse disinvestment by local banks. More recently, the federation has worked with a nonprofit development corporation in planning an "ethnic village" commercial project on West 63rd Street.

Joining the Southwest Siders in seeking to present to Mayor Washington the candle of understanding were representatives of a second group, the Northwest Neighborhood Federation. The Northwest Federation dates from 1976, when some members of another, failing, neighborhood coalition, the Citizens Action Program (CAP), sought to initiate a new movement.[29] Within a few years, eight neighborhood organizations were affiliated with the Northwest Federation.

Well before 1983, there were extensive ties between the Southwest and Northwest federations. In the early 1970s, individuals who would play leading roles in each federation had participated in the fight to stop a proposed public works project, the Crosstown Expressway, that threatened to bisect their communities. The Northwest Federation's constituent groups and their members do not feel quite so threatened by neighborhood transition as do residents of the Southwest Side; nevertheless, they also have demonstrated in opposition to local realtors and supported a municipal ordinance restricting front-yard "for sale" signs. The Northwest Federation's two principal professional organizers previously worked for the Southwest Federation.

The proximate force that produced the SON/SOC alliance was Chicago's nasty mayoral election of 1983. In the Democratic party primary, three well-known candidates sought the nomination: the incumbent, Jane Byrne; Richard M. Daley, the son of the city's longstanding "boss," Mayor Richard J. Daley; and a black congressperson, Harold Washington. Washington narrowly defeated Byrne and Daley, but not before Alderperson Edward Vrdolyak made a well-publicized speech suggesting that Byrne supporters must go out and defeat Washington because of his race.[30] In the general election, many Democratic party activists from the Southwest and Northwest Sides supported the Republican party nominee, Bernard Epton.

However, for the individuals who would form SON/SOC, the nadir of the campaign occurred when Washington and Walter Mondale visited St. Pascal Church on the Northwest Side. As Washington and the Democratic presidential aspirant sought to enter the church, they were surrounded by a hostile, chanting crowd.[31] Local television camera crews documented the incident, and several media commentators lamented the tenor of the campaign, citing in particular the racism of the city's white ethnic population. Few Northwest or Southwest Siders voted for Washington in either the Democratic primary or the general election, but in the aftermath of the bitter campaign, leaders of the Northwest and Southwest federations sought a rapprochement with the new mayor.[32]

SON/SOC and Its Members

Organizationally, SON/SOC fits comfortably in the category of social movement that historian Robert Fisher terms "neo-Alinskyism."[33] As such, the coalition's structural relationships, means of decision making, and tactics represent an updating of the community organizing philosophy of Saul Alinsky. But at the same time, in a number of respects SON/SOC's organization and methods reflect the particular character of its constituency.

SON/SOC is an alliance of sixteen parish and neighborhood organizations, with the intermediate Southwest and Northwest federations coordinating the activities of eight local groups apiece.[34] The coalition uses a committee system to organize its work. For example, at SON/SOC's first convention in April 1984, the Real Estate/FHA Practices, Schools, Anti-Crime, CHA (Chicago Housing Authority)/Home Equity, and Economic Development committees made recommendations to the membership at large. It is not easy to calculate the size of SON/SOC's membership. The coalition's leaders claim to represent all of the residents in the sixteen parish/neighborhood organization areas, but even individuals who are quite active in one or another of the local groups may play no role in SON/SOC. Practically speaking, SON/SOC can deliver as many as 1,000 people to one of its political actions or conventions. The coalition's principal organizers estimate that there are sixty leaders in SON/SOC.[35] At the

coalition's periodic leadership briefings and retreats, the turnout of activist members usually numbers about thirty.

SON/SOC and the two federations share a small professional staff, with about a half-dozen organizers supervising office volunteers and door-to-door solicitors. The role of the organizers is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, resident leaders and staff agree that the chief function of the organizers is to serve the constituent groups, and the public face of SON/SOC is invariably presented by resident activists. On the other hand, at any given time the organizers have the best idea of the full range of activities SON/SOC and its constituent groups are carrying on. Moreover, at the coalition's leadership retreats, the organizers clearly set the agenda for discussion.

SON/SOC raises money from a variety of sources: door-to-door solicitation in its organizing areas, bingo, contributions from local Roman Catholic parishes, and foundation grants. It received federal funding to research its "home-equity" insurance proposal. Judging from the organization's austere office decor, it is not lavishly funded. However, SON/SOC does not appear to encounter difficulty in meeting payroll or in publicizing its activities. SON/SOC prints and distributes copious information on upcoming events and its program proposals, such as linked development and home-equity insurance.

A variety of specific events and circumstances have motivated SON/SOC members' involvement in neighborhood affairs, but these varied routes to activism seem readily channeled into a focused cluster of organizational priorities: protection of the family home and the investment represented by the home, and preservation of neighborhoods. In 1982 a member of the Southwest Federation described the dynamic of neighborhood apprehension and residential turnover in a way that has meaning for many SON/SOC people: "They left Austin (a West Side Chicago neighborhood), which they loved, and also lost money on their homes. Of course, they're concerned when they see more signs of change. People get themselves into a state because they don't know what's happening."[36] At the April 1984 SON/SOC convention, a video presentation recalled several of the South- and Southwest-Side neighborhoods from which Southwest Federation members have fled, eliciting a vocal reaction from the audience. When Joseph Crutchfield, one of the leaders of the

Northwest Federation, was asked why he had gotten involved in neighborhood affairs, his response was quick and specific. The right-of-way of the Crosstown Expressway would have taken his house.[37]

Joining these fears of lost homes, communities, and investment is a marked alienation from the conventional political process. Given the opportunity, SON/SOC members and staff do not hesitate to attack politicians for laziness and dishonesty. Indeed, coalition members often express irritation at accounts of Chicago politics that suggest that they, as white ethnics, were well served by the Democratic party machine in its heyday under Mayor Richard J. Daley. In their view, they are underdogs who have had to fight for what they have accomplished, and neither local politicians nor city government have served them well. The following comments, from a letter addressed to the director of the Roman Catholic church's Archdiocesan Office of Human Relations by the chairpersons of the Southwest and Northwest federations, provide an apt representation of the embattled self-image of many SON/SOC members: our people were not welcomed in this new land. We were called every vile name in the book. We were discriminated against in housing and employment. What labor we did find was wickedly exploited. When we organized to advance ourselves, we were denounced and often brutalized."[38] In short, SON/SOC members see themselves caught between forces working to undermine their homes and neighborhoods and an unresponsive outside world.

SON/SOC and the Southwest and Northwest federations are renowned for their media-oriented, confrontational political tactics. In the late 1970s, the Southwest Federation organized a mass picketing of a redlining savings and loan association in which one of the demonstrators dressed as a white elephant to highlight the institution's unwise nonlocal investment of local deposits.[39] SON/SOC and its affiliates often turn meetings with public officials into "accountability sessions" at which rank-and-file members fire hard questions regarding the politician's stand on coalition program proposals. In one sense, this approach to politics, which downplays persuasion and electoral participation in favor of highly publicized confrontation, reflects the Alinsky style of community organization. But in addition, SON/SOC political tactics are a direct expression of the membership's frustrations.

SON/SOC maintains member allegiance by thoroughgoing door-to-door mobilization. When SON/SOC is building support for its program proposals, its affiliate neighborhood groups hold meetings at which new initiatives are presented and discussed. At these meetings, staff members work very hard to relate program objectives to the interests of rank-and-file members. Decision making at public meetings is consensual and formally democratic. As a rule, the observer does not encounter internal disagreements regarding SON/SOC philosophy, programs, or tactics. At the group's well-attended April 1984 convention, one of the members questioned the cost of a particular proposal. There was a brief flurry in the audience—as no objections had been raised to any other committee reports that day—but the committee chairperson, without directly answering the query, assured the questioner that finances were not a problem. In just a few moments the proposal was approved without further dissent. The presumption appeared to be that the questioner was not raising a substantive issue, but rather that he had not been briefed sufficiently on the workings of the program in question. Thus, paralleling SON/SOC's commitment to open, participatory decision making is an internal culture that emphasizes rank-and-file allegiance to organization policy.

Shaping Public Policy

SON/SOC's neighborhood preservation agenda includes a variety of program components. We have noted that the practices of banks and real estate agents have been a source of concern for both the Southwest and Northwest federations. The Northwest Federation, in response to local fears of crime, has also sponsored an elaborate neighborhood watch program.[40] Since the federations' amalgamation as SON/SOC, the coalition has devoted much energy to a pair of new policy initiatives: linked development and guaranteed home-equity insurance. By tracing the evolution of these two proposals, we can identify the dilemmas confronted by SON/SOC as it seeks to define an agenda that transcends simple neighborhood protectionism.

From 1984 until 1986, much of SON/SOC's energy was devoted to promoting its linked-development program, which was introduced at its first convention, on April 29, 1984.[41]

SON/SOC's plan called for a $5.00-per-square-foot levy on all downtown commercial developments in excess of 100,000 square feet. The funds thus generated would be distributed to the city's seventy-seven officially recognized community areas. Within each community, residents would decide how to use the funds. In making this proposal, SON/SOC leaders likened their plan to the linked-development programs just getting under way in Boston and San Francisco. However, unlike the programs in these two cities, linkage funds in Chicago would not be dedicated to low-cost housing production.

Business groups in Chicago did not approve of SON/SOC's linked-development proposal, but they also did not need to take it very seriously until later in 1984, when Mayor Washington indicated his willingness to consider the plan. Washington, who was working hard to assuage Southwest- and Northwest-Side concerns about his administration, addressed the second SON/SOC convention in September 1984 and agreed to form a commission to study linked development. Washington appointed the committee shortly afterward, including business leaders, neighborhood housing activists, city officials, and Joseph Crutchfield from SON/SOC.

Decision making by the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Development was anything but consensual. The banking and real estate representatives never accepted the SON/SOC proposal, and over the course of the committee's deliberations, SON/SOC leaders began to question whether Mayor Washington and the city government representatives, in fact, supported linked development. When the committee released its preliminary report in September 1985, a series of alternative funding mechanisms were substituted for the SON/SOC formula. In addition, the committee recommended that recognized neighborhood organizations and not-for-profit developers serve as the conduits for linkage-fund expenditures. Coinciding with the release of the preliminary committee report was a minority report, offered by the business representatives, contending that a linked-development fee would undercut needed downtown investment in Chicago.

SON/SOC was displeased by the preliminary report, and over the course of the next several months leaders and staff became convinced that Mayor Washington's support for linked

development was wavering. In fact, city officials accepted the proposition of linking downtown investment to neighborhood improvements, but their preference was to negotiate with developers on a project-by-project basis. In effect, this meant trading zoning variances or low-interest municipal bond proceeds for infrastructure improvements, contributions to a low-cost housing fund, technical assistance for neighborhood groups, and the like. SON/SOC opposed this type of "voluntary linkage.

The Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Development took more than a year to produce a final report, and by the time this document was released, in December 1986, a mayoral election was well under way.[42] Mayor Washington put off responding to the report until after the April 1987 general election. In the meantime, SON/SOC rejected the final report, which was essentially consistent with the preliminary document, and moved to promote its initial linkage plan. It was introduced as a municipal ordinance in 1987, but because of lukewarm support among city council members and the governmental hiatus that resulted from the sudden death of Mayor Washington late in the year, it was not reported out of committee.

At the end of 1988, the administration of Washington's successor, Mayor Eugene Sawyer, continued the practice of using development negotiations to win "linkage" concessions from developers. SON/SOC, however, felt betrayed by the Washington administration and hoped for city council action on its proposal. Yet a year before, in 1987, the coalition's primary attention had already turned to a second program initiative, guaranteed home-equity insurance.

SON/SOC's home-equity insurance plan seeks to stabilize neighborhoods by protecting property owners from losses on their home investments. In designated home-equity districts, each homeowner will be levied a fee of up to 12 cents per $100 of assessed property value and will have the opportunity to enroll in the insurance program. Interested homeowners will pay a registration fee and the costs of a property appraisal. If, in five years, an enrollee desires to sell his or her home but is unable to attract any offers at or above the home's appraised value, he or she will receive the difference between the best offer and the appraisal figure. The costs of these reimbursements will be underwritten by proceeds of the homeowner levy.[43]

SON/SOC's home-equity proposal closely parallels a program devised by the Chicago suburb Oak Park, which has developed a comprehensive policy to promote racial integration.[44] The Southwest Federation proposed its own home-equity insurance plan in the late 1970s, but this proposal was rejected by the city council. The appeal of the program is especially strong in this part of Chicago, because many local residents have lived previously in racially changing neighborhoods to the east. Furthermore, for more than two decades the often-turbulent racial divide has been creeping westward as black families have moved from Chicago's old "Black Belt" in the near South Side. SON/SOC leaders do not suppose that most residents of home-equity districts will enroll in the program; however, they do contend that the existence of the program will increase residents' sense of security. In this indirect way, home equity will promote neighborhood stabilization.

In 1987 and 1988 SON/SOC demonstrated a remarkable tenacity in promoting its home-equity program. The group originally sought the support of Mayor Washington and attempted to push home-equity legislation through the city council. However, in order to demonstrate grass-roots support on the Northwest and Southwest Sides, SON/SOC sought state legislative action authorizing nonbinding "advisory referendums" in selected precincts within Chicago. In late 1986 the state legislature approved the local referendum bill, and SON/SOC began to collect thousands of petition signatures to put the home-equity plan on the April 1987 city ballot. The petition drive was successful, and in the election home equity passed with nearly 90 percent of the vote.[45]

SON/SOC's successes in the state legislature and at the polling place were not matched in the Chicago City Council. By the fall of 1987, Mayor Washington began to suggest that the home-equity districts include black neighborhoods—SON/SOC's advisory referendum was on the ballot only on the Northwest and Southwest Sides—and at October 1987 city council hearings, some black alderpersons termed the proposal "discriminatory."[46] Indeed, the hostility of black alderpersons was sufficient that, following Mayor Washington's death, neither Mayor Sawyer nor any other leading black politician offered to support the home-equity ordinance.

In the face of these setbacks, SON/SOC once more turned to the state legislature, proposing legislation to permit the creation of home-equity districts by local referendums. Ultimately, a closely divided city council approved the home-equity ordinance, but Mayor Sawyer vetoed the legislation. In July 1988, however, Illinois Governor James Thompson approved the state legislature's local referendum bill, and during the summer SON/SOC organized a second petition drive to place home equity on the ballot in about 500 Chicago precincts. One of the municipal ordinance's opponents, Alderperson Marlene Carter, challenged some of the SON/SOC petitions, but the referendum qualified for the November 1988 ballot in nearly all of SON/SOC's targeted precincts. On both the Northwest and Southwest Sides, the referendum passed with large majorities. In the aftermath of the election, and in spite of opposition from city government, work began on the formation of the home-equity districts.[47]

Neighborhood Mobilization in a Segmented City

The rise and development of the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City Coalition reflects each of the three pivots of the postwar environmental politics of neighborhood. Residents of Northwest-Side and Southwest-Side neighborhoods such as Belmont-Cragin and Chicago Lawn seek to preserve communities in which door-to-door neighboring, local churches, and familiar merchants communicate a sense of connectedness and security. Moreover, many of SON/SOC's Southwest-Side members, who have left neighborhoods subject to quick and harrowing racial transition, have direct experience of the loss of these values. At the same time, SON/SOC members perceive very little support from local politicians and city government in their efforts to preserve their neighborhoods. Thus, the coalition's attitude toward established political figures and institutions is routinely combative; and as both the linked-development and home-equity cases demonstrate, SON/SOC presently works to directly initiate and implement public policy.

SON/SOC's debt to the Alinsky model of community organizing is quite evident, and the ways in which the coalition has amended the Alinsky model are also illuminating. For example, SON/SOC has avoided the "burnout" characteristic of Alinsky

groups by developing a set of program proposals whose promotion represents an ongoing organizational commitment. However, by becoming a policy advocate, SON/SOC has moved into new political forums: city council and state legislative committees, municipal commissions, and the like. The coalition is often uncomfortable in these contexts because it is unaccustomed to the bargaining assumptions characteristic of their decision making. SON/SOC's program proposals are also devices for mobilizing its constituents, and the coalition's leaders are wary of making concessions that undercut its rallying points. Thus, the Washington administration's endorsement of the linkage "concept," which was tied to modified programmatic details, was unacceptable to SON/SOC.

SON/SOC's structure, by uniting neighborhood groups in separate though similar portions of the city, also seeks to transcend another weakness of Alinsky groups, their tendency to parochialism. Furthermore, SON/SOC has reached beyond its local constituencies in promoting its programs. For instance, it initiated discussions on linked development with the Chicago Urban League, and the two groups sponsored a linked-development conference in June 1986. Nevertheless, SON/SOC leaders and staff often characterize opponents in the harshest of terms, and the coalition has not devoted its principal energies to proposals that could reach across Chicago's racial divisions. Irrespective of the fairness or unfairness of criticism directed by black city council members at its home-equity insurance plan, the wrath directed at these critics by SON/SOC probably precluded the coalition's winning any support among rank-and-file black homeowners.

Ultimately, the ideology of home and community that motivates SON/SOC activists gives the coalition its force, but also limits its ability to make alliances across the lines of class, race, and neighborhood. In his study of post–World War II neighborhood racial tensions, urban redevelopment, and public housing, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960,* Arnold Hirsch notes the sense of neighborhood "proprietorship" felt by Chicago's ethnic population. Even in the 1930s, homeownership figures were quite high among foreign-born Irish-, Italian-, and Polish-Americans. Moreover, these groups were in several instances the original settlers of their neighbor-

hoods. Thus, Hirsch argues, the defenders of the racial divide on the city's South and Southwest Sides were clinging to turf of great symbolic value.[48] Many SON/SOC members are the sons, daughters, grandsons, and granddaughters of the ethnics studied by Hirsch.

The world view of SON/SOC members is not simply a function of neighborhood turbulence in Chicago. Anthropologist Constance Perin notes that in the United States the ". . . appreciation of house value is regarded as a 'right' 'religiously defended in all income-levels' against the 'specter of decreasing home values' "[49] For SON/SOC members, as for most homeowners in the United States, equity in their place of residence is their principal source of wealth. As a consequence, neighborhood change—which SON/SOC members overwhelmingly associate with racial transition and declining property values—threatens one's sense of community *and* economic well-being. This combination of factors accounts for the force of SON/SOC's defense of neighborhood.

If there is a break in the consensus among SON/SOC leaders, members, and staff, it is over the specific sources of threat to their neighborhoods. For instance, SON/SOC leaders and staff privately admit that racism motivates some of SON/SOC's members. More commonly and publicly, the coalition's spokespersons attack redlining banks that have cut off mortgages in their communities and unscrupulous realtors who play on fears of racial change in order to profit from accelerated neighborhood turnover. Politicians are also cast as villains, but again, there is less than unanimity in designating just which politicians are SON/SOC's foes. For example, SON/SOC's leadership was divided in assessing Mayor Washington. Finally, the Federal Housing Administration, as mortgage insurer of high-risk purchasers, is the object of something approaching universal dislike.

There are other sources of neighborhood change and racial tension in Chicago that SON/SOC members seldom, if ever, identify. Although they recognize the shift of Chicago's economy from industry to services, SON/SOC leaders and rank and file do not draw a connection between national and international economic restructuring and the decline of central cities. The Reagan administration's reduction of federal aid to cities, which accelerated the municipal courting of downtown investment

and pressures on local service and tax levels, is also not criticized. Nor do SON/SOC members accept the proposition that past racial discrimination in housing and the work place has helped produce the current competition for desirable living space among Chicago blacks and whites. And although they are very skeptical of politicians, SON/SOC activists do not identify the city's longstanding Democratic machine as an orchestrator of neighborhood competition and interethnic hostility.

A key to understanding why SON/SOC finds fault with some of the foregoing institutions and trends, but does not link neighborhood pressures to the others, may be inferred from the following comment, made in reference to SON/SOC's first home-equity referendum: "If the village of Addison, which is much smaller than most Chicago neighborhoods, can vote on whether they want a sports stadium, why can't neighborhoods have the same kind of privilege?"[50] What is revealing about this comment is the identification of SON/SOC territory in Chicago with an exurban community to the west of Chicago. As the working- and middle-class owners of inconspicuous homes in neighborhoods threatened by sudden change, SON/SOC might envision some of Chicago's other "victimized" groups—blacks isolated on the city's South and West Sides, Hispanics and Appalachian whites threatened by gentrification on the near Northwest and North Sides, even the city's homeless—as prospective allies. In fact, SON/SOC's sights are set upward, and the coalition's leaders make their identification with suburban homeowners and other taxpayers threatened by crime, loss of home equity because of incompatible neighbors or land uses, and local tax hikes. Viewing their situation in this way, SON/SOC leaders seek the means to control community resources, enhance the sense of local security, and counter the activities of rapacious relators, meddling city officials, and irresponsible bureaucrats, both public and private. In the context of the city in which they actually reside, this perspective produces a political stance that is at its core defensive and exclusionary.

In spite of their professed attachments to their local neighborhoods, many SON/SOC members, given the chance, would probably relocate to communities like Addison, Illinois. Others would leave Chicago if only they could take friends, neighbors, and familiar institutions with them. In fact, most SON/SOC

members do not have the option to relocate, and they remain in a city whose municipal services seem ever to decline and whose surrounding population seems ever to become more threatening. Chicago residents who have greater resources than do SON/SOC members confront these circumstances through a variety of strategies, of which spatial segmentation is one of the most pervasive. What other Chicagoans seek through architectural means, city planning techniques, and household upgrading, SON/SOC members seek through restrictions on real estate practices, neighborhood watches, linked development, and home-equity insurance.

6

The Future of the New American City

Cities are complex configurations of physical and social elements. Some of their physical elements, such as public buildings, parks, and transportation systems, are planned by government officials with an eye to achieving broad social purposes. Their physical character also reflects innumerable decisions by real estate developers, architects, and individual property owners pursuing more particularized agendas. The social character of cities both reflects broad cultural values and influences the design of cities. For example, in the United States cultural values emphasizing individualism and the sanctity of private property emerged long before the nation's massive urbanization and have had a major impact on the physical pattern of cities. At the same time, the manner in which cities are built profoundly shapes patterns of neighborhood formation and interaction, how urban residents view their fellow citizens, and the use of public spaces.

In the preceding chapters of this book we have examined how the post-World War II rebuilding of American cities has affected this complex set of relationships. The thesis informing this discussion has been that considerations of stability, security,

and predictability in confronting the ambiguities of urban life have produced design strategies that undermine cities' capacity to spawn surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic participation. Ultimately, for cities to provide satisfactory environments for their residents, they must encourage surprise *and* security, stability *and* innovation. However, post–World War II urban rebuilding has emphasized safety while neglecting the historic role of cities as agents of personal growth and social innovation.

The main trends in downtown and neighborhood rebuilding, by isolating different uses and removing activities from the street, explicitly work to reduce the likelihood of surprising encounters. For many current users of these spaces, the reduction of surprise is desirable, but at the same time, one of the great pleasures of urban life is lost. Ultimately, the pervasive adoption of the new design strategies will foreclose any urbanites' even comprehending the pleasures of the street, much less learning the social skills taught by the street.

The insulation of different uses coincidentally insulates different portions of the urban population—"upscale" consumers, the "underclass," and so on—thus reducing individuals' contact with others of different race and ethnicity or with alternative patterns of public behavior and dress, as well as the use of public space for political purposes. Reducing surprise and reducing tolerance are thus twin consequences of the new American city's design, for only by learning to live with surprise does the individual come to tolerate and even appreciate diversity.

In similar fashion, innovation—in both its more expansive sense of social exploration and its more limited economic application—is undermined by the new American city. Increasingly, the urban social explorer seeking new experiences or to extrapolate from others' experiments must know where to go to find innovation. One of the remarkable ironies of contemporary urban economic development is that municipal governments must devote resources to establish specialized spaces, or "incubators, to house small firms with the potential for dynamic growth. In this instance, an important outgrowth of urban form has been redefined as a specialized use. What the city once accomplished naturally must now be planned.

If there is a positive consequence of recent urban rebuilding

in the United States, it is the increased participation in neighborhood organizations and the widespread inclination among grass-roots urbanites to engage in political action. However, as our account of Chicago's Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City Coalition suggested in chapter 5, given the physical and social segmentation of American cities, neighborhood action can have a largely exclusionary character. Residents of particular neighborhoods, threatened by developments in the city at large, may use political action mainly to protect their own place in the game. In the short term this sort of grass-roots politics merely pits one local faction against another in the competition for scarce resources, and in the long term it does little to build a sense of community across neighborhoods.

In the face of these unsettling trends, there are other signs of life in American cities. As my traversal of three locales in Chicago indicated, city residents are constantly improvising in their use of urban spaces, even those as seemingly inhospitable as fast-food parking lots. Furthermore, contemporary architects and other urban designers sometimes do construct inclusive public spaces and amenable housing that are available to more than just the most affluent. A shining example of the former is Chicago architect Helmut Jahn's State of Illinois Building atrium and concourse. In Boston's South End, the Tent City housing project is physically compatible with its surrounding neighborhood and at least relatively affordable.[1]

American cities are not yet dead, even if countless planners, developers, politicians, and architects are hard at work on the task. In this chapter, we examine the new American city from two final perspectives. First, we look at how recent urban rebuilding has been influenced by the criticism of early postwar urban renewal offered by Jane Jacobs, whose descriptions and theory of urban form have played a major role in shaping the thinking of urban designers since the 1960s. To conclude the chapter and book, we return to the neighborhood movement, suggesting in more general terms its limitations, as well as its potential for reconstituting surprising, tolerant, innovative, and participatory urban life in the United States.

THE LIVELY, SEGMENTED CITY

One of the paradoxes of observing urban life in the United States during the 1980s is the discrepancy between social scientists' measures of city well-being, such as population figures, municipal financial performance, and the quality of services, and the more anecdotal evidence one collects by walking city streets, reading daily newspapers, and talking with the residents of different neighborhoods. In the first instance, the depressing slide experienced by cities during the 1970s seems to have continued into the 1980s. Central cities continue to lose population, and their governments still confront the nasty choice of cutting services or raising taxes just to keep up with basic municipal priorities. Nor is there much evidence that the quality of urban services, such as public education, has improved.

Yet despite the downward slope of these indicators, since the 1970s the life of central cities in the United States seems to have been reinvigorated. Part of this rebirth has been documented by this book and is attributable to the investment practices of large corporations building downtown office and commercial complexes. We have further noted how the seemingly individualized practice of gentrification, in fact, grows out of the economic restructuring that is pumping dollars into downtown areas. Nonetheless, gentrifiers as individuals do express the preference for a kind of urban life—though it may be smoothed of its rougher edges—and one observes in many other niches of American culture signs of renewed appreciation of cities. The general quality of architectural practice in American cities seems to have improved in recent years, in large part because of the profession's increased understanding of contextuality, that is, fitting new buildings into the surrounding urban fabric. From the standpoint of popular culture, the middle-class passion for dining out and the resurgent interest in jazz are bringing more people onto city streets and into the semipublic space of restaurants and nightclubs. Neither separately nor collectively do these developments represent a contradiction of the more objective measures of urban decline, but they do attest to the city's revived status in American culture.

A clue to understanding this dichotomy between urban indicators and signs of urban liveliness may be found by reconsidering the work of Jane Jacobs, in particular her famous indictment of urban renewal, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities.*[2] Jacobs's book appeared in 1961, at a point when the failings of the urban renewal planning and relocation processes were evident, but when relatively few observers were prepared to suggest that the vision of urban renewal was defective.

Jacobs's critique of postwar urban renewal may be summarized as follows. The highly concentrated, jumbled city of adjoining mixed uses served two principal functions: (1) in local areas, by virtue of the "busy-ness" resulting from ongoing, overlapping activities, the achievement of a high degree of neighborhood security; (2) through the accumulation of activities and resources based in particular locales, a highly energetic and innovative citywide economy.

Several specific characteristics of the unrenewed city contributed to this urban vitality. Its mixture of primary uses, which "bring people to a specific place because they are anchorages,' insured busy, safe streets throughout the day.[3] The unrenewed city's short street blocks permitted residents to make many variations in their daily transit, thereby increasing the number of attractive commercial locations. Older buildings' cheap rents allowed nascent businesses and other forms of enterprise to hold down their initial overhead expenses. The physical concentration of unrenewed cities was itself a key contributor to mixing primary uses.

In Jacobs's account, postwar planners identified these features with disorder and sought to correct them through strict zoning and the development of integrated single-use complexes. Furthermore, urban renewal planning, by inducing intense real estate speculation in advance of land purchase and clearance, inadvertently hurried neighborhood decline.

Jacobs was unequivocal in naming planners and their intellectual precursors, such as Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier, as perpetrators of the demise of great American cities. Howard misled planners through his advocacy of low-density, decentralized metropolitan regions. Le Corbusier, as we noted in chapter 4, was a segmenter of urban space. As one might expect,



Embarcadero Center, at the foot of Market Street. John Portman's Hyatt Regency Hotel is at left

Elevated walkway leading from plaza



View of street from elevated walkway

Cluster of condominiums approached from elevated walkway

the response of professional planners to *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* was not especially friendly, although in subsequent years the book became required reading for professional planning students.[4]

As one who recalls professional training in city planning, I find a curious inconsistency between Jacobs's estimation of the impact of planning and the self-estimate of professional planners, who typically view themselves as serving other masters, such as redevelopment officials, politicians, and private real estate developers. To quote one of the early reviewers of Jacobs's book: "Most planners will be shocked to find that Mrs. Jacobs has aimed her needle-sharp pen at them, and that they are the archenemies who must be rendered impotent if cities are to be saved. The typical frustrated, maligned, ignored, and powerless planner will ask himself 'Does she mean me?'"[5] In fact, Jacobs's explanation of the forces producing the planners' passion for order is the least satisfactory element of her argument. In *The Death and Life of Great American Cities,* when Jacobs leaves the street, her close observation of how orthodox redevelopment strategies undermine the creative disorder of cities shifts to a factually suspect polemic.

Jacobs's baseline for indicting urban renewal planning was an unusually rosy appraisal of the nineteenth-century industrial city. For most residents in most such cities, conditions were not especially pleasant, and these cities' explosive economic energy is attributable to a variety of factors aside from their peculiar physical form. These included massive immigration and the resultant low-wage labor supply, the availability of cheap industrial inputs, and expansive new markets. Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, forces quite apart from city planning were beginning to unscramble the spatial order of industrial cities. Although the visions of Ebenezer Howard, the proponents of the City Beautiful, and Le Corbusier served to rationalize the segmentation of the postindustrial city, the forces producing it transcended the practice of city planners.

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, some of the great industrial enterprises, such as the Pullman Palace Car Corporation and U.S. Steel, were already locating their new facilities on huge sites away from the central city.[6] This practice simplified

land assembly and reduced the costs of land acquisition, and it also permitted these industrial producers to concentrate their work force in adjoining residential areas. Even earlier in the nineteenth century, suburban residence had become a desirable objective for affluent families.[7] After the turn of the century, the invention of the automobile increased the physical accessibility of outlying residential areas, and the spread of automobile ownership gave a much larger proportion of the population the means to reach the metropolitan fringe. Coincidentally, the advertising industry was shaping an image of suburban residence that was to become a touchstone of American family aspiration.[8]

In short, while Jane Jacobs was on the mark in detailing how postwar planning practice tore at the urban fabric, her indictment of planning failed to recognize that the planners were executing physical plans that were consistent with the dictates of an emergent economic order and quite in keeping with most people's understanding of how cities should be organized. The mechanical vision of the city revealed in Le Corbusier's drawings and models, postwar urban renewal projects, and the modern city functional have all played a role in inculcating the necessity of urban segmentation, but much of the underlying power of these urban images has been because of their congeniality with prevailing social conditions and expectations. To cite the classic source of unease in contemporary American cities, street crime, it is because so many people recognize the danger of street life in areas of extreme unemployment and poverty that the megastructure is so successful. For Detroit suburbanites, the Renaissance Center really does represent a safe haven in an otherwise dangerous central city.

For developers, architects, and the other design professions, the key lessons of *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* pertained to specific urban spaces and how these might be given distinctive character, liveliness, and the aura of security. This is why, as one observes and uses particular developments in contemporary downtowns, one is often impressed by their vitality. James Rouse's central city "markets" in Boston, Lower Manhattan, and Baltimore are textbook examples of the skillful deployment of mixed uses and architectural contextuality.

Early nineteenth-century residential block, Philadelphia

Turn-of-the-century block, Chicago's North Side

In Atlanta's rebuilt downtown

Again as noted in chapter 4, parts of Jacobs's analysis have also been incorporated by gentrifiers and developers of the city-as-glass menagerie. Jacobs's affinity for old buildings was quite pragmatic—they required lower rents—whereas gentrifiers create a nostalgic image of urban charm, attention to structural detailing, and human scale. As practiced by the "new traditionalist" planners and architects praised by critic Philip Langdon, the incorporation of older structures and design strategies in new developments can result in lively and visually pleasing projects.[9] However, these better-designed compounds are well beyond the means of most American urbanites, and the people who can afford to live within them may not wish them to be physically accessible from the surrounding city.

The legacy of *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* is thus mixed. In the quarter-century since the book's appearance, Jane Jacobs's appreciation of the city and her extremely careful observation of how particular locales function as physical space and social stage have been widely assimilated by architects, planners, and urban residents. This has produced many congenial buildings, complexes of buildings, and particular public spaces; and among the public at large, the city as a place of interest and excitement has become a well-entrenched idea.

Yet as historian Robert Fishman has noted, by puncturing the legacies of Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier, Jane Jacobs also managed to deflate the very idea that one can define an inclusive vision of the city.[10] And by focusing on the physical components of these twentieth-century urban visions, Jacobs implied that the source of the postwar urban crisis was faulty urban design. This narrow reading of her book was probably not intended by Jacobs, who was also attuned to the utility of neighborhood political mobilization and a critic of bureaucratic decision making. Nevertheless, the clearest arguments presented in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* redefine the criteria for good urban design; and, unfortunately, Jacobs's solutions offer few if any answers to the problems posed by extreme economic disparities, social pathologies bred by poverty and racial exclusion, and ineffective provision of municipal services. In the end, good design can be used to insulate more-advantaged urbanites from the city of the poor.

The Lively, Segmented City: James Rouse's Harborplace, Baltimore

THE NEIGHBORHOOD MOVEMENT AND THE NEW AMERICAN CITY

Jane Jacobs, by advocating the organization of neighborhood districts that have the authority to review planning and development initiatives, may be viewed as a forerunner of both the community-control and neighborhood movements.[11] Yet, much like her appreciation of older buildings, which has been transformed by the very nostalgic art of gentrification, Jacobs's espousal of local political mobilization was essentially pragmatic and narrowly gauged. Neighborhood politicking would not create community—indeed, in Jacobs's view community at the street level was the prerequisite for effective neighborhood mobilization—nor would it be the basis for social transformation. Much more circumspectly, Jacobs viewed neighborhood political mobilization as a means for local urban areas to protect their interests.

Nevertheless, current proponents of neighborhood mobilization have linked their movement to those larger objectives: building community and achieving social transformation. Yet even as the rebuilding of the American city has given impetus to neighborhood mobilization, its principal characteristic, spatial

segmentation, forms the main stumbling block for the organizers of an inclusive neighborhood movement.

This is because the use of structures and space to locate particular urban groups has the immediate political effect of reducing the bases for mobilizing residents across neighborhood lines. In the new American city, the interests of different neighborhoods simply do not correspond. At the very moment that affluent residents of gentrifying neighborhoods protest property tax increases, parents in slum areas criticize the education provided in rundown, antiquated school facilities.

This fragmentation of neighborhood interests grows out of a more fundamental effect of neighborhood physical segmentation. As residents of different neighborhoods, members of different racial groups, and persons of differing levels of affluence lose the habit of sharing public space, they also lose the empathetic urbanity on which common political action is built. In essence, the residents of other parts of the city are not viewed as fellow citizens whose particular neighborhood concerns may vary. Instead, these "others" are seen as enemies in a desperate competition for local security and scarce municipal resources.

Exacerbating these conditions engendered by the segmentation of the new American city are the prevalent Alinsky and neo-Alinsky styles of neighborhood mobilization. As Harry C. Boyte comments: . Alinsky believed that the organizer must appeal to people's perceived self-interest around concrete issues. He was nonideological, experimental, pragmatic. He voiced little interest in long-range goals. . . "[12] This tactical stance may contribute to the efficacy of local organizing, but it also contributes to the unyielding parochialism into which Alinsky groups often fall. Yet self-interest organizing is an article of faith even among post- or neo-Alinsky organizers, as witnessed by this statement by West Coast activist/organizer Mike Miller: ". . people will act when it is in their immediate self-interest to do so. A larger more 'enlightened' self-interest may emerge but it is not what initially moves people to active participation."[13]

Given this approach to mobilizing particular neighborhoods, one is hard-pressed to identify how an inclusive neighborhood movement can coalesce. Urban segmentation represents a system of "nests" for particular groups and reduces individuals' tolerance of diversity. The predominant mode of neighborhood

organizing accepts this nesting and capitalizes on it as a means of spurring neighborhood-specific mobilization. The neighborhood movement is in this sense bedeviled by what Ira Katznelson has called "city trenches," a segmentation of urban political life that is attributable to the spatial division of work place and home and the competing "home" interests of disparate neighborhoods.[14]

Without exception, when one seeks the grounding for neighborhood mobilization across neighborhood lines, the principal issues around which groups organize founder in the face of these contradictions. Although problems in delivery of urban services are the object of political mobilization in many neighborhoods, just which services need to be improved is subject to varying identification. Even more problematic is the question of how to raise the funds to pay for better services. In gentrifying and defensive middle-class and working-class communities, support for the tax increases to pay for better schools and other social services, which will mainly benefit less-affluent communities, does not appear to be in the offing. Similarly, the preservationist movement is a powerful force in some gentrifying areas, but its program is too narrowly drawn to elicit much support in other parts of the city. The provision of affordable housing touches on more profound and pervasive neighborhood needs, but activists in stable working-class and middle-class neighborhoods have little stake in this objective.

Enhanced participatory democracy, both as a vehicle for better decision making and as an exercise in developing the norms of citizenship, is a consistent aspiration of neighborhood activists.[15] In principle, this is a mobilizing objective that unites neighborhoods across the spectrums of race and class. But neighborhood-based decision making, in the context of wide disparities in local economic and political resources, does not promise to solve fundamental urban problems, nor does it resolve the contradictions among local interests in a highly segmented city. Indeed, more local democracy, without accompanying measures to rectify service delivery and economic disparities, could be a recipe for increasing neighborhood inequality.

There may be other organizing objectives that can bridge the segmentation of urban neighborhoods. Dolores Hayden has

argued powerfully in support of redefining neighborhood and household relations in such a way as to redistribute the burdens of paid work and family nurturing between men and women, reintegrate home and work place, and reduce class- and race-based economic disparities. Hayden's agenda is ambitious, but she has identified a wide array of practical techniques, including "spatial reintegration" of residential neighborhoods, limited-equity cooperatives as an alternative to homeownership, and congregate housing for the elderly and families with small children, as means of approaching her objectives.[16] Moreover, her program offers the prospect of winning the support of lower-, working-, and middle-class residents in central-city and suburban communities.

Other rallying points for inclusive neighborhood organizing might be environmental issues, given that air, water, and noise pollution degrade most urban neighborhoods, and that the unresolved problems of disposing of various environmental toxins ultimately threaten everyone's street and home. There is also the prospect of joining neighborhood concerns to an attack on the warfare economy, which at the federal level absorbs a huge portion of tax revenues, in the 1980s cut into social-service and infrastructure expenditures, and threatens our continued habitation of this planet.

The suggestions offered in the preceding two paragraphs are not meant to denigrate the utility of organizing around specifically neighborhood concerns. Indeed, what remains of public life in cities can be one base upon which a politics of urban rebirth and social transformation might be built. However, given the fragmented character of the modern American city, both physically and socially, neighborhood organization by itself is not a sufficient basis for transforming contemporary society, or for building democratic, inclusive, economically just urban communities. Furthermore, for Americans to relearn the neglected urban virtues of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation, they must also relearn how to build political coalitions that reach across neighborhood, class, and racial lines. When these coalitions are formed, urban public spaces will once more be used with pleasure and confidence, and downtown and neighborhood can be viewed as inclusive physical and social territories.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), pp. 131–348.

2. Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick W. McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Robert E. L. Faris, *Chicago Sociology, 1920–1932* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

3. Robert Ezra Park, *Human Communities* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 74.

4. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life,' *American Journal of Sociology* 44 (July 1938): 1–24; Michael P. Smith, *The City and Social Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 21–23; Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Construction of Communities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

5. Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Robert A. Slayton, *Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Sociologists Barry Wellman and Barry Leighton refer to such studies as the "Community Saved" tradition of neighborhood research in "Networks, Neighborhoods, and Communities: Approaches to the Study of the Community Question," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 14 (March 1979): 373–76.

6. James Dahir, *The Neighborhood Unit Plan: Its Spread and Acceptance* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947).

7. Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizens Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

8. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), and *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* (New York: Random House, 1984); Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), and *The Fall of Public Man* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air.*

9. Nathaniel Hawthorne, "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," in Hyatt

H. Waggoner, ed., *Hawthorne: Selected Tales and Sketches* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), pp. 25–45. Hawthorne's story is discussed in Morton Whyte and Lucia Whyte, *The Intellectual versus the City: From Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 43.

10. Charles Dickens, *Dombey and Son* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 759. See also Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 152–64, for an analysis of Dickens's portrayal of urban settings.

11. Gunther Barth, *City People: The Rise of Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 193–94.

12. Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities,* p. 122.

13. Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air,* p. 316.

14. Murray Bookchin, *The Limits of the City* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 24.

15. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961), p. 280.

16. Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

17. Mark I. Gelfand, *A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 136–56, 222–30; Ashley A. Foard and Hilbert Fefferman, "Federal Urban Renewal Legislation," in James Q. Wilson, ed., *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973), pp. 71–125.

18. Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

19. For example, 630 businesses were displaced by the near West Side Chicago urban renewal project that resulted in the construction of the University of Illinois-Chicago campus. See George Rosen, *Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980), p. 141.

20. Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., *The Rehabilitation Planning Game* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973); John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 180–212; James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," in Wilson, *Urban Renewal,* pp. 407–21.

21. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution,* p. 11.

22. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

23. David Rogers, *110 Livingston Street* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 15–35.

24. William K. Stevens, "No Doubt About It, Rizzo Will Stir Up Philadelphia,' *New York Times,* November 30, 1986, p. 38.

25. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City,* p. 122–35.

26. Peter Steinfels, *The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), pp. 58–63, 90–95.

27. Phillip L. Clay, *Neighborhood Renewal* (Lexington, Mass.. Lexington Books, 1979); Franklin J. James, "The Revitalization of Older Urban Housing and Neighborhoods," in Arthur P. Solomon, ed., *The Prospective City* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1980), pp. 130–60; H. Briavel Holcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, *Revitalizing Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Resource Publications in Geography, 1981), pp. 37–50; Shirley Bradway Laska and Daphne Spain, eds., *Back to the City: Issues in Neighborhood Renovation* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); "The Revitalization of Inner-City Neighborhoods," special issue of *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 15 (June 1980).

28. In 1977, Arthur Rubloff, developer of Sandburg Village on Chicago's North-LaSalle urban renewal site, was asked: "What would have happened to the near North Side by now if Carl Sandburg Village had not been created 14 years ago?" Rubloff's response: "The whole area would have gone down the drain.' A critical interpretation of urban renewal's functions and consequences may be found in Susan S. Fainstein et al., *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment* (New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 252–54.

29. Sharon Zukin, *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 58–81.

30. Merrill Goozner, "Loft Developers vs. Smokestack Industry: What's Good for Goose Island,' *The Reader* (Chicago), November 7, 1986; Zukin, *Loft Living.*

31. David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 240–84; R. B. Cohen, "The New International Division of Labor, Multinational Corporations and Urban Hierarchy," in Michael Dear and Allen J. Scott, eds., *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society* (New York: Methuen, 1981), pp. 287–315; Michael Storper and Richard Walker, "The Spatial Division of Labor: Labor and the Location of Industries," in Larry Sawers and William K. Tabb, eds., *Sunbelt Snowbelt: Urban Development and Regional Restructuring* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 20–22.

32. Christopher B. Leinberger and Charles Lockwood, "How Business Is Reshaping America, *The Atlantic Monthly,* October 1986, pp. 43–52.

33. "The Second War Between the States," *Business Week,* May 17, 1976, pp. 92–114; Kirkpatrick Sale, *Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976); David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins, eds., *The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1977); Sawers and Tabb, *Sunbelt Snowbelt.*

34. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City,* pp. 20–41; Fainstein et al., *Restructuring the City,* pp. 4–13.

35. Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *Journal of Politics* 26 (November 1964): 775–97; Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (September 1976): 309–32; Mollenkopf, *The Contested City,* pp. 3–11.

36. Janice E. Perlman, "Grassrooting the System,' *Social Policy,* May/June 1976, pp. 4–20; Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution;* Robert Fisher, *Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984), pp. 121–66.

37. Larry Bennett, "Beyond Urban Renewal: Chicago's North Loop Redevelopment Project," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 22 (December 1986): 250–53.

38. In some respects this classification of big-city power arrangements parallels the work of urban "regime theorists." For example, see Stephen L. Elkin, "Twentieth Century Urban Regimes,' *Journal of Urban Affairs* 7, no. 2 (1985): 11–28, and Clarence N. Stone, "Summing Up: Urban Regimes, Development Policy, and Political Arrangements," in Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders, eds., *The Politics of Urban Development* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), pp. 269–90.

39. Regarding Cleveland, see Todd Swanstrom, *The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), pp. 154–77. Regarding Detroit, see Richard Child Hill, "Crisis in the Motor City: The Politics of Economic Development in Detroit," in Fainstein et al., *Restructuring the City,* pp. 106–9. A sense of the New York City municipal government's situation may be gained from Sam Howe Verhovek, "Builders Got Tax Breaks, But What Did City Receive?" *New York Times,* May 24, 1987, p. E6; Michael deCourcy Hinds, "A Tax Subsidy That Cost $551 Million," *New York Times,* March 29, 1987, s. 8, pp. 1, 4; and Alan Finder, "Balancing the Highest Offer Against the Greatest Good," *New York Times,* November 30, 1986, p. E6.

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pares the mayoral administrations of Chicago's Harold Washington and Boston's Raymond Flynn in "Local Economic Development Planning in Chicago and Boston: Case Studies in Community Empowerment," paper presented at the New York State Sociological Association Annual Meetings, Dobbs Ferry, New York, October 16, 1986.

41. Pierre Clavel, *The Progressive City: Planning and Participation, 1969–1984* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986).

Chapter 2

1. Mark I. Gelfand, *A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America, 1933–1965* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 105–76. Bauer is quoted on p. 156.

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3. Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 20–156; Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900* (New York: Atheneum, 1969).

4. Harold M. Mayer and Richard C. Wade, *Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 40; Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks, *Landmark Neighborhoods in Chicago* (Chicago, March 1981), pp. 25–26.

5. This quotation appears in M. Christine Boyer, *Manhattan Manners: Architecture and Styles 1850–1900* (New York: Rizzoli, 1985), p. 45.

6. Warner, *Streetcar Suburbs;* Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier,* pp. 103–15.

7. Edward Greer, *Big Steel: Black Politics and Corporate Power in Gary, Indiana* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 51–87.

8. John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 103–9.

9. Gelfand, *A Nation of Cities,* pp. 217–19.

10. See Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 126–58; and Alan Altshuler, *The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1973), pp. 189–296, for accounts of the role played by downtown business leaders in promoting redevelopment in Chicago and Minneapolis, respectively.

11. Michael A. Kemp and Melvyn D. Cheslow, "Transportation," in William Gorham and Nathan Glazer, eds., *The Urban Predicament* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1976), p. 289.

12. Harold Kaplan, *Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 10–38.

13. R. B. Cohen, "The New International Division of Labor, Multinational Corporations and Urban Hierarchy," in Michael Dear and Allen J. Scott, eds., *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society* (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 287–315.

14. Jack Newfield and Paul DuBrul, *The Abuse of Power: The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York* (New York: Viking Books, 1977), pp. 88–91.

15. William G. Conway, "The Case Against Urban Dinosaurs,' *Saturday Review,* May 14, 1977, pp. 12–15; H. Briavel Holcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, *Revitalizing Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Resource Publications in Geography, 1981), pp. 126–33.

16. David G. Shaffer, "Pumping New Life Into a Mall,' *New York Times,* November 30, 1986, s. 8, pp. 1, 5, and Mitchell Locin, "Downtown Hubbub Takes Giant Step Up Into New Urban Hub,' *Chicago Tribune,* December 24, 1987, describe the downtown skywalk systems in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Des Moines, Iowa, respectively.

17. The experience of visiting megastructures has a very powerful effect on some writers, as witnessed by accounts such as Frederic Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (July/August, 1984): 80–84, and Todd Gitlin, "Domesticating Nature," in Donald Lazere, ed., *American Media and Mass Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 139–44. Jameson and Gitlin describe the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles and the Hyatt Regency Embarcadero in San Francisco, respectively.

18. For example, see Catherine S. Schulze, "A Center Revives Downtown," *New York Times,* May 24, 1987, s. 8, pp. 1, 5.

19. An interesting and controversial variant of the pedestrian mall is Underground Atlanta, which that city reopened in June 1989 after spending $142 million for its renovation. The Underground is the site of the original Atlanta downtown, over which the contemporary downtown was built in the 1920s. In the late 1960s, Underground Atlanta was reoccupied as a commercial and entertainment complex, which, however, failed within a few years. The new Underground Atlanta continues to emphasize entertainment, but the municipal government also seeks to promote it as a historical site and thus bring more visitors

to the city's underused central area. Critics of the new Underground contend that the cost of its renovation has been excessive. See Peter Applebome, "Atlanta Places Its Bets On a New Underground," *New York Times,* June 11, 1989, p. 12.

20. Restricting street access typically requires municipal authorization. Municipal planning and funds often are augmented by special assessments levied on property adjoining the mall.

21. Camillo Sitte, "Monuments and Plazas," in Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla, eds., *The Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and Public Spaces* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 48–59; Paul Goodman and Percival Goodman, *Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 49–52.

22. For example, see Calvin Trillin's reaction to the new downtown in Kansas City, Missouri, "Reflections of Someone Whose Home Town Has Become a Glamour City," *The New Yorker,* April 8, 1974, pp. 94–101.

23. Gary Washburn, "2-personality tower on rise in North Loop," *Chicago Tribune,* July 3, 1983.

24. Murray Melbin, "Night as Frontier," *American Sociological Review* 43 (February 1978): 11.

25. Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 9–12.

26. One sign of this urban nostalgia is the proliferation of coffee-table books that deal, mainly through period photographs, with late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century life in particular American cities. An example of this genre with a particularly evocative title is Marion E. Warren and Mame Warren's *Baltimore: When She Was What She Used to Be* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

27. The nineteenth-century effort to give meaning to the notion of urban community is the subject of Thomas Bender's *Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in Nineteenth-Century America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). Also, note Sam Bass Warner's concluding comments in *Streetcar Suburbs,* pp. 162–66, on how the suburbanization of Boston from 1870 to 1900 undercut the popular sense of a single Boston community.

28. Gunther Barth, *City People: The Rise of Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 232.

29. Lynn H. Lofland, *A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 82. Also see Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), pp. 130–37, 296–301.

30. Asa Briggs reports that the leaders of Bradford, England, felt

that through the construction of their city's St. George's Hall they would uplift "the intellectual, moral, and spiritual parts of our nature." *Victorian Cities* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 150–57.

31. Ada Louise Huxtable, "After Modern Architecture," *New York Review of Books,* December 8, 1983, p. 29.

32. Lofland, *A World of Strangers.*

33. Amos Rapoport, *The Meaning of the Built Environment* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 45–46.

34. Franz Schurmann and Sandy Close, "The Emergence of Global City U.S.A.' *The Progressive,* January 1979, pp. 27–29.

35. Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 281–335; Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 100–134.

36. David Emmons, *Dearborn Park/South Loop New Town: A Project in the Chicago 21 Plan* (Chicago: Citizens Information Service, January 1977); Ada Louise Huxtable, "Is This the Last Chance for Battery Park City?" *New York Times,* December 9, 1979, s. 2, pp. 39–40.

37. Sharon Zukin, *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

38. Larry Bennett, "Beyond Urban Renewal: Chicago's North Loop Redevelopment Project," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 22 (December 1986): 252.

39. The principal Dearborn Park real estate advertisement running in Chicago daily newspapers in 1988 and 1989 identified the area as "a small town in the shadow of the Sears Tower."

40. John Kass, "New School Becoming a Source of Class Conflict," *Chicago Tribune,* May 3, 1987.

41. Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 27–49.

42. Zukin, *Loft Living,* pp. 58–81.

Chapter 3

1. Robert Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 182.

2. Charles L. Leven, James T. Little, Hugh O. Nourse, and R. B. Read, *Neighborhood Change: Lessons in the Dynamics of Change* (New York: Praeger Books, 1976), p. xii.

3. Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick W. McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), pp. 47–79.

4. Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Housing Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939).

5. Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods,* p. 120.

6. Wallace F. Smith, "A Theory of Filtering," in Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg, eds., *Readings in Urban Economics* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 193–203.

7. Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., *The Rehabilitation Planning Game* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973), pp. 1–5; John C. Weicher, *Urban Renewal: National Program for Local Problems* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974), pp. 10–11.

8. Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

9. Herbert J. Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal," *Commentary* 39 (April 1965): 29–37; Weicher, *Urban Renewal,* pp. 6–7.

10. Chester Hartman, "The Housing of Relocated Families,' in James Q. Wilson, ed., *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973), pp. 313–15; Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 961–83.

11. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 21–23, 257–69, 401–2.

12. Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 87–88.

13. Jacobs, *The Death and Life,* pp. 8–11.

14. Jacobs, *The Death and Life,* pp. 297–99. The BYNC is the subject of a full-scale study by Robert A. Slayton, *Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

15. Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizens Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); Robert Fisher, *Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984).

16. Sandra Perlman Schoenberg and Patricia L. Rosenbaum, *Neighborhoods That Work* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980), pp. 49–64.

17. Schoenberg and Rosenbaum, *Neighborhoods That Work,* pp. 65–83.

18. Richard P. Taub, D. Garth Taylor, and Jan D. Dunham, *Paths of Neighborhood Change: Race and Crime in Urban America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 186–88.

19. Philip L. Clay, *Neighborhood Renewal* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 11–34.

20. Clay, *Neighborhood Renewal,* pp. 35–55.

21. Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park are two of seventy-seven "Community Areas" recognized and statistically tracked by the City of Chicago. With a few adjustments, these neighborhoods can be traced to the 1920s, when Chicago School sociologists initially identified them. See Albert Hunter, *Symbolic Communities: The Persistence and Change of Chicago's Local Communities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

22. Evelyn M. Kitigawa and Karl E. Taeuber, eds., *Local Community Fact Book Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1960* (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, 1963), p. 29.

23. Howard M. Rieger, "Redeveloping Chicago's Lincoln Park Area" (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1969); Margaret S. Warner, "The Renovation of Lincoln Park: An Ecological Study of Neighborhood Change" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979).

24. City of Chicago, Department of Urban Renewal, *Lincoln Park General Neighborhood Renewal Plan,* 1962.

25. Peter H. Prugh, "Chicago Neighborhood Fights City Hall," *Wall Street Journal,* January 3, 1967, p. 16.

26. Warner, "The Renovation of Lincoln Park," p. 40; "Mid-North Garden Walk To Be Held Sunday, June 24,' *North Loop News,* June 14, 1962; Patricia Ansett, "Fullerton Area Gains in Fight," *Chicago Today,* January 20, 1972; "Lincoln Park Neighborhoods Win Landmark Status,' *Mid North News,* November, 1977.

27. Ed Hadfield, "Lincoln Park Groups Battle Speculators," *Chicago American,* September 2, 1963.

28. Larry Bennett, "Post-War Redevelopment in Chicago: The Declining Politics of Party and the Rise of Neighborhood Politics," in Gregory D. Squires, ed., *Unequal Partnerships: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Postwar America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989), pp. 161–77.

29. Rieger, "Redeveloping Chicago's Lincoln Park Area," pp. 89–92; Warner, "The Renovation of Lincoln Park," pp. 52–57; Carolyn Shojai, "Threats, Shouts at Lincoln Park Council Meeting," *Chicago Tribune,* May 25, 1969; Paul Gallowway, "Useful Lesson in the Rubble of 'People's Park'," *Chicago Sun-Times,* June 15, 1972.

30. City of Chicago, Department of Planning, *Chicago Statistical Abstract 1980,* 1983, pp. 1, 29. By the mid-1980s, property values in some portions of Lincoln Park far exceeded the neighborhood's 1980 median value. See Gary S. Meyers, "Old Town, Lincoln Park Can Thank Urban Renewal,' *Chicago Sun-Times,* July 10, 1988; and "DePaul's Affordable Alternative," *Chicago Sun-Times,* August 14, 1988.

31. Kelly Graettinger, "Owner Says USBG Is Working with Neighbors, But Problems Continue," *Inside Lincoln Park,* August 20, 1986; Larry Adams, "Neighbors, Bars Clash over Late-Night Licenses," *Inside Lincoln Park,* July 27, 1988; Ed Zotti, "Hot Times in Old Town: Democracy Runs Amok in Eugenie-Wells Controversy," *The Reader* (Chicago), March 9, 1984; Steve Kerch, "High-Rise Plan Stirs Near North Controversy," July 6, 1986; Ben Joravsky, "No Entry, Gentry: New Rules for Clybourn Corridor," *The Reader* (Chicago), September 2, 1988.

32. Kitigawa and Taeuber, *Local Community Fact Book, 1960,* p. 69.

33. Allan H. Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago: 1940–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 2–4.

34. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto,* pp. 120–24.

35. Kitigawa and Taeuber, *Local Community Fact Book, 1960,* p. 220.

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